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Abstract
In spite of the wave of privatization of the 1980s and 1990s, state ownership of enterprise
remains a very important part of the political economies of both developing and
industrialized nations. The conventional wisdom in industrial organization states that
public enterprises are inefficient; nevertheless, it says very little about the wide variation
among these firms both within and across countries. This dissertation provides a new
analytical framework to explain differences in behavior among state-owned enterprises.
New insights are possible thanks to the use of theoretical and methodological tools from
three different fields: political science, economics, and organizational sociology. State-
owned enterprise behavior is conceptualized as having two elements, business efficiency
and policy utilization, and it can largely be explained with only three variables: the
ideology of the government's ruling coalition, the degree of competition in the business
environment, and the level of cohesion of the company's managers. Subsequently, this
study applies the framework to explain the puzzling variation in the behavior of the
subsidiary companies of the Mexican state-owned petroleum enterprise, Petr6leos
Mexicanos (Pemex). Throughout the dissertation, statistical analysis and qualitative
research-including over 100 in-depth interviews conducted with government and oil
industry officials from Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, and the United States-provide
empirical support.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1. The Different Faces of Pemex
Upon arrival at the airport of Ciudad del Carmen, the city on the coast of the Gulf
of Mexico that houses the main regional headquarters of Pemex Exploration and
Production (PEP)-one of the subsidiaries of Mexico's state-owned oil company,
Petr6leos Mexicanos (Pemex)-I was greeted by an assistant manager. He had
instructions from the national headquarters in Mexico City to pick me up and make
arrangements for my visit. When we finally reached the Southwestern Offshore regional
offices of Pemex, I noticed that everything appeared to be run in a well organized
fashion. The building, while modest, was spotless. Employees worked in cubicles
surrounded by a handful of offices for the managers and assistant managers. The
computing equipment seemed relatively new and the staff all behaved professionally.
Most of the people had received their college degree in Mexico, and some of them had
master's degrees from the National University in Mexico City.
This did not resemble the Pemex generally portrayed in the popular press: the
paragon of a dysfunctional state-owned enterprise (Hoyos 2007; Luhnow 2005; Geri
Smith 2004; Economist 2009). It might not have gathered petroleum engineers seasoned
in international endeavors, but this was a place of order, not disorder. In fact, the
dynamics of the building were hardly different from those of the offices of private oil
companies like Shell or Anadarko that I had visited in Houston. "Pemex has very good
engineers, although they lag in technology and managerial expertise compared to the
international standards," told me an industry expert. 1
1 Author's interview with an industry expert (Int.Exp.#1) who requested anonymity in order to provide a
candid assessment of Pemex (June 2009).
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The following day, I met with PEP's two regional deputy directors in Ciudad del
Carmen. Their secretaries had called the previous evening to confirm the meetings, just
like they said they would. One of the managers, who had worked at Pemex for 28 years,
eagerly showed me the Emergency Response and Attention Center located in the top
floor of the building. Its main meeting room was surrounded by state-of-the-art screens
with real-time images of production platforms offshore. There was a carefully detailed
protocol stipulating what to do in the event of an emergency; it seemed like every detail
had been taken care of ahead of time. "I got the idea to create this Center after visiting the
BP facilities in Aberdeen," said the regional director proudly. "It proved to be very useful
last year when we had a tragic accident in one of the platforms." 2
My arrival would be very different at the Pemex refinery in Tula, Hidalgo, one of
the six production facilities of Pemex-Refining. Despite having an "oficio" with me, that
powerful document that transmits official orders down to the lower levels in the Mexican
government, meeting with the managers was more difficult. First, I was delayed nearly an
hour at the front entrance by the security employees arguing they were not notified of my
visit. Once inside, I noticed widespread disorganization. The manager of the refinery
refused to meet with me, asking me to see his assistant-manager, who immediately asked
me to go to his assistant. I then walked into an office with several men chatting around a
desk, eating breakfast, feet on the table. After cracking a joke at my expense, one of them
asked the lowest ranking assistant in the office to meet with me.
2 Author's interview with Javier Hinojosa, director of the Northeastern Offshore Region (PEP), Ciudad del
Carmen, Campeche, 25 June 2008. He was referring to an accident where the "Usumacinta" rig hit a
production platform in the Gulf of Mexico due to bad weather in October of 2007. Twenty-two oil workers
died.
As I sat in a small, dark cubicle at the end of the hallway and began talking to the
assistant's assistant-a polite chemical engineer who had just been promoted from the
technical ranks-I wondered why Pemex-Refming looked so different from Pemex
Exploration and Production. In part, I thought, it could be due to better public relations
awareness in Ciudad del Carmen. Yet, I wondered if the refinery management often
disregarded orders from Mexico City, just like they had done with my "oficio." 3 A former
Pemex executive had earlier explained to me that "when you deal with Pemex-Refming,
it is as if you went back in time to the Mexico of the 1970s."4 I then understood what he
meant.
Hours later, as I was leaving the refinery, I noticed that the security guard was
listening to classical music on his portable radio-by no means a common occurrence in
Mexico. I turned around to look at him-an unassuming young man in his late twenties
or early thirties-only to be further impressed by his choice of reading: Nietzsche's Thus
Spoke Zarathustra. I could not help but think that things in Pemex-Refining were upside
down. "A company named Solomon ranks the refineries worldwide," explained a former
top executive asked to compare Pemex-Refining to other refining companies around the
world, "and the refineries of Pemex are always at the bottom."5
3 When I returned to the Pemex national headquarters in Mexico City, the people I spoke with were
shocked than an "oficio" had not been respected. That is the weight that such documents carry in the
Mexican public sector. A top corporate official then explained: "Refinery managers see themselves as kings
in charge of their territory" (author's interview, 2 July 2008).
4 Author's interview with a former Pemex executive (Mex.Exp.#9) who requested anonymity in order to
rovide candid assessments of the subsidiary companies of Pemex, January 2008.
Author's interview with a former Pemex executive, July 2008. The Solomon rankings are not publicly
available, and each company only knows what its own ranking is. The poor performance of Pemex
refineries in the Solomon rankings has been independently corroborated by other top Pemex officials,
speaking under the condition of anonymity given the sensitive nature of the information (author's
interview, 20 October 2009).
When I arrived at the offices of Petrdleos Mexicanos Internacional (PMI) in
Mexico City, I could hardly believe that I was dealing with a Mexican state-owned
enterprise. PMI is the marketing and trading branch of Pemex, charged with selling
Mexican crude in foreign markets and importing and exporting gasoline and other refined
products. "PMI is the jewel of the crown," had told me one of the former Pemex
executives referred to above.6 Former Pemex CEO Ran'l Mufioz Leos would agree: "The
people who created PMI hit the nail on the head. They left a very valuable legacy for the
company." 7
After meeting with me, the director of PMI insisted on giving me a tour of their
offices. I noticed the fingerprint recognition device that unlocked the doors to every
room, the state-of-the-art computing system, and the rows of desks with staffers staring at
their screens and making rapid phone calls. In short, PMI was no different from the
trading floors of a New York City firm.
The director was proud of his recruiting efforts to gather a highly competent staff.
We walked by a woman "who just returned from studying oil market economics at
Oxford" and a man "that we persuaded to join us after he got his MBA at the Stem
business school in New York."8 Just like in PEP and in Pemex-Refining, all employees at
PMI were Mexican--except that, at PMI, graduate degrees abroad were common.9 Since
then, every time I have talked to an industry expert in Houston or elsewhere familiar with
6 Author's interview with a former Pemex executive (Mex.Exp.#9) who requested anonymity in order to
provide candid assessments of the subsidiary companies of Pemex, January 2008.
7 Author's interview with Ranl Mui'oz Leos, former Pemex director-general (2000-2004), Mexico City, 30
July 2008.
8 Author's interview with Rosendo Zambrano, Mexico City, 12 June 2008.
9 PMI has several "offices of representation" abroad, which do hire foreign staff. In the Mexico City
headquarters, however, all employees are local.
PMI I ask them how it compares to its counterparts in other private or state-owned firms.
The vast majority of them has said that it ranks among the best in the business.
PEP, Pemex Refining, and PMI are all subsidiary companies of Pemex, chartered
as separate state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that conduct arm's length transactions with
each other. A reasonable a priori expectation would be that all these state-owned
enterprises, when compared to their international counterparts in terms of their technical
or commercial performance, would rank at similar levels. In other words, the
presumption would be that the Exploration and Production (E&P) company would be
placed at a similar level among international E&P companies as the refining company
would among international refining units. After all, they all belong to the same parent
company, respond to the same ministries in the Mexican government, draw workers from
the same labor pool, and have a common chief executive officer (CEO) and corporate
headquarters.10
Yet, the observed outcome could not be farther from that expectation. PMI has
excelled in a way that PEP has not, and Pemex-Refining has consistently fared poorly in
technical performance vis-a-vis its international counterparts. A fourth subsidiary
company, Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemicals (henceforth, Pemex-Gas), charged with
gas processing, storage, and distribution, is often regarded by Mexican oil industry
experts as a highly efficient firm.
What accounts for the differences in behavior among these different state-owned
enterprises? Given that country- and parent company-level factors are constant, why do
some of these firms succeed in the Mexican oil industry while others fail? The culture of
10 In Pemex (as in other state-owned enterprises in Mexico), the chief executive officer of the company has
the title of director-general. Throughout the dissertation, the terms director-general and CEO are used
interchangeably.
the country cannot explain why there is variation across business units of Pemex, since
they are all subject to the same cultural constraints. The same can be said about the
political system, the level of rule of law, and the country's overall level of education and
development. This dissertation provides an answer to this puzzle. In so doing, it sheds
light on the factors that determine the wide variation in the behavior of state-owned
enterprises more generally.
2. A Framework to Analyze Differences in State Enterprise Behavior
In spite of the wave of privatization of the 1980s and 1990s, state ownership of
enterprise remains a very important part of the political economies of both developing
and industrialized nations. Moreover, state ownership tends to be concentrated in
"strategic" industries with high economic and political importance, such as oil and gas,
electricity, water distribution, transportation, health care, and banking (OECD 2005). The
conventional wisdom in industrial organization states that public enterprises are
inefficient; nevertheless, it says very little about the wide variation in the behavior of
these firms both within and across countries. Current frameworks, for example, do not
explain how come two state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the same country, responding
to the same ministry, drawing workers from the same labor pool and facing similar
regulatory regimes can perform very differently. Mere knowledge that private firms are
on average more efficient lacks relevance for countries politically unwilling or unable to
divest state firms. This shortcoming has serious practical implications, given the political
and economic ramifications of poor management of strategic sectors.
This dissertation provides a new analytical framework to explain differences in
behavior among state-owned enterprises (see Chapter 2 for a detailed explanation). Much
of the variation, it argues, can be captured with only three variables: the policy
preferences of the government's ruling coalition, the degree of competition in the
business environment of the firm, and the level of cohesion of the managerial staff. It
thus greatly advances the study of state firms by synthesizing the large number of
political, economic, and sociological factors affecting state-owned enterprises into a
tractable analytical method. In particular, it integrates-rather than neglect-the political
goals of these companies as well as the role of the organizational variables.
Subsequently, this study applies the framework to explain the large observed
variation in the behavior of the subsidiary companies of the Mexican state-owned
petroleum enterprise, Petr6leos Mexicanos (Pemex). It finds that the policy mandates of
the SOEs reflect the policy preferences of the government. For example, rightist
governments view them simply as instruments of fiscal policy, while leftist governments
also view them in terms of industrial promotion and income redistribution.
Second, firms that operate in competitive business environments are much more
efficient than those that do not. This finding stands in contradiction to the expectation of
both neoclassical economics and public choice theory. The former assumes that all firms
minimize costs regardless of the structure of the market, but the case of Pemex shows that
market competition matters greatly. Similarly, public choice arguments state that
government ownership and the concomitant rent-seeking behavior inevitably dooms state
companies to a path of mediocrity. Instead, this dissertation shows how an SOE in a
competitive environment can achieve high levels of efficiency.
Third, the level of cohesion of the managerial staff explains behavioral
differences among those companies that face similar levels of market competition. In the
subsidiaries of Pemex, team cohesion played a key role to create a sense of shared
responsibility for improving firm efficiency and enhanced the managers' ability to
overcome collective action problems and prevent the appointment of underqualified
politicians to top executive positions. Managerial cohesion, therefore, determines the
"porosity" of the state enterprise to political interference and helps shape the policy
orientation and operational capacity of the company.
3. The Methodological Approach
3.1 The Sub-Organizational Analytical Method
This dissertation employs a "sub-organizational analytical method" to study
differences in firm performance. The method can be understood as a variant of the sub-
national method commonly used in comparative politics (Snyder 2001). The latter's
guiding principle is the desire to achieve better causal inference in social science
research-both qualitative and quantitative-by holding as many confounding variables
as possible constant and allowing the independent variables of interest to vary. The
appeal of selecting cases subnationally is that many institutional, cultural, and
sociodemographic characteristics can vary considerably (and in unobservable ways)
across countries, but they are relatively fixed within them. Thus, the significance of a
particular independent variable can be observed more clearly and explained more
persuasively when the heterogeneity across cases has been addressed.
The sub-organizational approach follows the same logic, except that it selects
cases within an organization instead of within a country. In doing so, confounding
variables common to all sub-units of the organization are controlled and the role of
independent variables can be discerned with greater precision. The method is applicable
to the study of business enterprises, government agencies, and international
organizations, and it has its greatest potential in maximizing the comparability of cases
when the sub-units operate also in the same political administrative entity (country, state,
province, etc).
Scholars such as Trebat (1983), Ramamurti (1987), and Schneider (1991) have
adopted a related methodological approach to the study of state-owned enterprises,
although theirs fall more in the camp of the strict sub-national method. In all those
instances, different state-owned enterprises within one country are selected. However,
unlike the present study, they do not compare sub-units within each state-owned
enterprise."
In a manner analogous to the sub-national method, the sub-organizational method
is exposed to the criticism of "external validity" (Gerring 2007). Such concern is valid,
although it is worth emphasizing that the contribution of the sub-organizational method
lies in improving internal validity. Efforts should still be undertaken to determine
whether the findings are applicable to different settings, but researchers who apply the
method can be more certain that, at least in the particular context under study, the results
are more robust.
" A recent study that closely matches the sub-organizational approach pursued in this dissertation is Long's
(2009), who examines differences in organizational culture among different services in the United States
military. Holding country-level variables and profession-level variables constant, he is able to analyze the
impact of differences in group formation and socialization patterns across branches.
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3.2 Why Pemex?
This study applies the analytical framework outlined above to understand the
behavior of the subsidiary companies of the Mexican state-owned oil and gas company,
Petr6leos Mexicanos (Pemex). Several SOEs could have been rightly chosen for this
study, yet Pemex is particularly useful for a sub-organizational study of SOE behavior.
First, internally, it is clearly divided into sub-units-subsidiaries-that operate at arm's
length from each other with their own human resources, financial, and legal teams.
Second, there is variation in the business efficiency and policy mandates of each of these
sub-units. Third, as mentioned earlier, these differences cannot be readily explained by
country-level or parent company-level factors, since these are held constant across cases.
Pemex has additional advantages for a study on SOE behavior. For example, it
enables a better understanding of the petroleum industry, a highly relevant economic
sector. Second, within the industry, Pemex is one of the most important companies. In
fact, throughout most of the 2000s, it ranked third in total oil production worldwide, only
behind Saudi Aramco and the National Iranian Oil Company. Moreover, it has a
relatively large refining capacity, providing gasoline for approximately 2% of the world
market (Energy Intelligence 2007). Table 1.1 presents general operational statistics for
Pemex and other large oil companies around the world.
[TABLE 1.1 HERE]
Table 1.1 Major Oil Companies Around the World (2005 Operational Figures)
Company
BP
Chevron
ConocoPhillips
ENI
ExxonMobil
Gazprom
KPC
Lukoil
NIOC
NNPC
PDVSA
Pemex
Petrobras
PetroChina
Petronas
Repsol YPF
Rosneft
Saudi Aramco
Shell
Sinopec
Sonatrach
Statoil
Total
Country
UK
United States
United States
Italy
United States
Russia
Kuwait
Russia
Iran
Nigeria
Venezuela
Mexico
Brazil
China
Malaysia
Spain
Russia
Saudi Arabia
UK/Netherlands
China
Algeria
Norway
France
Oil
Percent Reserves
State- (Millions of
Owned Barrels)
- 9,565
- 8,146
- 6,189
30% 3,773
- 11,229
50.0023% 9,829
100% 101,500
- 16,114
100% 137,500
100% 21,540
100% 79,700
100% 13,671
32.20% 9,716
90% 11,962
100% 7,599
- 1,167
75.16% 8,404
100% 264,200
- 5,382
71.23% 3,294
100% 11,712
70.90% 1,761
- 6,592
Source: Energy Intelligence (2007), The Energy Intelligence 100: Ranking the World's Oil Companies, New York, NY.
Additionally, Pemex is more open than other firms in terms of granting access to
researchers to conduct interviews or consult its archives. The Mexican Freedom of
Information Law requires all government agencies to respond to citizens' requests for
information that has not been explicitly filed as classified. Unlike Middle Eastern or
Oil
Production
(Thousands
of Barrels
per Day)
2,562
1,701
1,447
1,111
2,523
811
2,643
1,819
4,049
1,548
2,650
3,710
1,847
2,270
715
531
1,498
11,035
2,093
764
1,934
704
1,621
Total
Refining
Capacity
(Thousands
of Barrels
per Day)
2,832
2,195
2,608
701
6,350
750
1,075
1,175
1,451
439
3,045
1,707
2,156
2,337
367
1,233
210
2,440
4,026
2,997
450
325
2,708
Total
Revenue
(Millions
$US)
251,003
189,481
166,327
92,471
338,992
63,824
40,250
56,215
45,500
30,650
85,700
87,262
59,510
67,427
44,282
63,056
25,305
180,000
306,731
101,652
41,200
60,792
151,902
Number of
Employees
96,200
59,695
35,600
72,258
83,700
397,000
20,340
150,000
115,000
15,000
35,000
139,171
54,000
439,220
33,682
35,909
70,000
51,843
110,000
364,528
49,869
25,644
112,877
private oil companies, which are known for their reluctance to provide information, 2
Pemex is relatively transparent. In terms of quantity and quality of data collected for a
study that requires inside access to the internal environment of a firm, this fact cannot be
underestimated.
3.3 Case Selection within Pemex
This study compares four out of the five major subsidiaries that perform oil and
gas activities in Pemex. These are Pemex Exploration and Production (PEP), Pemex
Refining, Pemex Gas, and Petr6leos Mexicanos Internacional (known as PMI). The fifth
subsidiary, Pemex Petrochemicals, was not selected following the advice of several
experts on the Mexican oil industry who noted that it was not truly comparable with the
others.13 Since the mid-1990s, the Mexican government has sought to sell Pemex
Petrochemicals and has provided extremely limited investment funding. Hence, given
those structural constraints, it would not necessarily be representative of state-owned
enterprise behavior in the Mexican oil industry.
All the subsidiaries were created as separate legal entities following a reform in
1992. Before that year, this study traces the behavior of their precursors, which were
divisions of Pemex that did not operate at arm's length from each other. A brief
description of their activities is provided below, and a more extensive discussion can be
found in the chapters that analyze the behavior of each one of them.
Pemex Exploration and Production (PEP) is in charge of finding oil and gas
reserves, drilling and developing wells, and managing the production of hydrocarbons. It
12 Marcel's (2006) study is a rare exception in terms of a high level of access to Middle Eastern oil
companies.
13 For example, author's interview with Bernardo de la Garza, Mexico City, 7 April 2008.
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is divided into four geographic regions in Mexico-South, North, Marine Southwest, and
Marine Northeast. Its activities are concentrated in the Mexico City headquarters and in
those areas with prolific oil reservoirs-in particular the Sound of Campeche. As of
2008, PEP had 50,273 employees. The dominant worker is the petroleum engineer. PEP
has no competitors in the Mexican market.
Pemex-Refining is in charge of processing crude oil into products suitable for
industrial and residential consumption. It operates six petroleum refineries scattered
throughout Mexico, in addition to the grid of pipelines and the domestic transportation,
storage, and distribution of products at the wholesale level. Accordingly, its activities are
scattered throughout the entire country. As of 2008, it had 45,510 employees. Front-line
workers at Pemex-Refming are mostly chemical engineers, although finding
professionals with different training is not uncommon.
As in the case of PEP, Mexican law also prohibits private participation in refining
and distribution activities. Thus, Pemex-Refining has a monopoly in the domestic market.
Pemex-Refining does not operate at the retail level; instead, the law allows private
owners to apply for concessions set up gasoline stations. Yet, they must buy their supply
from Pemex-Refining. The subsidiary is required to purchase its crude oil inputs from
PEP, regardless of whether these are optimal for its refineries. Unlike PEP, which sells to
other subsidiaries at market prices, Pemex-Refining only makes purchases at market
prices. Further downstream, prices are regulated by a government-run price board.
Pemex-Gas is in charge of processing the natural gas coming out of the wells so
that it is suitable for industrial and residential use. Additionally, Pemex Gas operates the
transportation, storage, and distribution of natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
in Mexico. As of 2008, it had 12,976 employees. Unlike the cases of PEP and Pemex-
Refining, Pemex-Gas faces partial market competition in some segments of its
operations. A legal reform enacted in 1995 liberalized the market for transportation,
storage, and distribution of gas and thus in principle allowed the private sector to operate
alongside Pemex. In practice, however, the entry of competitors into the industry has
been limited.
Petrdleos Mexicanos Internacional (PMI) is in charge of marketing Mexican
crude and refined products in international markets, as well as purchasing products for
import. Additionally, PMI engages in trading activities for refined products for hedging
purposes and oversees the international joint ventures of Pemex-with Shell at the Deer
Park, Texas refinery and with the Spanish company Repsol in the Petronor refinery.
PMI is the only entity allowed to export and import crude oil and petroleum
products. It has a considerably smaller workforce than the other subsidiaries; in 2008, it
only had 322 employees. PMI's personnel consists in economists, lawyers, and engineers.
Moreover, while approximately 80% of the staff of PEP, Pemex-Refining, and Pemex-
Gas is unionized, PMI does not have unionized employees. Yet, this was not always the
case-in the 1980s, the union voluntarily withdrew from PMI, a fact that is discussed in
Chapter 4. PMI's offices are more scattered geographically, since it has branches in the
United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, and the Netherlands. Its transactions with PEP
and Pemex Refining are made at market prices.
14 Unlike the other subsidiary companies, PMI was created in 1989. See Chapter 4 for a detailed overview
of the creation of PMI.
3.4 Determining the Behavior of Pemex
This study draws from an extensive array of primary materials. Academic
research on the Mexican oil industry virtually disappeared after the late 1980s, thus
leaving a void of secondary sources for most of the time period under consideration.
Fortunately, both current and former employees of the company granted me access to a
vast amount of information. Completion of the fieldwork entailed traveling to Mexico
several times over the course of two years, from 2008 to 2010. The majority of the field
research was completed in the months of June, July, and August of 2008, when I was
permitted full access to the Pemex headquarters in Mexico City and provided with a
cubicle in the area where the advisors to the CEO worked. The data gathered in Mexico
was complemented with information collected during research trips to Houston, Texas,
Washington, DC, and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Several interviews were also conducted by
telephone from Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Four complementary methods were used to assess the behavior of the different
subsidiaries of Pemex: in-depth interviews, archival research, statistical analyses, and
participant-observation. In this study, over 100 formal interviews (and dozens more of
informal ones) with Mexican and international oil industry experts were conducted to
determine how the subsidiaries of Pemex compared with their international counterparts.
Archival data consists primarily in minutes from Board of Directors meetings, old
statistical yearbooks, and company annual reports spanning from 1965 to 2009. Statistical
analyses complement expert opinion by providing a common metric applicable to several
companies. Data is generally scarce in the industry, and indicators are not always
comparable-for instance, the geology of a region, which is hard to quantify statistically,
may affect the productivity of a firm. Moreover, much of this analysis consists in
descriptive statistics, since sample sizes are too small to allow more sophisticated
techniques. However, whenever possible, statistical results add reliability to the views of
industry experts. Finally, first-hand analysis of the behavior of the personnel via
participant-observation provides information not available in other sources.15 In this
particular case, the research stay in the Pemex headquarters proved to be a remarkable
opportunity to observe a state-owned company "from within." Additionally, I had the
opportunity to travel to several of Pemex's industrial facilities to speak with the engineers
on the field.
4. Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the analytical
framework to study differences in state-owned enterprise behavior. It provides definitions
for the concepts used throughout the study, discusses prior research, and explains the
causal mechanisms at stake. It also applies the analytical framework in order to explain
cross-sectional differences in outcomes among the subsidiaries of Pemex. Chapter 3
offers an overview of Pemex as a state-owned enterprise. Its early history, current
organizational structure, and symbolism as an entity of Mexican nationalism are
explained in detail.
Once Pemex, the parent company, has been presented, the contemporary history
of each subsidiary is introduced. The longitudinal analysis is made with special emphasis
on tracing the effects of the independent variables of interest and on explaining the causal
15 Participant-observation consists in immersing the researcher in the day-to-day activities of the units
under study (Becker 1958; Fenno 1986; Glaser 1996).
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mechanisms at stake. Therefore, some aspects are left out in favor of others that add
clarity to the role played by the explanatory variables. Thus, Chapter 4 describes the
evolution of PMI, while Chapter 5 discusses the history of PEP. Chapter 6 is different in
that it analyzes two subsidiaries concurrently, Pemex-Refining and Pemex-Gas. This
method of presentation is employed in order to highlight the effect of the introduction of
market competition in an industry where previously it did not exist.
The concluding chapter revisits the analytical framework presented in Chapter 2,
but with the advantage that the reader is already familiar with the history of the
subsidiaries. Additionally, an argument is made to show how knowledge of the behavior
of the different subsidiaries allows understanding the parent company better than it would
have been possible otherwise. Finally, the conclusion discusses avenues for comparative
research and compares and contrasts Pemex to other state-owned enterprises around the
world.
CHAPTER 2
A FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE THE BEHAVIOR OF A
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE AND AN APPLICATION
1. What are state-owned enterprises?
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are government-administered commercial
entities. This generally refers to companies where the state owns 50 percent plus one of
the voting shares, although this need not be the case. On occasion, governments may
administer enterprises even though they are minority shareholders.
State ownership of enterprise has been a ubiquitous policy tool for both
developing and industrialized capitalist countries at least since the nineteenth century
(Aharoni 1986; Toninelli 2000). While the number of SOEs around the world decreased
considerably in the 1980s and 1990s, by no means did they disappear, even in
industrialized countries. In fact, of the fifty largest companies worldwide in terms of
revenues in 2009, eight were state-owned.16 In 2003, for example, the asset value of
SOEs as a percentage of GDP was over 50% in Finland and the Slovak Republic, and
between 15 % and 35 % in Sweden, Italy, France, South Korea, Turkey, the Czech
Republic, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. Similarly, in India, SOEs are key players in
the coal, petroleum refining, steel, and fertilizers industries and, in Russia, public firms
produce 20% of the country's industrial output (OECD 2005).
At the start of the 21st century, important companies across a variety of sectors are
owned by the state. For example, Codelco, the largest copper producer in the world
(Craze and Attwood 2009), is owned by the Chilean government, and the railroad
transportation company Amtrak is run by the government of the United States. Singapore
Airlines, ranked among the top 50 most admired companies worldwide by Fortune
16 See http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/globa15OO/2009, accessed on 30 June 2010.
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magazine (Fortune 2009), the Canadian Broadcasting Company, and Meridian Energy-
New Zealand's largest electricity company-are also all state owned. Finally, with
regards to petroleum-the most important commodity in the world in terms of value
traded and number of transactions (BBC News 2007; James L. Smith 2009)-state-
owned enterprises dominate the global supply of proven reserves. In fact, Exxon-Mobil,
BP, and Chevron, the three private oil companies with the largest reserves, rank 14th,
17th, and 19th worldwide in this regard, significantly behind their state-owned
counterparts (Baker Institute 2007).
Furthermore, state-owned enterprises may be on the rise around the world.'
Between 2006 and 2010, several governments nationalized or intended to nationalize
major private companies. The Venezuelan government, for example, expropriated
cement, steel, and banking firms,' 8 and the Bolivian government nationalized companies
in the oil and natural gas sectors.19 In Ukraine, in late 2008, Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko called for the nationalization of Prominvest, one of the country's largest
banks.2 Last but not least, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, the
United States government became the primary owner of the insurance company AIG and
the automobile company General Motors, and in 2009 it debated at length the possibility
of creating a government-run health insurance firm.
17 In academic circles, this resurgence of state ownership of industry-and of state intervention in economic
activity, more generally-has been associated with Karl Polanyi's (1944) interpretation of change in
political economy, which suggested that market liberalism and state intervention interacted in a pendulum-
like "double movement." While Polanyi was writing about the 19*' century historical processes, the rise,
demise, and potential resurgence of state-led capitalism seems to fit his theory of change.
18 See Alonso, Juan Francisco, "Chavez expropia la cementera Cemex tras fracasar en el intento de
comprarla" (El Pais, 20 August 2008, p. 9) and Romero, Simon, "Bank Tries to Allay Fears of Instability in
Venezuela" (The New York Times, 2 August 2008, p. 7).
19 See Schneyer, Josh, "Bolivia's Morales nationalizes energy firms; Move comes ahead of key referendum
in energy-rich eastern province" (Platt's Oilgram News, 5 May 2008, p. 7).
20 See "Two Ukrainian MPs take over troubled Prominvest" (Forbes.com, 11 November 2008, available
online at http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2008/11/11/afx5677416.html).
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2. The behavior of a state-owned enterprise
2.1 Basic Definition of SOE Behavior
The behavior of a state-owned enterprise can be broadly defined as the set of
activities carried out by the firm during a given period of time. For the purposes of this
study, SOE behavior is narrowed down to two elements: a "policy utilization" component
and a "business efficiency" component. This particular definition results from the fact
that SOEs are hybrid entities-part government agencies and part commercial
enterprises-and hence, in addition to their commercial mandate, they are often used as
instruments of public policy. Evidently, SOE behavior must be conceptualized and
assessed differently from that of the textbook profit-maximizing firm (Vernon and
Aharoni 1981)."
To clarify these two components, Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) distinction
between organizational "effectiveness" and "efficiency" is helpful. The policy orientation
of the firm can be associated with the concept of "effectiveness" of organizations.
Following Pfeffer and Salancik,
Organizational effectiveness is an external standard of how well an
organization is meeting the demands of the various groups and
organizations that are concerned with its activities... The effectiveness of
an organization is a sociopolitical question. (p. 11, emphasis in original.)
21 From a theoretical perspective, a private firm can serve several functions-legal, administrative,
productive, planning and allocative, etc.--(see, for example, Chandler 1992). State-owned enterprises
perform all these functions in their pursuit of their objectives.
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Effectiveness, however, is often a subjective standard that depends upon the particular
concerns and cost-benefit calculations of those who oversee the organization. For this
reason, the analysis of effectiveness in this study is descriptive, seeking to identify the
policy orientation of the SOE, rather than prescriptive.
The business component of behavior refers to the commercial activities proper of
a company, and it can be associated with the concept of "efficiency."22 Again, citing
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978),
Organizational efficiency is an internal standard of performance. The
question whether what is being done should be done is not posed, but only
how well it is being done. Efficiency is measured by the ratio of resources
utilized to output produced. (p. 11, emphasis in original.)
Aharoni (1986) puts the distinction between efficiency and effectiveness as follows:
"Efficiency measures gauge whether things are done right and effectiveness is purported
to measure whether the right things are done" (p. 170).
22 Neoclassical studies-which focus on exchange-usually assume that firms minimize costs and operate
at the technological frontier determined by a production function. Production-based theories, on the other
hand, allow for inefficiencies in the process of attaining the technological frontier and suggest that social
losses due to allocative inefficiencies can be trifle compared to productive inefficiencies. Leibenstein
(1966) coined the term "X-Inefficiency" to refer to the failure to reach the production frontier, and Jones
and Papanek (1983) argue that X-Inefficiency is rather feasible in the case of state-owned enterprises.
Following Gillis (1982), this dissertation allows for both productive and commercial inefficiencies to take
place, and makes an explicit distinction between them to make the analysis more clear. In all likelihood,
however, technical and commercial efficiency are interdependent.
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2.2 Varieties of State-Owned Enterprise Behavior
State-owned enterprises around the world vary widely both in terms of their
business efficiency and their policy utilization. Emphasis on privatization has led some
authors to neglect that some SOEs have attained a high level of business efficiency or
have been very effective instruments of policy.23 This section lists just a few examples to
illustrate the divergence in behavior that has been observed among SOEs.
In terms of business efficiency, Ramamurti (1987), for example, analyzed the
financial record of SOEs in high-technology industries in Brazil and India and found
wide disparities within each country. In the oil industry, Brazil's Petrobras is often
ranked as one of the top performing national oil companies. Yet, within Petrobras, stark
differences exist between its deepwater exploration and production activities-
unequivocally rated as world class by industry experts25-and its petroleum refining
subsidiary.26 Similarly, Venezuela's state-owned oil company, Petr6leos de Venezuela
(PDVSA), is today considered to have lost its luster of the 1980s and 1990s (Mares and
Altamirano 2007)-yet, its refining company, Citgo, has remained as one of the top firms
in the United States market (Francisco Flores-Macias 2009).
The variation in policy mandates is similarly extensive. This is hardly surprising,
since the creation of an SOE in capitalist economies has been justified in a variety of
ways. From a national security standpoint, the objective of SOEs can be to provide goods
23 For a study that emphasizes the need to privatize rather than alternatives to reform SOEs within a state
ownership regime, see the World Bank's report Bureaucrats in Business (1995).
24 Variation in state-owned enterprise behavior is analogous to variation across government-run entities.
Wilson (1989), for example, points out the need to explain the striking differences in behavior between
federal prisons, schools, etc.
25 Author's interview with Richard Sears, former vicepresident for deepwater exploration and production at
Royal Dutch/Shell, 27 August 2009. This view has been corroborated independently by top executives at
rivate oil companies such as Total and Anadarko.
6 Author's interview with a Brazilian oil industry expert who requested who requested anonymity, May
2010.
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and services "that cannot be cut off without danger of total and partial collapse of an
economy" (B6s 1986). Due to the strategic importance of many of these industries,
control over public companies can also be associated with questions of economic and
political power-providing leverage in negotiations between states and between states
and multinational corporations (Richard P. Nielsen 1982). From a developmental
perspective, SOEs can provide a "helping hand" for the private economy, creating
forward and backward linkages in order to break industrialization bottlenecks (Jones and
Papanek 1983; Hirschman 1958). The idea is that public enterprises create demand for
intermediate goods produced by domestic firms and can also supply other companies at
subsidized prices. From a social security standpoint, SOEs can afford the luxury of not
firing workers during economic recessions, thus mitigating the impact of business cycles
via defacto unemployment insurance. Traditional sectors for SOEs are public utilities,
coal, oil, steel, banking, education, transportation, and healthcare.
The energy company Gazprom, for instance, has been considered by many to
serve as a powerful geoeconomic instrument for the Russian state (Larsson 2006;
Goldman 2008).27 The Venezuelan oil company, PDVSA, has been steered by the
government of President Hugo Chavez towards the implementation of "missions" for the
economic development of low-income rural areas (Mares and Altamirano 2007). In the
services sector, the Indian transportation company, Indian Railways, has been geared at
least in part towards maintaining high employment, but it has managed to do so while
27 "Russia has not hesitated in the past," writes Goldman (2008), "to cut off the flow of both petroleum and
gas to strengthen its side of a political dispute, a practice it inherited from its forebears in the Soviet
Union's Ministry of the Gas Industry and Ministry of the Petroleum Industry" (p. 3). Yet, Abdelal
(Emmons 2009) disagrees with this interpretation.
staying profitable (Musacchio and Francisco Flores-Macias 2009). 28 Other transportation-
sector SOEs have consistently pursued income redistribution policies by subsidizing low-
income urban dwellers. Similar examples abound.
In the case of the subsidiary companies of Pemex, the variation in business
efficiency is particularly striking given the number of characteristics that are common to
all. Elsewhere in Mexico, one electricity SOE, Comisidn Federal de Electricidad (CFE),
was generally regarded as more technically competent and less corrupt than another, the
now defunct Luz y Fuerza del Centro. 29 And within CFE, industry experts regard the
subdivision CFE-Generation as much more efficient than CFE-Distribution. As one
international expert familiar with the company said, "CFE-Generation is an 8 in a ten-
point scale; CFE-Distribution is in the dark ages." 30
Within Pemex, the different business units have also pursued multiple policy
mandates at different points in time. Thus, at one point the trading and commercialization
branch-the precursor of PMI-ventured into the negotiation of economic assistance
treaties with developed nations in exchange for oil supply contracts, although this
practice was abandoned in the 1980s (Snoeck 1988). Some observers believe that, during
the presidential administration of Vicente Fox (2000-2006), Pemex-Refining aimed to
enhance the political standing of the president's National Action Party (PAN) in the
eastern state of Veracruz. Moreover, in the early 2000s, Pemex Refining served as an
28 As of 2005, with 1.6 million employees, Indian Railways was the largest commercial employer in the
world (OECD 2005).
29 For example, according to Chac6n (2008), in 2007 the average time to connect a new CFE user to the
grid was one day, while for Luz y Fuerza users it was 6 days. Similarly, the average time of interrupted
service at CFE was 100 minutes per user per year, while for Luzy Fuerza it was 114.8.30 Author's interview with an industry expert who requested anonymity, April 2009.
31 Several Pemex employees referred to "horror stories" regarding the activities of Pemex Refining during
those years. A former Pemex top executive interviewed for this study argued that the director of Pemex
Refining was actively utilizing the company to assist a potential run for governor of Veracruz. See also
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instrument of fiscal policy, whereas in the 1970s and early 1980s it was a tool to promote
regional development.
2.3 Unexplained Variation of SOE Behavior
Much of the empirical research in economics dealing with SOEs has focused on
the privatization debate, concluding that private enterprises are more efficient than state
firms (Boardman and Vining 1989; Dewenter and Malatesta 2001; Megginson and Netter
2001; Sheshinski and L6pez-Calva 2003; La Porta and L6pez-de-Silanes 1999).32
However, this finding is largely unhelpful to understand the wide variation within the
subgroup of SOEs. Given that governments around the world continue to retain
ownership of certain industrial enterprises, how to account for the fact that some operate
at world-class levels of efficiency while others become highly inefficient?
Differences in efficiency between state-owned enterprises of radically different
countries may be readily accountable by cultural or economic factors. For example,
Norway's state-owned oil company-StatoilHydro-is considered much more efficient
than its counterpart in Nigeria (Eller, Hartley, and Medlock 2007). While both SOEs face
similar challenges-primarily overseeing the production of crude oil in inhospitable
offshore environments-the Nigerian National Oil Company suffers from technological
backwardness and corruption (Nwokeji 2007), both of which are absent in Norway
(Gordon and Stenvoll 2007). Yet, many social and political indicators already suggest
that any government entity in Norway would be better run than in Nigeria. Norway's per
Cruz Serrano, Nod, "Bueno Torio deja Pemex, en medio de indagaci6n" (El Universal, 16 December
2005).
32 Although see Caves and Christensen (1980) and Bartel and Harrison (2005) for alternative findings.
Laffont and Tirole (1993) readily acknowledge that it is not theoretically possible, a priori, to determine
whether state-owned enterprises are intrinsically less efficient than private firms.
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capita income in 2007 was $49,359, while Nigeria's was $1,859." Similarly, Norway
ranked #9 in the "Corruption Perceptions Index" published by Transparency
International, ahead of countries like the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, and the
United States, while Nigeria ranked #147 out of 179.34 In an index of the level of political
and civil liberties, published by Freedom House, Norway scored an average of 1
(highest), while Nigeria scored an average of 4 (where 7 is the lowest).35 Yet, little has
been said about differences among SOEs operating under very similar circumstances.
Furthermore, there is a conspicuous lack of a broad-based theoretical
understanding of state-owned enterprises that conceptualizes them as bureaucratic
organizations embedded in the intersection of political and economic decision-making.
There is extensive theoretical and empirical research on the efficiency of public
enterprises, but the findings are partial for two main reasons. First, they generally shirk at
the task of analyzing the policy goals of the firms. How these goals arise in the political
domain, how they are implemented, and how they shape firm behavior are central issues,
yet existing analytical frameworks do not account for them.
Second, much of the published literature treats the public enterprise like a "black
box" and does not address organizational variables. Organizational sociologists and, to a
lesser extent, political scientists have analyzed the internal workings of bureaucratic
organizations and found them to be important drivers of behavioral differences. At least
since the works of Kaufman (1960), Crozier (1964), and Wilson (1968), the role of
33 In constant 2005 dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parity (source: World Development Indicators,
World Bank).
34 Source: Transparency International, available online at
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveysindices/cpi/2007; accessed on 8 September 2009.
35 Source: Freedom House, available online at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page =366&year=2007; accessed on 8 September 2009.
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organizational culture has been shown to explain behavioral differences among
government agencies that at the outset appear similar. Extending their findings to the
study of public enterprises is a natural step forward.36
3. Two Dependent Variables: Unpacking the Concept of SOE Behavior
3.1 The Relationship between the Dependent Variables
This study explicitly considers two jointly dependent variables-business
efficiency and policy utilization-and an intermediate, "linking" variable that serves as a
bridge between them. This approach seeks to provide a framework for the analysis of
SOE behavior that acknowledges both the fact that government firms pursue commercial
and policy objectives and that these goals often entail tradeoffs. The result is a more
realistic, yet still manageable view of the activities of SOEs than that presented in prior
research.
Early scholars of public enterprise recognized the multiplicity of objectives
among SOEs and the potential tradeoffs among business efficiency and policy mandates
(Vernon and Aharoni 1981). In spite of this, the academic literature on privatization in
the 1990s focused almost exclusively on the business efficiency of government firms
relative to their private counterparts (Megginson and Netter 2001). The findings of this
36 Furthermore, little has been written on the role of the industrial activity in shaping governmental
mandates and SOE efficiency. A vast literature in industrial economics analyzes industrial sectors under the
structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm (Chamberlin 1939; Edward S. Mason 1939; Grether
1970). The market structure of a particular industry, according to this view, shapes the conduct of the
individual firns. The primary determinants of the structure of the market are the size of the firms, the
barriers for the entry of new firms into the industry, and the degree of differentiation among the products of
the companies (Grether 1970). Nevertheless, as Porter (1979) points out, this framework assumes a high
degree of homogeneity among firms that is not warranted by empirical observation. More importantly for
our purposes, the S-C-P paradigm does not allow for the examination of sociological outcomes that result
from the industrial activity itself. Similarly, it does not explore whether certain industrial activities transmit
more clear signals of performance to those in charge of oversight or whether or not they create more rent-
seeking opportunities.
method underscored the potential losses in efficiency of state firms from a partial
equilibrium framework. The approach is sensible given that efficiency is an important
consideration and, perhaps more importantly, it can be quantified more easily. Yet, the
understanding of the policy utilization of SOEs and of the relationship between their
policy role and their business efficiency was seldom pursued.
The framework advanced here posits that the outcomes of the SOE's business
efficiency and policy utilization are determined simultaneously. The connection between
the two dependent variables is provided by an intermediate, "linking" variable that
measures the degree to which the government is able to intervene in the internal
operations of the SOE and utilize it as an instrument of public policy. The variable
includes those government actions that are not explicitly intended to enhance the business
efficiency of the company, instead seeking to achieve goals on a public policy space
distinct from the strictly productive and commercial aspects of the SOE. In other words,
it makes an assessment of government action that is not aligned with the business
objectives of the firm. For this reason, this variable is labeled "non-aligned government
intervention" (or NAGI). 38
The two dependent variables are affected by three primary explanatory variables:
market competition, managerial cohesion, and government ideology. The basic insight is
that these factors affect business efficiency and policy utilization both directly and
indirectly through their effect on NAGI. Definitions for the dependent, explanatory, and
linking variables are provided in the following pages. Figure 2.1 presents a schematic
37 That is, analyzing the economic sector where the SOE operates and not the economy as a whole.
38 This term serves to underscore that governments can and occasionally do implement policies than
enhance the business efficiency of the firm.
representation of the framework that helps explain the outcomes in the two dependent
variables.
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Figure 2.1 A framework to Analyze State-Owned Enterprise Behavior
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3.2 Definition of Business Efficiency
At a fundamental level, business efficiency occurs when the firm is able to
accomplish its tasks well. From a static perspective, this may mean either achieving a
given level of production with the minimum amount of resources possible or maximizing
production given a set amount of inputs. From a dynamic view, it means innovating and
absorbing others' innovation in order to remain at the frontier of production possibilities.
For simplicity, these two processes can be conceptualized simply as productivity and
innovation.
Productivity and innovation, the components of business efficiency, are easy to
conceptualize but difficult to measure. For example, in the industrial organization
literature, scholars have followed several different approaches to measure efficiency, and
comparisons of labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) growth are common
approaches to the study of the business efficiency of a firm (La Porta and L6pez-de-
Silanes 1999; Bartel and Harrison 2005; Nickell 1996; Ehrlich et al. 1994). In technical
terms, TFP growth can be understood as "the ability to produce more output from the
same inputs, which can be thought of as a shift in the production function" (Jorgenson,
Ho, and Stiroh 2005, p. 292). Its main appeal rests in its construct validity (that is, it
measures production given a set level of inputs) and in its widespread use in industrial
organization to gauge relative firm performance.
However, there are several shortcomings with TFP approaches. First, errors in
measurement are highly problematic (Coelli et al. 2005). Since it is estimated as a
residual, it is difficult to disentangle actual efficiency improvements from simple errors
in the data. Second, in some instances it is not readily clear how to measure the inputs or
outputs for the TFP estimation.39 In some applications, this may not be a problem; but if
the purpose of the analysis is to examine the effect of a particular managerial decision,
TFP is unlikely to yield clear results. Third, precise estimation of TFP depends on
choosing the correct production function. If this function is unknown by the social
39 Inputs are difficult to measure in extractive industries, where the valuation of the input in the reservoir is
not clearly defined. Outputs are difficult to determine in the services industries.
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scientist, the result may be biased (Coelli et al. 2005). Alternative ways to measure
productive efficiency are not necessarily better. The so called "frontier approaches" such
as data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis can also render highly
biased estimates in the presence of measurement error.
Another popular way to measure efficiency is by analyzing earnings, although
even in this case there are a variety of different variables that can be employed. Thus,
sales, net earnings, earnings before interest and taxes, return on assets, and return on
equity have all appeared in the literature (Dewenter and Malatesta 2001; Omran 2004). A
common concern with earnings estimates is that they are dependent on the fluctuations of
the differentials between product prices and factor prices. Moreover, in instances when
prices or rates of return are regulated, earnings data may also be a biased measure of
efficiency.
The direct measurement of successful innovation activity is also challenging, as
innovative activity is difficult to quantify.40 A popular method in industrial organization
studies consists in comparing the number of patents obtained by a firm (Griliches 1995).
While not void of information, this approach is susceptible to criticism. First, this method
does not assess the relative worth of an innovation. Some patents are given to paradigm-
shifting inventions that transform the outlook of an industry, while others simply provide
the most marginal of improvements. Second, actually assessing the value of an
innovation is a subjective process that demands time and is feasible only for a handful of
innovations (Patel and Pavitt 1995). Finally, much innovative activity centers on
improving processes rather than products (Stoneman 1995). Process innovation is more
* As opposed to TFP growth, which is an indirect method to measure innovation.
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difficult to observe by an outside researcher and its impact on productivity more difficult
to quantify.
These concerns with the operationalization and measurement of the two
components of business efficiency lead to the following conclusions. First, in an
imperfect world with measurement error problems, no single method tracks business
efficiency without problems. Second, alternative analytical approaches are necessary in
instances where data is not readily available. The use of qualitative information and
expert opinion, in some instances, may be a helpful approach to obtain robust results.
In this dissertation, statistics are employed whenever they are available and
comparisons are sensible. Otherwise, expert opinion is presented in order to gauge the
relative ranking of firms in terms of their business efficiency-even if numerical
estimates of their productivity cannot be obtained. In the case of innovations, in-depth
interviews with industry observers are the preferred method to determine their impact.
3.3 Definition of Policy Utilization
For analytical purposes, the variable "policy utilization" is disaggregated into two
components. First, "the direction of policy" describes what policy mandate is given to the
SOE. Governments may pursue a wide range of policy objectives with their SOEs, such
as fiscal revenue maximization, industrial promotion, income redistribution (including de
facto unemployment insurance), the enhancement of geopolitical power, and the
allocation of political patronage. These policies may be pursued simultaneously, and they
are seldom explicitly stated by governments.
41 "It has been possible," writes Vernon (1981), "for the managers of state-owned enterprises to argue that
any disappointing financial performance was the result of costly policies and programmes, mandated by
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This study focuses on the explanation of one type of policy that can be pursued by
SOEs-industrial policy. Most SOEs are used as instruments of fiscal policy and will be
seen as natural tools for political patronage. However, an industrial policy orientation is a
defining characteristic. Other policy mandates pursued are acknowledged but no explicit
attempt is made to determine why a particular government seeks to implement them.
In the words of Katzenstein (1985), industrial policy refers to measures whose
purpose is "to influence industrial competitiveness and through it achieve objectives such
as employment, investment, growth, or an improved balance of payments" (p. 25). The
idea consists in the view that the state ought to correct market failures and actively pursue
economic development by injecting dynamism into industrial activity. As Rodrik (2004)
explains, few recommend today the type of industrial policy of the 1950s and 1960s, but
the claim that the state can alter the structure of the economy in beneficial ways has
hardly disappeared. Actual implementation varies and may include creating backward
and forward linkages throughout the economy, promoting industrial growth in
underdeveloped regions, safeguarding industrial relations, and creating employment
opportunities.
The second component of policy utilization is the "strength of the policy
mandate." Casual observation of government policy suggests that policy preferences exist
in a continuum. For example, one government may endorse industrial policy, but only
moderately, while another one may prefer a more extreme form. This element of policy
utilization addresses that distinction.
their government masters, which were intended as a contribution to social welfare" (p. 17). In the same
vein, Raiffa (1980) writes that "a multiplicity of vague objectives serves to protect the inefficient" (p. 57).
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Furthermore, it is important to clarify that the "strength of the policy mandate" is
different from the actual strength of the policy implementation observed in practice. The
former is the a priori preference of the government. The latter, on the other hand, is what
is executed by the SOE after other variables have come into play.
The measurement of policy utilization is perhaps more challenging than business
efficiency, and it is further obfuscated when the same government pursues apparently
conflicting mandates simultaneously. Reliance on in-depth interviews and on secondary
sources is necessary to describe the policy utilization of the SOEs, and it is generally
justified in relative terms-that is, comparing one subsidiary against another one or one
time period against another.
Overall, the following outcomes are used. Direction of policy is described as
"industrial policy" or "no industrial policy." Strength of policy is described as "strong"
and "weak." It should be clear, however, that this typology is a purposeful simplification
for ease of analysis. Evidently, the policy dimension is more complicated and the
discussion that follows later in the dissertation is mindful of that.
3.4 The Linking Variable: Non-Aligned Government Intervention
In the analytical framework, the jointly dependent variables "business efficiency"
and "policy utilization" are linked by an "intermediate" variable: the degree of non-
aligned government intervention (NAGI). The level of NAGI is different from the
direction of the policy mandate, since it measures the extent to which the government is
actually able to intervene in the internal operations of the firm and not what is the
preferred policy orientation of the government in an abstract policy space. A higher level
of NAGI decreases the business efficiency of the state-owned enterprise while increasing
the actual strength of its policy utilization.
A given level of NAGI can be understood as the combination of two variables: (i)
the willingness of the government to intervene in the internal operations of the company
and (ii) its ability to do so. Both of these are necessary, to some degree, for NAGI to
occur. If either of these variables is low, then the level of NAGI is also likely to be low.
Non-aligned government intervention can take place in several ways. It can occur
through the appointment of politicians to top executive positions in the company. These
politicians, for ideological or pragmatic reasons, may adopt government policies with
much greater strength than the managers who are brought from within the firm.
Additionally, NAGI can occur through regulatory or budgetary decisions made outside
the realm of the SOE. Regulations approved by other government agencies or by
legislatures can constrain managerial actions even if the top executive positions are filled
with career company professionals. Similarly, the government can add strength to a
policy orientation depending on the allocation of the company's budget. The degree of
intervention can increase when the government has the capacity to provide more
resources to certain areas or by refusing to fund projects that are not to the politicians'
liking.
Business efficiency is not a direct result of the policy orientation, but rather of the
degree of NAGI. A government that pursues industrial policy through its SOE may not be
able to affect the firm's productivity if the level of NAGI is low. By contrast, with a high
NAGI, business efficiency may suffer even in the absence of industrial policy. In those
instances, fiscal policy or patronage considerations may be hurting the operations of the
firm.
Conceptually, the degree of NAGI is a continuous variable. In practice, however,
it is easier to measure it qualitatively (low, medium, high) and in comparison to other
cases. Some elements of NAGI can be quantified, such as the number of politicians
appointed to executive positions. In their book on legislative control of bureaucratic
agencies, Huber and Shipan (2002) measure the length of the statute creating a
government agency in order to estimate its degree of operational autonomy. A similar
approach could be pursued in the case of SOEs, although in a small sample these
quantitative approaches may not be able to capture qualitative differences as well as an
actual close reading of the statutes or of the impact of politicians at the helm of the
companies.
4. The Analytical Framework: Explaining the Behavior of SOEs
The analytical framework (displayed in Figure 2.1) posits several claims
regarding the business efficiency and the policy utilization of the company. First, both are
intrinsic elements of the concept of state-owned enterprise behavior. Second, they are
both determined jointly in part due to the effect of the degree of non-aligned government
intervention in the company. Third, business efficiency and policy utilization are also
affected by other explanatory variables. This section discusses the relationship among the
variables and explains the theoretical underpinnings of the causal mechanisms at stake.
The framework emphasizes six "independent" or explanatory variables. Of these,
three are of primary importance and three are "auxiliary" or of secondary importance.
The primary variables are the level of market competition in the business environment of
the SOE, the level of cohesion among the managers of the company, and the political
ideology of the government. The auxiliary variables are whether or not the government
faces a context of severe fiscal jeopardy, the presence of persons or institutions in the
political system that can effectively alter the policy mandate coming from the
government (i.e., veto players), and the skill of individual managers to take advantage of
structural opportunities and constraints.
For heuristic purposes, the framework is presented as a system of equations
(without making assumptions regarding the functional specification of each). The two
jointly dependent variables are the following:
Business Efficiency =f (Competition, Managerial Ability and Cohesion, NAGI) + E (1)
Policy Utilization =f (Ideology, NAGI) + E (2)
As explained above, NAGI can be disaggregated into two components:
NAGI = Willingness to Intervene + Ability to Intervene (3)
where,
Willingness to Intervene =f (Ideology, Competition, State Jeopardy) + c (4)
Ability to Intervene =f (Managerial Cohesion, Veto Players) + e (5)
Put in words, the system of equations states the following. Business efficiency is a
function of the degree of market competition, managerial ability, the cohesion of the
managers, and the degree of non-aligned government intervention or NAGI. The first
three variables enter with a positive sign-that is, they increase business efficiency. The
level of NAGI, however, has an expected negative sign. In the case of policy utilization,
the ideology of the government has a positive sign-meaning the desire to use industrial
policy-as well as the level of NAGI, which also increases the actual policy utilization of
the company.
In the case of NAGI, the willingness to intervene is a function of the desired
strength of policy utilization, the degree of market competition, and the existence of
fiscal jeopardy. Strength enters the equation with a positive sign, while competition and
fiscal jeopardy decrease the government's willingness to intervene inside the company.
The government's ability to intervene, on the other hand, is constrained by the level of
managerial cohesion and the number and effectiveness of veto players in the political
system.
The outcomes of non-aligned government intervention can be described as
follows. For a fixed level of government ideology, fiscal jeopardy, and veto players, the
level of distortionary government intervention is low if market competition and
managerial cohesion are low and it is high if both explanatory variables are high. If
cohesion is high but competition is low or viceversa, NAGI will be medium. Table 2.1
portrays this relationship.
[TABLE 2.1 HERE]
Table 2.1 Setting the Level of Non-Aligned
intervention
Market Competition
C
0
Low
0
~g High
Table 2.2 describes the relationship, in terms of business efficiency, between
market competition and a managerial cohesion in a public enterprise. Holding other
variables constant, low levels of competition and cohesion greatly increase the
probability of inefficient behavior. In these instances, the operation of a state-owned
enterprise is more similar to that of a government agency. Conversely, high levels lead to
efficiency in the business performance of the firm, which behaves more like a
commercial enterprise. Low market competition with high specialization and high market
competition with low specialization are likely to lead to moderate levels of efficiency, as
the absence of signals of performance or capacity and solidarity prevents the firm from
reaching its full potential. In these "mixed" cases, market competition provides a stimulus
for an upward trend, while cohesion without competition leads to a downward trajectory.
Without competition, the managers lack incentives to modernize the company as quickly
as their counterparts in competitive environments.
[TABLE 2.2 HERE]
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Low High
High Medium
Medium Low
Table 2.2 Typology of SOE Business Efficiency
r_
0
i3 Low
-c
0
c High
Market Competition
Low High
Inefficient Moderate
(Behaves like Efficiency,
Government trending
Agency) upward
Moderate Efficient
Efficiency, (Behaves like
trending Commercial
downward Enterprise)
Holding market competition and managerial cohesion constant, the effect of the
secondary variables-veto players and state jeopardy-on the level of NAGI can be
described by the relationship in Table 2.3. These differences are "second-order effects,"
small compared to the effect of the primary variables. Yet, they allow for an
understanding of SOE behavior in a more nuanced manner. These variables do not affect
business efficiency independently from their effect on the level of NAGI-and thus they
are excluded from those equations.
[TABLE 2.3 HERE]
The following paragraphs describe in greater detail the definition and causal
mechanisms of the explanatory variables. In each case, a brief review of the literature is
combined with an account of the expected effect on SOE behavior. The chapter
concludes with a brief application of how the framework affects the subsidiaries of
Pemex, although the more detailed explanation is presented in Chapters 4 through 6.
Table 2.3 Setting the Level of Non-Aligned
Intervention
Veto Points
Low High
{ Low High Medium
0J
0
M High Medium Low
5. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Explanatory Framework
5.1 The Role of Market Competition
Competition exists as long as the entry of rival companies in the market is not
legally forbidden. If a monopoly is granted by statute to a state-owned enterprise, by
definition the level of market competition is zero. This has been historically the situation
of PEP and Pemex-Refining. Yet, when competition does exist, there can be different
degrees. In this dissertation, at least three additional scenarios are identified. If entry of
rivals is very difficult due to high capital costs or risks to investment, competition is low.
This has been the context of Pemex-Gas since 1995. If several players exist in the market,
yet demand for their goods is so high that, in practice, companies do not face any
difficulty to sell their products, competition is low as well. This has been the market
environment of PMI at some points in its history. Finally, if several players exist in the
market and the level of demand is such that a significant effort is required to find and
maintain customers, then market competition is high. The only subsidiary of Pemex that
has been in this situation has been PMI during some periods.
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Since market competition plays a major role in this study, it is worth defining the
concept in greater detail. In the words of Paul J. McNulty, a scholar of the meaning of
competition in the writings of Adam Smith and other classical economists, "the essence
of [competitive] behavior [is] the active effort to undersell one's rival in the market"
(1967). Put differently, under market competition, supply chains are fixed and in order to
sell an additional unit, one firm must displace another one's output by providing better
quality or a lower price. Moreover, competition demands the effort to undersell-if no
such behavior exists, even in the presence of multiple firms, then competitive forces are
low. Finally, competition is not restricted to the product market, but can also occur in the
capital and labor markets.
Several scholars have argued that state firms can be as efficient as private ones
when they operate in a competitive product market (Caves and Christensen 1980; Teeples
and Glyer 1987; Bartel and Harrison 2005).42 Moreover, state enterprise efficiency is
improved, according to Gupta (2005), after the emission of shares in a stock market.
Besides raising capital, the so called "partial privatization" means that the company is
participating in a competitive capital market where investors can buy and sell shares
based on performance evaluations (or, in the jargon of financial economics, the capital
market is "monitoring" the company).43
42 Other authors disagree, claiming that SOEs are always less efficient, even under market competition
(Boardman and Vining 1989; Ehrlich et al. 1994; Vining and Boardman 1992). Ramamurti,(1987b), in his
study of Brazilian and Indian high technology SOEs, argues that the more protected companies were the
ones that managed to develop better. It is feasible that an "infant-industry" logic could apply for public
enterprises in competitive sectors, since they would otherwise have greater difficulty surviving upon their
creation.
4 The argument is that, unlike private shareholders, the ultimate owners of an SOE-the taxpayers-
cannot sell their stake in the company if it is underperforming. The consequence is a lack of interest in
monitoring the state-owned enterprise. This concept is analogous to that of the role of "exit" in
Hirschman's (1970) classic work. Yet, others disagree with this interpretation, suggesting that participation
in the stock market may push the management towards short-sighted activities to maximize the value of the
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However, studies of privatization have not delved into the causal mechanisms that
could propel an SOE in a competitive market to behave more efficiency. The level of
competition in the business environment influences SOE behavior to the extent that it
provides signals of performance to measure if goals are being met. Given the reluctance
of public enterprises to fire workers and the fact that politicians have multiple concerns-
of which SOE behavior is only a part-the absence of signals of performance provides
incentives not to pay attention to the optimization of SOE behavior.44
From the perspective of the managers of the firm, the signals of performance
provide "pressures to change," since the company must adjust to changing industry
conditions and keep their rivals at bay. Furthermore, competition also diminishes non-
aligned government intervention due to the risk posed by destabilizing a company that
may lose money rapidly if it is mismanaged, if its investment budget is restricted, or if the
regulatory framework prevents it from making swift entrepreneurial decisions. Thus, as it
lowers the level of NAGI, market competition provides the SOE with the "means to
change."
How exactly does competition provide signals of performance? First and most
clearly, competition gives customers an "exit" option (Hirschman 1970). If the public
enterprise provides lower quality or higher prices than the alternative firms-or if its
commercialization strategy is deficient-its market share will decrease and financial
results will suffer. If the gap between the public and the private firms is large and
shares, sacrificing valuable investments that have returns farther into the future (Stein 1989)-precisely a
otential advantage of state ownership in the first place (Laffont and Tirole 1993).
The literature on bureaucratic politics has focused on the effects of asymmetric information on the
political control of government agencies (e.g., Bendor 1988). I argue that absent signals of performance,
the state-owned enterprise also lacks information on its own operations. Rather than a context of
asymmetric information, the problem is one of lack of information by all actors.
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customers can exit quickly enough, losses can be severe, hurting fiscal revenues and
creating a political embarrassment for the ruling coalition. Similar causal mechanisms
occur under competition in the capital markets-where investors punish poor behavior-
and in the labor market-where qualified talent exits in search of higher salaries or better
working conditions.
Second, once the public enterprise reaches an "equilibrium" market share under
competitive conditions, the presence of rival firms provides benchmarks to assess
inefficiencies in SOE operations. Arguably the most important of these benchmarks is the
presence of a transparent reference price provided by a market average or by a
representative product. A monopoly lacks the mechanism of price discovery afforded by
market competition, and therefore politicians lack a way to measure the level of technical
and commercial performance of the company and to estimate whether the policy
utilization gains merit any losses in business efficiency. The presence of private sector
companies provides this information and may compel politicians to act in response.
Third, the presence of rival firms provides examples for the public enterprise on
how to conduct its operations. This signal, which does not necessarily originate due to a
market exchange, can lead to a process labeled by sociologists as "isomorphism"
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Mizruchi and Fein 1999). As the name implies,
isomorphism refers to a phenomenon where organizations-e.g., firms in the same
industry-come to resemble each other. When the SOE is exposed to more
technologically advanced or more prestigious companies, it may choose to adopt similar
practices out of a desire of company managers to "fit in" with colleagues of their
profession. Similarly, when faced with uncertainty in a given situation, managers may be
more likely to choose a path that has already been tested by another company.
The signals from market competition are more clear in those industrial activities
where performance can be measured rapidly-i.e., with short feedback loops-than in
those where results become visible after several years-i.e., with long feedback loops.
The former allow the managers and their political superiors to identify poor performance
and respond accordingly. Marketing strategies usually have short loops, unless clients are
bound by long-term contracts. Heavy capital investments, on the other hand, take several
years to materialize and even longer for the political economy or business impact to be
assessed.
Industrial activities with long feedback loops increase the odds of
mismanagement and slack, given that the culprit is less likely to be identified. Even if he
or she remains in the company, the politicians who were originally interested in the
project are likely to have moved on to other government positions or to have been voted
out of office. Likewise, when performance feedback loops are long, managers facing a
dysfunctional company have an incentive to steer the company towards electoral
objectives in order to earn the praise of their superiors and either keep their jobs or move
up in the bureaucratic ladder. After all, results from good management would not only
take too long to materialize, but they may never materialize at all.
This dissertation measures market competition in a different way from many
industrial organization studies. This literature often employs a "concentration ratio" that
accounts for the number of firms that control the majority of the industry's output or an
4 A question may arise regarding what constitutes a short, as opposed to a long, feedback loop. The
distinction is certainly qualitative, but a good rule-of-thumb is the average time that supervising managers
or politicians last in the same office.
indicator known as the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) (Tirole 1988). The HHI is
also estimated based on the market shares of the firms in the industry. These approaches
are not adopted in the current setting because in many cases such level of detail is not
necessary (in all cases except for PMI) and because they are less helpful to explain the
nature of the international oil market. In the mid-1980s, for example, competition for a
firm like Pemex was rising at the time when the market share of its dominant player,
Saudi Arabia, was also rising. For the statistical analysis presented in chapter 5, the level
of competition is approximated using a measure of rising world demand for petroleum.
For all other instances, a qualitative assessment of the level of competition suffices.
5.2 The Role of Managerial Cohesion
Cohesion is an element of the culture of the organization that describes the
strength of the bonds among the different members of the managerial cadre. These bonds
are important since they increase the group's esprit-de-corps and improve internal
mechanisms of coordination towards achieving a common goal.46 In a way, cohesion
allows for the existence of an identifiable organizational "personality" and, in the words
of James Q. Wilson (1989), "a sense of mission." 47 In the case of state-owned enterprises,
cohesion has a direct effect on business efficiency and an indirect effect on policy
utilization (by reducing the "porosity" of the company to non-aligned government
intervention).
4' In more technical terms, cohesion helps overcome problems of collective action within a group of the
sort that Olson (1965) describes.
47 "When an organization has a culture that is widely shared and warmly endorsed by operators and
managers alike, we say the organization has a sense of mission" (Wilson 1989, p. 95).
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Cohesion primarily results from the accumulation of shared experiences among
the membership. These experiences increase the similarities of the insiders and increase
the differences with outsiders, creating bonds of solidarity within the organization.48 if
the intensity of these experiences is strong, the bonds will last longer and be more
resistant to outside pressures. Specialized training and socialization in the workplace are
common mechanisms for the creation of shared experiences.
Specialization develops a professional identity-with its common language,
rituals, symbols, and normative guidelines (Parsons 1939). As Friedson (1988) points out,
the medical profession is paradigmatic in this regard-in order to admitted into the guild,
individuals must undergo years of training in medical school (often using the same
books), swear to abide by the Hippocratic Oath, take excruciating exams, and complete
their residency training-a rite of passage. In consequence, physicians develop a
connection with others in the profession and acquire a particular value system (Wynia et
al. 1999).
Beyond the links created by a common training, cohesion is enhanced by the
patterns of socialization.49 Bonds are particularly strong among individuals who spend
considerable amounts of time together outside of work or who participate in high stakes
activities where success depends on everyone's contribution. Gouldner (1954), for
example, recounts how dangerous working conditions lead coal miners to develop high
levels of cohesion. Similarly, Wilson (1989) attributes the high cohesion among Japanese
48 The idea that solidarity can result from shared characteristics of the members of a group, and that this in
turn leads to greater cohesion comes at least since Durkheim's concept of "mechanical solidarity," which
appeared in his book The Division of Labor in Society (published in 1893). In the book, however,
Durkheim dwells on the concept of "organic solidarity," which refers to the bonds of interdependence
among different groups that allow a society to function.
49 Socialization often also takes place while individuals undergo specialized training, but that is not
necessarily the case.
government workers in part to their custom of regularly going to bars with their
colleagues at the end of the workday.
Arguably the officer corps in the military epitomizes both drivers of cohesion-
specialized training and socialization amidst high risk activities. In The Professional
Soldier, Janowitz (1960) describes how military culture is acquired and sustained by the
officers' prolonged training and adoption of a body of ethics. As Long (2009)
emphasizes, the military's monopoly over specialized training for officers strengthens the
development of cohesion-all members adopt the same values and combat doctrine in
school in a process of "homogenization." In "The New Professionalism of Internal
Warfare and Military Role Expansion," Stepan (1976) explains how Brazilian military
members who fought together in World War II developed loyalty towards each other and
developed a similar viewpoint of the military's role in political life. Their organizational
culture would then be propagated with the creation of two specialized schools that would
become the main doctrinal transmission mechanism for all future commanders.
The examples above suggest that managerial cohesion in a state-owned enterprise
will increase if one profession is dominant in the organization. Moreover, cohesion will
be higher if this dominant profession is characterized by intense bonds of solidarity
among the members. The question that remains to be explained in greater detail is how
exactly managerial cohesion affects the behavior of a government-controlled
organization.
Efficiency can be enhanced, for example, due to the higher esprit-de-corps.
Referring to the "sense of mission" that high cohesion provides, Wilson (1989) argues
that "[it] is the chief way by which managers overcome the problem of shirking in
organizations that (like most government bureaus) cannot make the money wages of
operators directly dependent on the operators' observed contribution to attaining the
goals of the organization" (p. 95). Wilson uses the example of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to underscore the importance of high morale on employee performance. "The
corps advertises itself as a prestige organization," says Wilson, "with exacting standards
and difficult duties" (p. 99). Those who are admitted into the Corps of Engineers
understand their work as a privilege as much as a responsibility, and thus seek to live up
to the reputation of their organization.
Similarly, high cohesion improves the internal mechanisms of coordination.
Following Arrow's (1964) classic analysis, coordination in a large organization depends
on the existence of "operating rules" and "enforcement rules." The former "instruct the
members of the organization how to act," while the latter "persuade or compel them to
act in accordance with the operating rules" (p. 398). Managerial cohesion, with its shared
specialized knowledge and code of conduct, increases the likelihood that both sets of
rules will exist.
Enforcement rules require "the detection and the punishment of deviations from
the operating rules" (p. 398), and they are particularly important in government-
controlled organizations. In these instances, as mentioned earlier, the dismissal of
workers who underperform is rare and good behavior cannot always be measured by
increased profits (in the case that price controls or subsidies exist). Yet, if top managers
are knowledgeable regarding the operating rules of the profession, transgressions will be
detected more easily. Moreover, punishment often times at most entails shunning a
person from the profession. For this punishment to have any meaning, the punished
person must also be a member of the profession (otherwise he or she might care little
about the consequences), the profession must be tight enough that violations to the code
of conduct are understood as attacks on the collective good, and the banishment must
represent a significant social or financial loss.
Kaufman's (1960) study on the U.S. Forest Service illustrates the effect of
cohesion on esprit-de-corps and coordination within a government agency. How is it,
Kaufman asks, that a group of forest rangers, scattered throughout the country and with
minimal supervision, carry out the mission of the organization so effectively? The
expectation, given these "centrifugal" forces, would be for forest rangers to shirk at their
jobs and be captured by the interests of the local populations rather than respond to the
directives coming from the national headquarters. Kaufman's analysis provides the
following explanations. First, the U.S. Forest Service has instituted a recruiting system
that admits only those individuals most motivated to a career in forestry administration.
These members feel especially proud to be part of the agency and are willing to make
personal sacrifices in order to fulfill their central tasks. Second, the Forest Service
provides a comprehensive system of socialization in the symbols and traditions of the
organization-training courses, uniforms, high levels of mobility-so that the only thing
that is constant in workers' lives is their sense of belonging to the bureaucratic agency.
The result is loyalty, high technical ability, and discipline.
The organizational personality and sense of mission afforded by a cohesive staff
is particularly relevant for government organizations given the tension between the policy
mandates issued by the political authorities and the technical interests of the career public
servants. Cohesive government agencies have been known to "resist" orders from
politicians that run counter to the accepted best interests of the profession-whatever
these may be at particular points in time. Aberbach and Rockman (1976), for instance,
documented the reluctance of career bureaucrats in social ministries of the United States
to implement Richard Nixon's conservative policies in the late 1960s. Similarly, in the
United Kingdom, the pro-Keynesian orientation of the bureaucracy may have slowed
down the implementation of the more conservative economic policies advocated by
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher after her election in 1979 (Wilson 1989).'5
In these instances, the staff may implicitly or explicitly coordinate to follow
established professional norms. Katzmann (1980), for example, analyzed the behavior of
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and found noticeable behavioral differences
depending on whether lawyers or economists held the key operational posts. The FTC is
charged with preventing unfair competitive practices by firms, but it has significant
discretion deciding what constitutes an unfair practice. Lawyers, writes Katzmann, are
prosecution oriented and choose to pursue instances of clear violation of the law.
Economists, on the other hand, are welfare oriented. To them, cases of clear misconduct
are of little interest unless consumer welfare is affected in a substantive way. Depending
on whether lawyers or economists dominate positions that decide which cases are
pursued, the FTC operates differently.
Behavioral differences may arise even with people from the same profession,
since socialization and training can influence the way in which employees approach
similar problems. Long (2009) shows that the practices of the different services of the
50 Yet, scholars of U.S. bureaucratic politics have argued that opportunities for autonomous managerial
behavior are, in the end, limited. The powers to appoint and remove agency chiefs and to allocate the
budget help the politicians retain control over the mandate (Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989;
Wood and Waterman 1991; Daniel P. Carpenter 1996; Wildavsky 1964; Fenno 1966).
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U.S. military, for example, can be traced back to the first war that each service fought.
The "path dependence" of the lessons learned from the first wars persists even in light of
changes in written doctrine. Another instance of these differences within members of the
same group arose among employees of the Venezuelan state-owned oil company,
Petr6leos de Venezuela (PDVSA) (Villalba 1983). Prior to the nationalization of 1976,
the two main foreign companies that operated in the country were Exxon and Shell.
Among industry insiders, Exxon's corporate culture is known for the tight control of the
headquarters over the operations of its international offices. Shell, on the other hand, has
a decentralized decision-making system. When PDVSA was founded, top executives
soon realized that former Shell employees were experienced in managerial activities-
such as planning. Former Exxon workers, while very precise in their technical work,
lacked management experience.
In short, managerial cohesion improves the business efficiency of a state-owned
enterprise due to its concomitant esprit-de-corps and coordination mechanisms-namely,
the introduction of clear operating and enforcement rules. Additionally, managerial
cohesion has an indirect effect on the policy utilization of the SOE via its role in
diminishing the non-aligned government intervention. Cohesive managers are more likely
to possess both a professional identity that is at odds with most policy mandates and a
capability to exercise collective action and block the implementation of those mandates.
Thus, cohesive managers can neglect or even sabotage a professional politician appointed
to an executive position and delay adoption of certain policies and attenuate their scope.
The proper way to measure the degree of managerial cohesion has been debated
in the business literature for some time. In an influential article, Hambrick and Mason
51 Author's interview with Ram6n Espinasa, former chief economist of PDVSA, 19 May 2009.
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(1984) suggest the use of demographic variables to examine the link between managerial
characteristics and firm outcomes.52 These authors acknowledge that these proxies are
noisy, but emphasize that variables such as age or educational background could be used
to analyze statistically some of the anecdotal accounts on managerial behavior.
This dissertation complements the qualitative evidence on managerial cohesion,
obtained from the high number of in-depth interviews, with archival information that
provides the educational background of all directors and deputy directors of each
subsidiary company of Pemex from 1992 to 2010. More specifically, the analysis shows
the extent to which top managers have had the same professional training at different
points in time. Combined with more detailed information on the patterns of socialization
and promotion of each of these professions, managerial cohesion is then measured as
"low" or "high."
5.3 The Role of Political Ideology
The direction and strength of the policy mandates of state-owned enterprises
respond to the particular preferences of governments. These preferences can result from a
variety of factors, including economic reasoning, the pressure of interest groups, and
political calculations. Furthermore, governments are seldom monolithic entities-
generally they consist in a series of groups that form a ruling coalition.53 Policy-making
within ruling coalitions is seldom a straightforward process, even in authoritarian regimes
52 See Carpenter, et al. (2004) for a review of this so called "upper echelons" research agenda.
53 The use of "ruling coalitions" as units of analysis is widespread in comparative political economy (e.g.,
Katzenstein 1978; Frieden 1992; Mares 1985; Crystal 1989). The mling coalition is composed of those
groups that provide legitimacy and sustain the highest decision-maker in the country, regardless of whether
the regime is democratic or autocratic. The term is helpful to point out that governing elites are seldom
homogeneous.
(Schneider 1991). Still, arguably the strongest factor in determining the a priori
government preferences is the political ideology of the leaders of the ruling coalition.
What is the relationship between political ideology and the policy utilization of
state-owned enterprises? At least with regards to industrial policy, the choice often
closely depends on the government's positioning along the Left-Right ideological
spectrum. If the ruling coalition is located on the ideological left, the direction of the
mandate will usually be towards industrial policy. On the contrary, if the coalition is
placed on the right, industrial policy will be avoided.
The distinction between the Left and the Right, while imperfect, has withstood the
test of time as a reasonable way to aggregate a set of policies espoused by a government
or a political party (e.g., Bradley et al. 2003; Gabel and John D. Huber 2000; McDonald,
Mendes, and Kim 2007; Benoit and Laver 2007). It is true that some aspects of the Left-
Right distinction change over time. Nevertheless, as Bobbio and Cameron (1997) argue:
The terms 'left' and 'right' continue to be very much part of political
terminology, in spite of all the arguments from various quarters which are
used to challenge it... It is not surprising that a dyad, or dichotomy, is the
most common way of representing the political world, which is, by its
very nature, antagonistic and divided into opposing sides. (pp. 29-31.)
Despite the heterogeneity across time and across places and the usefulness of the
terms to describe all individual politicians or parties, the Left and the Right certainly
5 The academic literature has discussed the impact of economic interests and ideology on policy-making at
length. A reference on the role played by ideological considerations is Blythe (2002).
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summarize identifiable policy packages (John D. Huber 1989; Benoit and Laver 2007;
Klingemann et al. 2006)." On economic policy, the Left is generally concerned with
social justice and income redistribution (Castafneda 1993; Cleary 2006; Eley 2002). On
domestic affairs, it emphasizes political rights over internal security considerations. It is
usually associated with labor unions and intellectuals, and its popular support is
concentrated in urban areas. Conversely, the Right is associated with the implementation
of free-market policies. It views attempts to redress social injustice as causing more harm
than good, and it criticizes industrial policy for "misallocating" economic resources.
Business organizations and rural areas provide most of its popular support.
With regards to state-owned enterprises, the leftist ruling coalitions seek income
redistribution via, among other things, employment protection and income transfers to
underdeveloped areas. Additionally, they prefer to utilize SOEs as generators of forward
and backward linkages throughout the economy, and they are more willing to subsidize
the training of domestic technical and managerial cadres. On the other hand, the Right
prefers to use state-owned enterprises simply as an instrument of fiscal policy-thus
being able to keep lower taxes on the private sector of the economy.
In democratic regimes, the battle for the mandate takes place during elections. In
authoritarian regimes and in democracies where the ruling party comprises a broad-based
coalition from both the left and the right, the struggle takes place inside the bureaucracy.
As Ben Ross Schneider (1991) points out in his study of the bureaucracy in authoritarian
Brazil, the "politics within the state" can be quite important for policy change even when
electoral contestation is absent.
5 For a dissent, see, for example, Giddens (1994).
How to determine the ideology of a ruling coalition? This is not always a clear-cut
issue, and it is complicated by the experience of several countries in the 1990s, when
politicians elected on leftist platforms changed course and adopted neoliberal economic
policies once they took office. The case of Argentina under the Peronist (i.e., traditionally
leftist) government of Carlos Saul Menem (1989-1999) is a paradigmatic case, but it is
not the only one (Stokes 2001). With this consideration in mind, it is still usually possible
to approximate the a priori preferences of a government based on the manifesto of its
political party and the educational and professional background of the key cabinet
members.
The strength of the policy utilization follows from the same positioning of the
government along the ideological spectrum. Governments with a strong leftist orientation
will pursue a higher level of utilization for industrial policy. Moderate leftist ruling
coalitions will adopt instead more subtle means.
5.4 Auxiliary Variables
The auxiliary variables have a secondary, more limited impact on the behavior of
state-owned enterprises. Yet, they can be very helpful to distinguish differences in
performance among companies without discernible differences along the primary
variables. Below, three auxiliary variables are discussed: state jeopardy, veto players, and
managerial ability. The first decreases the government's willingness to intervene in the
operations of a company, the second affects its ability to do so, and the third, as expected,
increases the business efficiency of the firm.
5.4.1 State Jeopardy
Regardless of the desired mandate of the ruling coalition, certain circumstances
56lead to temporary shifts in its policy positioning. Threats to the autonomy of the state
are one such instance. State autonomy is simply defined as the ability of the state to
"formulate and implement its preferences" (Krasner 1984, p. 224).
One kind of threat to state autonomy is easily identifiable and leads to fairly
predictable changes in policy preferences: fiscal jeopardy. Fiscal jeopardy does not
necessarily refer to those cases where the government is highly dependent on SOE
revenues, since it is conceivable that these countries can enjoy high surpluses. Instead,
fiscal jeopardy means that the government is close to defaulting on its debt--or, at the
very least, foresees a serious disruption in the collection of its income. In these
circumstances, the usual battle between leftists and rightists is likely to be suspended in
order to address the need to raise government revenues, and even leftist ruling coalitions
are expected to diminish their support of industrial policy given the need to economize on
resources. Similarly, the willingness to implement non-aligned government intervention
should decrease.
5.4.2 Veto Players
Veto players, in the language of Tsebelis (2002, 1995), are individual or
collective agents that must be in agreement before policy change is implemented. The
56 The interaction of institutional and external constraints with ideology or interests in policy-making has
been discussed for the case of monetary policy, among others, by Franzese (2002).
57 A debate exists in comparative politics regarding the agency of the state vis-A-vis other social actors. In
the well-known book Bringing the State Back In, Skocpol, Evans, and Rueschmeyer (1985) asserted that
the state apparatus can develop interests of its own independent from societal actors and should thus be
treated as an agent in its own right. While acknowledging the importance of this debate, for the present
purposes all that matters is that the national government has autonomy from foreign actors to implement its
own policy.
underlying causal mechanism of veto player theory is straightforward. In the absence of
veto players, governments can generally choose policy fairly unobstructed. Their
presence, on the other hand, leads actual policy to differ from the desired mandate. In
other words, veto players hinder the government's ability to interfere in the operations of
the company.
Tsebelis (1995) identifies two kinds of veto players, institutional and partisan,
although he acknowledges that other types may exist. Examples of institutional veto
players are bicameralism and federalism. Two legislative chambers decrease the potential
for policy change, especially when these represent somewhat different constituencies or
when incentives for party discipline are weaker.58 Federalism generally increases the
number of players that must be in agreement before constitutional changes are enacted,
again restricting policy change opportunities (Wibbels 2005; Weingast 1995). By
contrast, partisan veto players are simply the parties that make up a government coalition
in parliamentary regimes. Under certain assumptions, 59 Tsebelis shows that the potential
for policy change decreases (or at least stays the same) if the number of veto players
increases or if the policy distance-which he labels congruence-among these players
increases. 60 Additionally, he explains that, for collective veto players (i.e., groups),
greater cohesion in policy preferences decreases the possibility of policy change.
58 This is the case, for example, in federal systems where the upper chamber is designed to represent
"states' rights," regardless of the size of their population. Similarly, in parliamentary regimes party
discipline has been shown to be stronger than in presidential regimes, given that the stability of the
governing coalition depends, to a large extent, on party discipline.
59 Tsebelis assumes that veto players have "circular indifference curves" (i.e., that veto players are
indifferent among all the policies lying within a circle).
* Cox and McCubbins (2001) introduce the term "effective number of vetoes" in reference to the fact that
not all veto players will have different preferences on an issue. In their argument, these vetoes shape public
policy, by influencing the "decisiveness" and the "resoluteness" of the government. With a high number of
vetoes, changing policy is more difficult, but once policy has been set, the government is fairly steadfast in
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Empirical work has shown the role of veto players in obstructing legislation
(Immergut 1990; Tsebelis 1999) or in mitigating economic policy swings (Hallerberg and
Basinger 1998; Franzese 2002; Swank 2002; Kastner and Rector 2003; Gustavo Flores-
Macfas 2009). In these studies, following Tsebelis's (1995) initial contribution, the role
of political parties and governmental institutions is central. For state-owned enterprises,
however, one additional veto players play a role: the level of operational decentralization
of the company.
Decentralization has been shown to increase the opportunities to moderate the
mandate of the ruling coalition.61 Whenever a holding company separates a government
ministry from operational subsidiaries, it introduces a "buffer" that enhances the
autonomy of the public managers vis-A-vis the politicians (Trebat 1983). For example, the
companies of Brazil's Eletrobras have thus historically enjoyed relatively high levels of
autonomy from the government's desired mandate. Similarly, prior to a reform in 1998,
the operating firms of the Venezuelan state-owned oil company, PDVSA, also benefitted
from the additional institutional separation from the government.62
Table 2.3 presents a list of the different veto players that affect SOE policy
decision-making. In some contexts, some may not play a role. In general, however, as the
number of veto players increases and the distance between their policy positions widens,
the ruling coalition will have a more difficult time implementing its desired mandate. In
the case of legislation related to the SOE, the statutes are likely to be "locked in." For
its implementation. The logic of my argument is slightly different, since I argue that veto points, rather than
reventing policy change, move policy towards the center of the spectrum of political preferences.
1This argument, in the context of regulatory agencies in the United States, has been made by Whitford
(2002), who showed how decentralization in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission insulated it from the
mandate set by the federal government during the Reagan administration. See also Carpenter (1996).
62 Author's interview with Luis Pacheco, former PDVSA director of planning, 1 July 2009.
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those policies that are renegotiated on a yearly basis-such as the budget, for example-
number of players and distance of policy positions is likely to moderate actual policies. In
the language of institutionalist approaches, the veto players will then have a "centripetal"
effect.63
[TABLE 2.3 HERE]
Implicit in the variables of Table 2.3 is the role of democratization on state-owned
enterprise policy mandates. While authoritarian regimes may also have some veto
players, democratic politics institutionalizes policy contestation and provides clear rules
for political actors to delay or block policy implementation. The expectation, then, is that
democratization will make legislative change more difficult and will moderate those
policies that are enacted annually.
5.4.3 Managerial Ability
For the most part, this study presents an account of state-owned enterprise
behavior that emphasizes the impact of structural constraints-the market and political
institutions, the professional identity of the managers, etc. It would be disingenuous to
believe, however, that managerial talent does not play a role in effecting outcomes.
Variables such as high market competition and high managerial cohesion increase the
chances for a state-owned enterprise to operate efficiently, but success is never
63 Centripetal forces have generally been studied regarding the role of electoral rules on subsequent policy
outcomes (Cox 1990, 1997; Magar, Rosenblum, and Samuels 1998). In the case of state-owned enterprises,
the centripetal forces arise from the institutional arrangement of the company or the cohesion and solidarity
of the personnel.
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guaranteed. Just like private companies in competitive environments often times go
bankrupt, poorly managed SOEs can also fail or do much better than expected with the
right CEO.
Table 2.3 Veto Players in SOE Policy Utilization
Political System
Separation of powers
Bicameralism
Federalism
Political parties
State-Owned Enterprise
Decentralization
Veto Mechanism
Presidentialist regimes may encounter greater
difficulty in implementing policies if the president's
party does not control the legislature; similarly,
presidents with strong veto power may block
congressional initiatives. In some instances,
independent judiciaries may strike down SOE policy
deemed to run contrary to a given statute (e.g.,
Tsebelis 2002).
One chamber may effectively block the policy
initiatives of the other (e.g., Tsebelis 2002).
In some federal systems, the agreement of a majority
of provincial governments is required before a change
to constitutional provision is made (e.g., Wibbels
2005).
Minority parties in parliamentary systems may veto
particular policies as a condition to remain as a
member of the coalition government (e.g., Tsebelis
1999).
Veto Mechanism
Each decision-making layer adds a "buffer" between
policy instructions and operational decisions (e.g.,
Trebat 1983; Carpenter 1996; Whitford 2002).
Good leaders, on the other hand, will recognize how to steer the public enterprise
through the intricacies of both the government bureaucracy and the market environment.
They can take advantage of positive structural conditions and circumvent or change the
negative ones. They can develop cohesiveness with a team of managers even if they do
not share the same professional background, and they can learn to negotiate with
politicians. Accordingly, this study pays attention to managerial agency, although
underscoring the context in which decisions are made.
6. Application of the Framework: A Cross-Sectional Approach
Chapter 4, 5, and 6 present detailed case studies of each subsidiary of Pemex. The
historical approach employed allows tracing changes in the explanatory variables over
time and discerning how they have affected the business efficiency and policy utilization.
Accordingly, each account constitutes a rich longitudinal analysis of the effect of changes
in the values of key variables with regards both to the same subsidiary at earlier points in
time and to other subsidiaries. In order to explain how conclusions are drawn, each
chapter begins with a brief overview of the activities of the different subsidiaries and the
justification for the measurement of the different variables.
This section illustrates the application of the analytical framework by comparing
the subsidiary companies cross-sectionally at one particular point in time. The year
chosen is 2008, when most of the fieldwork for this study was conducted, although any
time period since 1995 would have rendered approximately the same results. Values to
the variables are assigned in relation to the other subsidiaries, an approach that differs
from segments of the subsequent chapters that seek to make comparisons with
international counterparts.
6.1 The Dependent Variables
The business efficiency of the subsidiaries was measured by conducting a survey
of Mexican oil industry experts-including former Pemex CEOs-between April and
August of 2008. Respondents were asked the following question: "How would you rank
the efficiency of the subsidiary companies of Pemex?" Table 2.4 presents the results,
which show an overwhelming consensus.64 All those respondents who ranked PMI
consider it to be the most efficient subsidiary. Pemex-Gas is ranked number two by
everyone who ranked PMI number one, with one exception. Moreover, all three
respondents who did not rank PMI regarded Pemex-Gas to be more efficient that PEP and
Pemex-Refining. Finally, Pemex-Refining was placed last by all participants except for
one, who ranked it just above PEP.
[TABLE 2.4 HERE]
With regards to the policy utilization of the subsidiaries, industrial policy for all
of them was low. In general, the government did not seek to use the companies to create
forward and backward linkages with domestic firms throughout the economy.65 This,
however, did not mean that government intervention was low. All subsidiaries with
exception of PMI were subject to fiscal and budgetary control from the Ministry of
Finance and to a strict regulatory regime implemented by the Ministry of Public Service.
Additionally, industry experts pointed out to the fact that in Pemex-Refining
64Whenever an interviewee declined to rank a subsidiary, no further attempts to follow-up were made.
Selection of respondents was based on long-term knowledge of Pemex or on having had a position in the
company that allowed an assessment of mutliple subsidiaries.
65 Author's interview with Ranl Muftoz Leos (Pemex CEO from 2000 - 2004), Mexico City, 30 July 2008.
Informal interviews with top-level Pemex staffers confirmed this claim.
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appointments of outsiders and politicians were not uncommon-thus serving as a better
instrument for the allocation of political patronage.
Table 2.4 Survey of Experts Ranking Subsidiary Business Efficiency
Description PEP Ref Gas PMI
Oil industry researcher 3 4 1
Former CEO #1 3 4 2 1
Former CEO #2 2 4 3 1
Former CEO #3 2 3 1
Pemex manager #1 3 4 2 1
Pemex manager #2 3 4 2 1
Ministry of Energy official 4 3 2 1
International observer 3 2 1
Former advisor to CEO 2 3 1
Former comptroller 2 3 1
Note: Survey conducted among Mexican oil industry experts, April - August
2008. Selection was based on respondents' knowledge of the industry and
their willingness to provide a ranking of the business efficiency of at least
three of the subsidiaries. It is not a representative survey of oil workers.
In other words, the level of NAGI was low for PMI, high for Pemex-Refining,
and medium for PEP and Pemex-Gas (although for different reasons). In PEP, politicians
were seldom-if ever-appointed to top executive positions, but fiscal and regulatory
control was high. In Pemex-Gas, by contrast, taxation and regulation were less strict.
Furthermore, PMI has historically been exempt from cumbersome procurement
regulations to enhance the subsidiary's competitiveness in the international oil market.
Interestingly, this government intervention did not translate into increased industrial
policy implementation.
6.2 The Explanatory Variables
What values can be assigned to the explanatory variables? The political ideology
of the ruling coalition in 2008 was decidedly on the right of the spectrum of
preferences-which would explain the aversion to industrial policy. President Felipe
Calderon, of the conservative National Action Party (PAN), had appointed cabinet
members with a well-known neoliberal orientation. Among them stood out the Minister
of Finance, Agustin Carstens-with a doctorate in economics from the University of
Chicago-and the Minister of Energy, Georgina Kessel, formerly chair of the department
of economics at Mexico's Instituto Tecnol6gico Aut6nomo de M xico (ITAM,
Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico), a university known for its orthodox
economics training (Babb 2001; Camp 2002).
Table 2.5 presents the values for the variables of market competition and
managerial cohesion for each subsidiary. These levels are "stylized" in order to be
presented easily in a single table. Nuances in the actual measurement of the variables are
left for subsequent chapters.
[TABLE 2.5 HERE]
The justification for the levels of market competition is straightforward. Pemex-
Refining and PEP have monopoly protection by law and thus do not face any market
competition. PMI, on the other hand, markets crude oil internationally and must
continuously make an effort to find clients. Pemex-Gas faces a higher level of
competition compared to PEP and Pemex-Refining, although not at the same level as
PMI. Some parts of the natural gas market in Mexico were liberalized in 1995 and, thus,
the entry of competitors is possible. In practice, however, competition has been limited
due to the high costs of entry to the industry (and issue that is further discussed in
Chapter 6).
Table 2.5 Explanatory Variables for the
Subsidiaries of Pemex, 2008
Market Competition
0V)
Low
0
U
c High
The explanation of managerial cohesion is developed in detail in later chapters.
Suffice it to say here that a key difference between PEP and the other branches is the
socialization of its dominant profession-petroleum engineering-which contrasts with
that of chemical engineers, economists, and lawyers present in other subsidiaries. In a
way, the socialization pattern for petroleum engineers is reminiscent of that of the forest
rangers analyzed by Kaufman (1960). Upon graduating from college, small groups of
petroleum engineers must work in production facilities in inhospitable conditions,
developing bonds of solidarity along the way. Moreover, promotion opportunities are
heavily controlled by a tight-knit community of older, more experienced petroleum
engineers. This fosters discipline and cohesiveness among the ranks, who know that few
Low High
Refining Pemex-Gas
(Behaves like Middling,
Government trending
Agency) upward
PEP PMI
Middling, (Behaves like
trending Commercial
downward Enterprise)
employment opportunities exist in Mexico outside of Pemex and do not want to see their
promotion opportunities decrease.
On the other hand, the chemical engineers that manage industrial plants in Pemex-
Refining and Pemex-Gas undergo a much less intensive socialization process. Top
executive positions are not reserved for chemical engineers moving up through the ranks,
thus removing an incentive to show loyalty to the supervisors. Additionally, chemical
engineers usually can find employment outside of Pemex, since their training is much
less specialized, and often they did not attend the same schools. All these reasons lead to
lower cohesion.
In PMI, cohesion has been developed over time in spite of the absence of a single
dominant profession. PMI is a relatively small company where personal bonds are easier
to build. Moreover, the subsidiary has a long-lasting tradition of making promotions from
within, strengthening discipline and loyalty among the lower and middle echelons.
Finally, PMI has developed over time highly specialized marketing and trading
methodologies which all employees learn upon entering the company-usually soon after
graduating from college. This shared experience provides the managers of the subsidiary
a common identity that transcends their professional background.
The analytical framework presented in this chapter provides clarity to the
explanation of the behavior of these SOEs. Beginning with the level of NAGI, the
following conclusions can be drawn. First, the willingness to intervene has been lower in
those companies facing market competition, as regulations and budgetary restrictions
have been relaxed to permit better performance in the market. Second, the ability to
intervene has been lower in those with high managerial cohesion-politicians seldom
appear in PEP and in PMI, which have a strong tradition of making appointments from
within their ranks. Lower levels of NAGI lead to higher business efficiency and lower
policy utilization, and the interest of the government to implement industrial policy has
been low.
In addition, market competition and managerial cohesion have a direct effect on
business efficiency within the company-regardless of their impact on the external
relationship with the government. PMI's efficiency is thus further enhanced, while
Pemex-Refining falls to the bottom. Pemex-Gas and PEP have a mixed set of variables,
but the presence of competition, over time, provides greater incentives for performance
than managerial cohesion alone. In a monopolistic environment, PEP has remained
insular, unable to keep up with the technological evolution of the industry (see Chapter
5).
7. Conclusion
The study of the behavior of state-owned companies is complex and has defied
scholars for several decades. Approaches that are not interdisciplinary have thus far
rendered only partial explanations. The framework proposed in this chapter simplifies the
analysis by separating the two different components of behavior-the policy utilization
and the business efficiency-while integrating the relevant economic, political, and
sociological variables. In so doing, it accounts for much of the observed variation among
these firms and provides a foundation for further theoretical and policy analysis of
government ownership of industrial enterprises.
While the analytical framework can be extended to capture the nuances of state-
owned enterprise behavior, its essence is simple. There are two dependent variables that
correspond to the two primary tasks of SOEs: business efficiency and policy utilization.
Moreover, these two variables are deternined simultaneously and are interrelated-
business efficiency affects the degree of policy utilization and policy utilization affects
the level of efficiency. In reality, this setup follows naturally from casual observation of
SOEs around the world.
Perhaps the most difficult conceptual argument in the framework consists in the
role played by the intermediate "linking" variable-the level of non-aligned government
intervention (NAGI). This is simply an analytical took to simplify the understanding of
the relationship between the two dependent variables. For greater clarity, NAGI is
divided into two components: the willingness of the government to intervene and its
ability to do so.
There are three main explanatory variables: the level of market competition, the
degree of managerial cohesion, and the political ideology of the government. Sometimes
these variables have a direct effect on a dependent variable and sometimes they have an
indirect effect. Managerial cohesion, for example, has a direct effect on business
efficiency by increasing esprit-de-corps and facilitating coordination throughout the
organization. Additionally, it has an indirect effect on both business efficiency and policy
utilization by decreasing the level of non-aligned government intervention. Managerial
cohesion reduces NAGI, for example, by lowering the government's ability to appoint
politicians to top executive positions. In turn, more professional managers help to further
improve business efficiency. Once this point is clarified, then the relationship among the
variables in the system becomes straightforward.
Finally, the framework provides tools to add nuance to the analysis of state-
owned enterprise behavior. The auxiliary variables-state jeopardy, veto players, and
managerial ability--fulfill this task. They are not necessary to understand the primary
structural determinants of SOE behavior, but they can play a key role in explaining
different outcomes among two companies that operate in similar circumstances.
The framework can explain the cross-sectional differences in behavior of the
subsidiaries of Pemex-precisely the puzzle described in Chapter 1. According to
industry experts, these companies exhibited varying levels of efficiency in spite of the
common characteristics shared by all. Yet, political ideology, market competition, and
managerial cohesion were enough to explain much of a complicated reality of
government mandates and incentives and disincentives for good performance.
Before discussing the contemporary history and evolution of each subsidiary in
detail, the following chapter provides an overview of Pemex and its significance for the
Mexican state. The background on the origins of the company and the most important
changes in its history will allow for a better understanding of the individual subsidiaries.
The analytical framework will be revisited in the concluding chapter, when Pemex is
briefly compared to international companies.
CHAPTER 3
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PEMEX FOR THE MEXICAN STATE
1. Pemex as a Symbol of Mexican Nationalism
1.1 Surrounded by "Adelitas"
On April 17, 2008 I was en route to attend a conference in downtown Mexico
City on the future of the Mexican petroleum industry. As I approached the venue of the
event-the well known Palacio de Mineria-I noticed a large group of people blocking
access from all cross-streets. I tried to continue walking, but the demonstrators-
hundreds of them, all women, all dressed in white-were holding hands and preventing
pedestrians from passing through.
A few moments later, I identified the leader of that "section" and pleaded my
case. "I'm a researcher," I said, "and I am just attending a conference at the Palacio de
Mineria. I am not trying to access the Senate building." "I understand," the woman
replied, in a considerably more polite way than her colleagues-some of whom were
already surrounding me and yelling at me. "However, please understand our cause. We
have orders not to let anyone near the Senate. Please go away and do not insist." I tried to
access via a different cross-street, but the response was the same and the demonstrators
were growing in numbers. Disappointed, I had to walk away.
The demonstrators I encountered were the so called "Adelitas," a group of women
protesting against the efforts of the government to liberalize Mexico's oil industry. 66 The
group followed Andres Manuel L6pez Obrador, a former Mexico City mayor and former
presidential candidate of the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) who
6 The term "Adelita" (literally meaning "Little Adela") comes from the character of a folk song
popularized during the time of the Mexican Revolution in the early 20th century. During the war, the term
came to signify a brave and attractive woman.
vowed to defend the country's oil wealth from the conservative government's attempts to
privatize it.67 In his words, the push to liberalize the sector represented a "barbaric" act
against the people: "What they try to do is to take away from us a piece of our nation, of
our heart." 68
Weeks earlier, the Mexican media had begun to speculate about the possibility
that President Felipe Calder6n would send an energy bill to Congress seeking to open the
sector. For decades, Pemex had enjoyed a monopoly in the exploration, production,
refining, and distribution of petroleum and petroleum products. Pemex had become a
symbol of national sovereignty, but its high levels of corruption and inefficiency were
equally well known. Some voices in Mexico called for a change in the corporate
governance regime as a necessary step to modernize the company, while others charged
that conservative governments were simply giving away a piece of the national
patrimony.
On April 6, 2008, a L6pez Obrador rally in Mexico City summoned as many as
10,000 female supporters, organized in twenty "brigades," and asked them to be ready, if
need be, to lead a peaceful civic opposition to the government's energy reform bill. 69 Any
attempt to liberalize, in his words, was a step towards privatizing Pemex. "We are not
sucking our thumbs," he said. "Joint ventures are privatization; alliances with foreign
companies are privatization; risk agreements are privatization; contracts with third parties
67 L6pez Obrador is a very well known and highly polarizing figure in Mexican politics. He grew up in an
oil producing municipality in the state of Tabasco and made national headlines in 1994 when he
orchestrated blockades of Pemex wells to protest for an apparent electoral fraud against him in the
gubernatorial elections of Tabasco in that year. A literature has appeared discussing L6pez Obrador's
political career. See, for example, Grayson (2006), Lajous (2006), and Trelles (2004).
Morales, Alberto. 2008. "'Adelitas' levantan carpas; marchan contra televisora." El Universal. 12 April
2008. Available online at http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/158769.html.
69 Mendez, Enrique and Alma E. Munoz. 2008. "Prev6 AMLO que la resistencia por Pemex se inicie esta
semana." La Jornada. 7 April 2008.
are privatization; multiple service contracts are privatization; managerial autonomy is
privatization."
On April 8th, President Calderon finally sent a bill to Congress-a bill that some
observers believed was purposefully moderate in hopes of gaining the support of the left
or, at least, of not prompting broad opposition. 70 Among other things, the government
sought to allow private companies to own and operate petroleum refineries and pipelines
in Mexico. One day later, L6pez Obrador asked the Adelitas to demonstrate in the streets
surrounding the Senate.7 1 Simultaneously, federal representatives allied to L6pez Obrador
took over the podium of the Chamber of Deputies, effectively shutting it down, in order
to prevent a vote on the president's energy bill. A similar takeover of the Senate ensued
soon after.
By the time I encountered the Adelitas, the demonstrations had lasted one week.
Eventually, the shutdown of the Mexican Congress would only be resolved with a pledge
by the government's party to open a lengthy public debate on the merits of a petroleum
reform. On April 2 5th, the legislative sitdown ended, with the leftist opposition claiming
victory upon securing a 71-day period for a national debate on the future of the oil
industry.73 Given the magnitude of the opposition to a moderate attempt to reform the
industry, it is worth examining the meaning of Pemex for the Mexican public and the
political elites.
70 See, for example, the opinion editorial published by Jose Carrefto in El Universal on 10 April 2008,
available at http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/columnas/70834.html.
7 De Maule6n, Hctor. 2008. "El estreno del ejdrcito de 'adelitas"'. El Universal. 11 April 2008.
7P2rez, Ciro and Roberto Garduno. 2008. "Zavaleta rebasada; diputados del FAP tomaron tribuna." La
Jornada. 11 April 2008.
73 Becerril, Andrea and Ballinas, Victor. 2008. "Pactan FAP, PAN y PRI debate nacional sobre Pemex por
71 dias." La Jornada. 26 April 2008.
1.2 The "Third Rail" ofMexican Politics
In modem Mexican politics, arguably no other topic entailed more danger for a
politician than the suggestion that the Mexican oil industry should be liberalized or that
Pemex should be privatized. Calder6n's attempt to implement any kind of reform was
bold, yet it did not seek to change the ownership structure of the company or its domestic
monopoly on exploration, production, and marketing. The major proposed change-
which would ultimately fail to receive support in Congress-was the suggestion to let
private companies refine crude in Mexico on a fee-for-service basis.
The presidential administrations of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), notorious for their neoliberal economic policies, never
advocated the privatization of Pemex." The Salinas administration, for example,
privatized the state-owned telephone company, Telmex, and the television network,
Imevision, among many others, but petroleum remained off limits.
Similarly, the Salinas administration explicitly resisted requests to end Pemex's
domestic monopoly during the negotiations for the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). In his memoirs (2002), Carlos Salinas recounted a cabinet meeting
where the question of state ownership of Pemex was discussed. In his view, Mexican oil
was off-limits for U.S. investors:
74 According to media reports, Calder6n was warned by a prominent politician in the months before he
presented the energy bill: "If you privatize Pemex, you give the presidency to L6pez Obrador." See Ricardo
Alemin's opini6n editorial, Itinerario Politico, published in El Universal on 10 April 2008.
75 In his book La D&ada Perdida, Carlos Salinas disputes the notion that his government followed
neoliberal economic policies (2008). However, most commentators catalogue him as neoliberal given the
record of privatization and economic liberalization that took place during his administration (Murillo 2000;
Teichnan 1997).
On December 23, the Economic Cabinet evaluated the strengthening of
the oil industry as the best antidote to the claims to privatize it. Faced with
the offensive launched at us from different U.S. sectors to privatize it or at
least open it to foreign investment, we decided to go directly to the Pemex
technicians and workers to explain fully the reasoning behind the
government's position. [Pemex CEO] Francisco Rojas undertook this task
with special care and attention. I again insisted that the subject of oil was
the most delicate in NAFTA, but that we would not modify the Mexican
Constitution. We had privatized other companies because the public sector
could not have provided the level of investment required for their
modernization. But oil was not included in that strategy. (pp. 114-115)
Ernesto Zedillo sought to liberalize related branches of the energy sector, but did
not dare push to open the core petroleum activities of exploration, production, refining,
and marketing. He opened the transport, storage, and distribution of natural gas to private
competition, and also attempted to reform the electricity sector and privatize the
76petrochemicals industry. In these latter two areas, his efforts failed largely because too
many key members of his ruling PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) remained
opposed. He never attempted, however, to divest the government's ownership of
Pemex.
76 Author's interview with Adrian Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2008. Lajous was director-general of Pemex
during the botched attempt to privatize the petrochemicals industry.
77 Author's interview with Luis T61lez, 26 June 2009. T61lez was Secretary of Energy during the reform
attempt in the late 1990s.
The conservative Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN), president of
Mexico from 2000-2006, was repeatedly questioned regarding his commitment to
maintaining Pemex entirely in the hands of the state. In the 2000 presidential campaign,
some of his opponents often charged that he would weaken Pemex and led him to
explicitly commit never to privatize the company. 8 Years later, in his memoirs, Fox
would lament about the state of Mexican politics where "if you want to open up energy to
private investment, opponents say you have a 'secret plan' to privatize Pemex" (Fox and
Allyn 2007, p. 226).
In short, even some of the most neoliberal governments avoided the mere
suggestion of privatizing Mexico's oil. The political risk was deemed too high. Even
during the last years of Mexico's one-party dominant regime, the president with the most
neoliberal economic agenda-Ernesto Zedillo-found that relatively minor liberalization
faced strong opposition from his own party. Adrian Lajous, the Pemex director-general
from 1994-2000, explains that "Zedillo told me that it was a pre-requisite for my
appointment that I commit to privatize the petrochemicals industry, and I tried but failed
because a large segment of the PRI was opposed to it. The neoliberals of the PRI in the
government were unable to impose the privatization on the rest of the party and on the
union."79
78 Olmos, Jos6 Gil, Juan Antonio Zifiiga, Juan Manuel Venegas, and Mireya Cu611ar. 2000. "Propuestas,
acusaciones y un tema recurrente: el salinismo." La Jornada. 27 May 2000.
79 Author's interview with Adriin Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2008.
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1.3 Elite-Level Views of the Relationship between Pemex and the State
What explains the reluctance of the Mexican political elite to consider the
privatization of Pemex? Carlos Navarrete, the leader of the PRD in the Senate (2006-
2012), explains contemporary elite-level views as follows:
The generation that is today in the Senate was brought in the tradition of
the petroleum expropriation of 1938, with General Lizaro Cardenas as its
mastermind, and in the idea of oil as the great national property that
permits the fulfillment of a set of economic needs... 80
Thus, the expropriation of the oil industry became one of the pillars of the post-
revolutionary Mexican regime, which provided a nationalistic rationalization to the
authoritarian regime of the PRI. As the years went by, Pemex's status as the most
important symbol of Mexican economic freedom was consolidated. In short, a state-
owned Pemex became part of the Mexican lore, as much as other icons of national
identity.
As a result, non-ideological debates regarding nuances in public-private relations
in the industry were discouraged. A former chair of the Energy Committee in the
Mexican Senate, Juan Jos6 Rodriguez Prats of the rightist PAN, lamented that "energy
policy in Mexico is loaded with prejudices, with myths, with emotional issues."81
Diversity of opinions gradually arose with the advent of democratization, although by the
year 2010 the voices of liberalization still moderated their discourse.
8 Author's interview with Carlos Navarrete, Mexico City, 28 July 2008.
81 Author's interview with Juan Jos6 Rodriguez Prats, Mexico City, 9 April 2008. Rodriguez Prats was
chair of the Energy Committee of the Senate from 2000-2006.
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In the early 2 1S" century, the political parties were positioned as follows. On the
left, the PRD maintained a strong preference against allowing private participation in
Pemex or loosening the company's domestic monopoly. This position was strengthened
by the fact that the founder and traditional leader of the party, Cuauhtemoc Cirdenas, was
the son of Lizaro Cirdenas, the mastermind of the expropriation himself. Additionally,
the party's 2006 presidential candidate and most influential member in the early 2000s
was none other than Andres Manuel L6pez Obrador-the leader of the Adelitas
movement and staunch proponent of a fully state-owned Pemex (LUpez Obrador 2008).
On the right, the conservative PAN displayed lukewarm support for liberalization.
While the party's ideology was generally in support of a diminished role of the state in
economic activity, not all of its members ventured to call for privatization-whether out
of conviction or fear of being labeled as unpatriotic. In the end, however, the PAN had
been founded in the 1930s largely as a response to the statist policies of President Lizaro
Cirdenas (Loaeza 1999), and it seemed to be a matter of time before more of its members
spoke openly in favor of liberalization.
Finally, the ideologically eclectic PRI had prominent members both in favor and
against private participation. Zedillo and one of his top advisors, Luis T6llez, advocated
liberalization. Other prominent members of the party, among them Manuel Bartlett, were
devoted opponents (see, for example, Bartlett Diaz and Rodriguez Padilla 2008). In fact,
ideological disagreements within the PRI had thwarted Zedillo's attempt to privatize
Pemex's petrochemical assets.
1.4 Public Opinion on the Relationship between Pemex and the State
Public opinion in Mexico has also been shaped by the symbolism of the oil
expropriation of 1938, taught in public school textbooks as one of the proudest moments
in the country's history. In 2008, for example, the free national history textbook for the
sixth grade-published at the request of the Ministry of Education-had six pages
devoted to the facts and benefits of the expropriation. This manifested a trend, begun in
1960, whereby the virtues of state ownership of oil would be taught to Mexican students
at a very young age. 82
Survey results available confirm that a majority of Mexicans oppose private
investment in the industry, although not necessarily by overwhelming margins.
Interestingly, surveys on political attitudes in Mexico only began to include items
gauging views on the oil industry in the 2000s. Presumably, prior to that decade
researchers took public opposition to privatization for granted. In recent years, however,
a sizable minority of the population is openly supporting private participation in the oil
sector.
The Mexico Global Views Survey, conducted in 2004, provides an idea of the
distribution of views on oil industry matters in the country several years prior to the
reform attempt of 2008 by Felipe Calder6n (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia
Econ6micas, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, and Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos
Internacionales 2005). The survey drew a nationally representative sample of 1,500
respondents and asked political questions of relevance for U.S.-Mexican relations. 83 in
82 See Martinez, Nurit, "Expropiaci6n se aduefia de libros de texto," El Universal, 8 June 2008.
83 The sample was selected following a multi-stage process that combined probability-proportional-to-size
and random sampling criteria. The methodological document states that the response rate was 60%,
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response to the question "In your opinion, should the Mexican government permit or not
that foreigners invest in oil production and distribution," 60% of Mexicans were opposed
and 34% were in favor.
Calder6n's proposed reform in 2008 triggered a series of surveys that sought to
measure changes in public opinion after the issue had become more salient and once the
government had orchestrated a media campaign urging Congress to authorize private
investment in deepwater oil exploration and production. In early March of that year, the
Mexico City newspaper Reforma published the results of a survey that specifically
probed on views on the liberalization of the energy sector.84 Table 3.1 presents some of
the most relevant results.
[TABLE 3.1 HERE]
Table 3.1 shows that the majority of respondents support a statist control of
Pemex, and most of those who are in favor of allowing private investment believe that the
company should still remain under governmental control. This is not surprising, given
that as many 63 % of respondents believe that the oil expropriation was a measure that
benefited the country. The survey also found that, as expected, public opinion on private
investment in the company varied greatly with the partisan identification of the
respondent. Among PAN supporters, 45 % supported allowing private capital in the
although it does not state the methodology to estimate this percentage. The margin of error for a 95%
confidence interval is plus or minus four percentage points.
8 This survey included 1,515 respondents also selected following a multi-stage process that included
probability-proportional-to-size and random sampling criteria. The response rate, calculated based on the
most stringent formula stipulated in the guidelines of the American Association for Public Opinion
Research, was 34%. The margin of error for a 95 % confidence interval is plus or minus 2.5 %. See
Gutierrez, Roberto and Alejandro Moreno, "Divide opiniones apertura energetica.," Reforma, 3 March
2008, p.6.
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company and 39% opposed it; among PRI supporters, 40% were in favor and 40% were
against; and among PRD sympathizers only 29% supported such liberalization while 60%
opposed it. Interestingly, 48% of non-partisan respondents also opposed the proposal,
with only 34% supporting it. Thus, preferences at the mass level fairly mirrored those
held by elites.
Table 3.1 Results of Reforma's Poll on Energy Policy
Do you believe that Pemex is an efficient or an inefficient company?
Efficient: 63%
Inefficient: 27%
What are the causes of Pemex's inefficiency?
Corruption: 44%
Bad government management: 22%
The Labor Union: 11%
Obsolete Infrastructure: 9%
Are you in favor or opposed to allowing private capital investments in Pemex?
In favor: 37%
Opposed: 46%
No opinion: 17%
The 70th anniversary of the petroleum expropriation will be celebrated this March. In your
opinion, did that measure benefit or hurt the country?
Benefit: 63%
Hurt: 24%
Doesn't know: 13%
In your opinion, what would be the best policy?
Keep Pemex exclusively in the hands of the Government and do not allow private
investment: 43%
Allow private investment in Pemex but keep the company under the Government's
control: 37%
Privatize Pemex: 7%
Doesn't know: 13%
Note: Reforma's poll was conducted between February 16 - 18, 2008 in 101 primary
sampling units selected nationwide. The total sample included 1,515 respondents.
The purpose of this section is not to explain the causes behind public preferences
with regards to oil policy, but simply to describe what those preferences are. In this
regard, two conclusions stand out. First, most Mexicans, in fact, oppose privatization.
Second, many of them do oppose a nationalized industry-in spite of a public education
system that emphasized the benefits of expropriation.
2. The Origins of Pemex
2.1 Expropriation Decree and the Creation of the Company
On March 18, 1938, President Lizaro Cirdenas issued a decree expropriating
most of the petroleum assets in the country.85 The legal rationale for the expropriation
was the refusal of the foreign companies to accept a resolution that established more
favorable terms for the oil workers' union than they were willing to provide. "It is of the
public domain," read the decree, "that the oil companies that operate in the country and
that were compelled to establish new working conditions by the Group Number 7 of the
Federal Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, have expressed their refusal to accept the
resolution, despite the fact that the Supreme Court of Justice has recognized its
constitutionality." Due to the dispute, the government argued that the suspension of labor
activities in the industry was imminent, and given the importance of petroleum for the
national economy, it was compelled to take control of the assets to ensure their continued
operation. Thus, decades of large-scale foreign investment in the Mexican oil industry
came to an end.
85 See Decreto que expropia afavor delpatrimonio de la naci6n, los bienes muebles e inmuebles
pertenecientesa las companias petroleras que se negaron a acatar el laudo de 18 de diciembre de 1937, del
grupo nuimero 7 de la Junta Federal de Conciliaci6n y Arbitraje, 18 March 1938.
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Almost three months later, on June 7, 1938, Petrdleos Mexicanos (Pemex) was
created as a public enterprise in charge of exploiting and administering the expropriated
oil resources in the country on behalf of the Mexican state. It would be governed by a
nine-member Board of Directors consisting in six representatives appointed by the
president of Mexico and three by the oil workers' union. The company's income and
expenditures would be sanctioned by the Ministry of Finance.86
The precedent for Pemex can be found in the company Petr6leos de Mexico, S.A.
(Petromex), which had been created as a mixed public-private company in 1933 to
increase the participation of the state and domestic capital in the national oil industry
(Alvarez de la Borda 2006). It had regulatory tasks and was vertically integrated, but it
failed to attract private investment-by 1936, only 6.29% of the shares of the company
were in private hands, far below the target of 50% (Alvarez de la Borda 2006). In 1937,
the government dissolved Petromex and transferred its assets to the newly formed
General Administration of National Petroleum (Administracidn General del Petr6leo
Nacional). This entity would control the expropriated companies between March 18,
1938 and the date of the creation of Pemex in early June of that year.
In its first years, Pemex did not have full control over all petroleum resources in
the country. At the same time when Pemex was founded, President Cirdenas issued a
decree creating a second state-owned enterprise charged with domestic and international
marketing, Distribuidora de Petrdleos Mexicanos. Additionally, Pemex only managed
those assets that were expropriated. While these constituted a majority, the General
Administration of National Petroleum still controlled those assets-approximately 3% of
86 See Decreto que crea Petr6leos Mexicanos, 7 June 1938.
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national production-that the Mexican state already owned before 1938 (Meyer and
Morales 1990; Macmahon and Dittmar 1942).
In 1940, the General Administration and Distribuidora were merged with Pemex.
Distribuidora's standing was jeopardized when a dispute with the labor union led to the
resignation of its director. Additionally, coordination problems arose in the corporate
governance of Pemex and the General Administration. In response, President Cirdenas
decided to vertically integrate all activities and consolidate all assets under a centralized
management.
2.2 The Oil Industry Prior to the Expropriation
In the first two decades of the 20t century, Mexico became one of the most
important oil producing countries in the world. In 1921, only the United States produced
more petroleum than Mexico (Haber, Maurer, and Razo 2003). A liberal natural
resources ownership regime adopted by the government of Porfirio Diaz in the late 19*"
century had encouraged foreign investment in the Mexican oil sector and had led to
significant discoveries along the Gulf coast (Meyer and Morales 1990).87 Similarly, a
small refining industry emerged clustered in the Tampico-Madero area in northeastern
Mexico (Brown 1992). During the turbulent years of the Mexican Revolution-from
1910 to the early 1920s-the promise of high returns continued to attract foreign
investment.
The defining element of the two decades prior to the expropriation of 1938 was
the enactment of a new constitution in 1917 and, more specifically, of its article 27. The
87 The introduction of the liberal regime of ownership of natural resources occurred with the enactment of
the Mining Code of 1884. While Manuel GonzAlez was president of Mexico at the time, the regime has
been associated with Porfirio Diaz, who supported and expanded the change (Meyer 1968).
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new legal regime reversed the liberal reforms of the Diaz era that granted perpetual
ownership of subsoil resources to the owner of the land and re-established the doctrine
that the subsoil wealth belongs to the nation (Rippy 1972). The original text of article 27
stated the following:
In the Nation is vested the direct ownership of all minerals or substances,
which in veins, ledges, masses or ore pockets, form deposits of a nature
distinct from the components of the earth itself, such as the minerals from
which industrial metals and metalloids are extracted; deposits of precious
stones, rock-salt and the deposits of salt formed by sea water; products
derived from the decomposition of rocks, when subterranean works are
required for their extraction; phosphates susceptible of utilization as
fertilizers; solid mineral fuels; petroleum and all solid, liquid, and gaseous
hydrocarbons. 88
The foreign oil companies that already operated in the country argued that their
assets were protected from the new restriction, since article 14 of the same constitution
clearly stipulated a no retroactivity condition for any law in the country. Negotiations
between the companies and the early post-revolutionary governments ensued, unable to
settle the oil question once and for all. To complicate matters further, it would not be
until 1925 that the Mexican legislature issued an Enabling Law for Article 27 that
clarified the scope of the constitutional text. While the Mexican government sought to
88 Translation based on the text provided in
http://www.ilstu.edu/class/hist263/docs/1917const.html#TitleIChapterI, accessed on 21 June 2010.
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reach a middle ground, the oil companies believed that acquiescing to a partial loss of any
property rights would set a precedent of their acceptance that article 27 could apply
retroactively (Meyer 1968). Moreover, they likely believed that a hard-line position
against the Mexican government would preempt other countries from enacting similar
laws (Maurer 2010).
When LAzaro Cardenas took office as president of Mexico in 1934, the context of
the oil industry was as follows. First, investment in the industry had decreased
considerably and production had fallen drastically from the peak in 1921. This was the
result of the exhaustion of the existing fields in Mexico (Haber et al. 2003) and the rise of
Venezuela as a more promising oil area from a geological and a regulatory perspective
(Meyer and Morales 1990). Second, the legal framework was based on the Petroleum
Law of 1925, as amended in 1928. This was the Enabling Law of Article 27, and with the
reform of 1928 it granted perpetual rights to those landowners who had acquired their
assets prior to 1917 and who had made "positive acts" to explore and produce oil prior to
that year.89 Third, Mexican petroleum workers had gathered strength as a collective force,
managing to combine the nearly 18,000 oil workers from different organizations into a
single national union (Meyer 1968).
In that setting, the facilitating condition for the nationalization of the industry was
not an appeal to Article 27-since the retroactivity question was still unsettled-but the
dispute with the Mexican Oil Workers' Union. As explained above, the workers
demanded better terms of employment and pleaded their case with the Federal Board of
89 The Petroleum Law of 1925 had limited the rights of landowners making positive acts prior to 1917 only
to 50 years. In the reform of 1928, a distinction was made between "landowners" and "lessees," with the
former re-acquiring perpetual rights over the subsoil of their lands (Meyer and Morales 1990). The
definition of a "positive act" generated controversy. In the Petroleum Law of 1925, a positive act was
defined stringently. In 1928, the definition was relaxed.
92
Conciliation and Arbitration. The latter sided with the union, but the oil companies
refused to abide by the resolution.
2.3 The Aftermath of Expropriation
The structure of the Mexican oil industry was in flux in the years immediately
following the expropriation. At first Pemex was only charged with the administration of
the assets of the expropriated companies, and it was only in 1940 that it acquired those
that belonged to the General Administration of National Petroleum. Furthermore, it
would not be until 1951 that Pemex acquired those oil fields belonging to private
companies that had not been expropriated in the Decree of 1938. Most notoriously, the
Mexican Gulf Oil Company had not joined its peers in the refusal to accept different
labor conditions for the oil workers and therefore its assets were not expropriated by the
government. In the 1940s, Gulf produced small amounts of oil and sold them to Pemex.
By 1951, however, the company agreed to sell its assets to the Mexican government,
which was eager to finally place all oil resources under state control (Bermndez 1963).
Two additional problems complicated the performance of Pemex in those early
years, one domestic and one international. On the home front, the government had to deal
with a highly militant and organized oil workers' union that had been further empowered
by their successful mobilization of 1938. The number of workers increased drastically,
from 15,895 in April of 1938 to 23,073 in October of 1939 (Meyer and Morales 1990).
The government pushed back, but the union responded with several work stoppages that
continued into the early 1940s and peaked in December of 1946 with a workers' strike in
Poza Rica and in the Azcapotzalco refinery in Mexico City. The newly inaugurated
government of President Miguel Alemiln deployed the army to break the strike, and the
Pemex director, Antonio J. Bermddez, orchestrated the dismissal from the company of
dozens of union leaders. The new leadership of the workers then reached a labor
agreement with the Pemex management in June of 1947 that provided stability to the
industrial relations in the company (Alemin 1977).
The second problem faced by Pemex was the international boycott organized by
the oil companies and the support that these received from the Department of State of the
United States, eager to set an example to prevent other countries from following the
Mexican experience and affect U.S. business interests (Meyer 1968; Maurer 2010). The
immediate effects of this boycott were the refusal to purchase oil from Pemex or to
provide physical and human capital to the infant Mexican oil industry. Additionally, the
U.S. Department of State maneuvered to block financing from the United States for
Pemex, which was in a dire financial condition and desperately needed a loan to
jumpstart its exploration and development programs (Alemin 1977).
The boycott from the companies was lifted in the early 1940s, when the Mexican
government began to reach agreements with them regarding the compensation for the
expropriation (Alemin 1977). By that time, the United States was purchasing crude from
Pemex directly to assist in the war effort, which was a more pressing concern for the
Roosevelt administration than "punishing" Mexico for the nationalization. The financing
question lingered until 1947, when the U.S. government agreed to provide economic
assistance to develop the nationalized Mexican oil sector (Alemitn 1977; Bermndez
1963).
3. Continuity and Change in the History of Pemex
Throughout its history, Pemex has undergone several important transformations.
In this section, the trajectory of the company is discussed based on four criteria relevant
for a state-owned enterprise. These four variables are: (i) the corporate structure, (ii) the
relationship with the private sector, (iii) the production profile, and (iv) the relationship
with labor. A fifth element, the policy value of the company for the state, is analyzed in
the next section of this chapter.
3.1 Corporate Structure
A central element of the corporate structure of the company since its founding has
been the principle of shared governance between the federal executive and the oil
workers' union. Accordingly, the Board of Directors, the top governing body of the
company, has included labor representatives since 1938. This arrangement responded to
the favorable view of industrial relations during the Cirdenas administration and to the
rising strength of the oil workers' union at the time, which played a decisive role in the
expropriation itself (Meyer and Morales 1990).
Initially, the Board of Pemex had nine members, of which six were designated
directly by the president of Mexico and three by the union leadership. In 1940, the
balance changed to five government representatives and four union ones. This structure
remained in place until the reform of 2008, when a new Ley de Petrdleos Mexicanos was
issued, expanding the Board to include four "professional Board members" chosen by the
president and subject to Senate confirmation.9
See Decreto por el que se expide la Ley de Petr6leos Mexicanos; se adicionan el articulo 3o. de la Ley
Federal delas Entidades Paraestatales; el articulo 1 de la Ley de Obras Pfiblicas y Servicios Relacionados
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The second element that describes the corporate structure of Pemex concerns the
organizational scheme of the company. Prior to the late 1980s, Pemex operated as a
single legal entity. Once the Distribuidora was merged with Pemex, the company became
vertically integrated from the well to the pump at the gas station. The different tasks in
the chain of production (exploration and production, refining, petrochemicals, gas
processing, and marketing) were commissioned to subdirecciones. In 1989, the foreign
trade activities were spun into a separate subsidiary, PMI, which was majority owned by
Pemex (see Chapter 4). The more comprehensive change, however, occurred in 1992,
when the company divided all other functions into four legally independent subsidiaries
that operated at arm's length from each other. These subsidiaries were still subordinated
to a holding company, Pemex Corporate, but each had its own Board of Directors with
increased managerial autonomy.91
The four subsidiaries were Pemex-Exploration and Production, Pemex-Refining,
Pemex-Gas, and Pemex-Petrochemicals. The separation followed standard practice in the
international oil industry and, in the words of its supporters, it was essential to introduce
accountability into a company of more than 100,000 workers scattered throughout the
country. Francisco Rojas, who was CEO of Pemex at the time, explains:
Pemex was a fully vertical enterprise and this led to management
inefficiencies. It was a company structured by functions: so sales would be
in charge of one person, construction someone else, and thus no one was
con las Mismas y un pdrrafo tercero al articulo 1 de la Ley de Adquisiciones, Arrendamientos y Servicios
del Sector P blico, 28 November 2008. The other Board members are selected by the President and are not
subject to Senate confirmation.
91 For example, the subsidiary boards of directors do not have any representatives from the union.
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responsible of anything. When you asked them: 'Why didn't you finish
this on time?' they would say: "Because that department didn't issue the
public bidding on time.' 'And why didn't you do the public bidding on
time?' 'Because the sales people didn't do their part on time.' In short, no
one was in charge of anything. We changed the structure into something
that was not a Mexican invention: it was similar to that of an integrated oil
company.92
Adriin Lajous, who was the chief planning officer of Pemex in 1992 and who is credited
with the conception and implementation of the reform, is more blunt:
When Pemex wasn't divided into subsidiaries, its accounting standards
were those of a corner convenience store. There was no way to see the
performance of smaller units. It was like a family corner store, where
brother Pedro was in charge of sales, and cousin Joaquin was in charge of
purchases, and uncle Juan kept the books. That's how Pemex kept its
data.93
Yet, the structure of Pemex into separate subsidiaries was one of the most
contentious issues in the company by the time of Calder6n's reform initiative in 2008.
Critics argued that duplicity of functions throughout each subsidiary was widespread,
leading to unnecessary expenditures in administrative services (Shields 2003).
9 Author's interview with Francisco Rojas, Mexico City, 30 July 2008. Francisco Rojas was CEO of
Pemex from 1987 to 1994.
93 Author's interview with Adrian Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2008.
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Additionally, they complained that the subsidiaries had amassed too much independence
without a strong centralized authority. In 2008, Pemex-Corporativo, the central
headquarters charged with coordination, was called by company staffers as "Pemex-
Decorativo" to emphasize its lack of real power. 94
Throughout the years, Pemex has owned several subsidiaries that are not directly
part of the company's formal structure. In 2010, for example, Pemex was majority owner
of Compahia Mexicana de Exploraciones, S.A. (Mexican Company of Explorations,
Comesa) and of Instalaciones Inmobiliarias para Industrias, S.A. de C. V (Real Estate
Facilities for Industries). Previously, it also owned gas local distribution companies.
An important change in the corporate structure concerns the ownership of the
gasoline service stations of the company. Originally, Pemex directly operated most of its
service stations through the subsidiary Compahia Mexicana de Estaciones de Servicio
(Mexican Company of Service Stations, CODESSA). In the 1980s and early 1990s, more
stations became franchises in the hands of private entities. Eventually, in December of
1992, CODESSA was dissolved and its remaining assets sold via public bidding. In 2010,
service stations in Mexico, while restricted to selling Pemex gasoline, were privately
owned.
A final aspect of the history of the corporate structure of Pemex concerns the
short life of Mexpetrol, a company that focused on international activities. Mexpetrol was
founded in 1989 with the objective of participating in all segments of the value chain,
from project design to the construction of "turn-key" facilities (Gil Valdivia 1997). The
9 Leftist politicians in Mexico have pushed for re-integrating the company into a single legal entity (see,
for example, Intervenci6n del Lic. Manuel Camacho Solis en el Foro de Debate de la Reforma Energitica,
8 July 2008). Rojas and Lajous dismiss these criticisms. Lajous, for example, argues that the duplicity of
tasks already existed prior to the company restructuring, and that the way to eliminate it is by decreasing
the number of workers rather than by changing the organizational structure.
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company combined Mexican private engineering firms with several state-owned
entities. 95 While the majority of the shares were in private hands, Pemex was the single
largest owner. The most important assets were located in Argentina and smaller ones in
Bolivia. In 1996, the Pemex Board of Directors authorized the sale of the company's
shares in Mexpetrol-leading to the dissolution of the company. 96
Disagreements exist regarding the virtues of Mexpetrol. Strictly speaking, the
subsidiary was a losing enterprise with rates of return to investment much lower than the
ones Pemex could obtain in Mexico. Francisco Rojas, Pemex CEO when Mexpetrol was
founded, believes that it was a worthwhile opportunity for capacity-building:
The logic was to internationalize Pemex and other Mexican enterprises.
Having the strength of a company of the size of Pemex, it made sense to
internationalize both Pemex and Mexican engineering enterprises. That's
what we wanted to do with Mexpetrol, and we could have created a super-
enterprise. Just so you know: we had the chance to end up with Peru's gas,
we had the chance of ending up with [Argentina's formerly state-owned
oil company] YPF, that Repsol later bought, we even had the chance of
ending up with Repsol when it was privatized. At the time, we were the
second large shareholder of Repsol. If we had doubled the size of our
investment, we would have ended up with control of Repsol.97
95 The constitutional restriction against associations with the private sector for the exploration and
roduction of oil only applies to assets in Mexico, not internationally.
See the minute of the Board of Directors meeting of Petr6leos Mexicanos of 4 September 1996.
* Author's interview with Francisco Rojas, Mexico City, 30 July 2008.
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Adriin Lajous, the Pemex CEO who decided to sell the company's shares in
Mexpetrol, takes a more pragmatic approach. He points out that, in practice, the private
partners in Mexpetrol had conflicting goals and coordination problems. Additionally,
Pemex did not have expertise to market its services abroad. More importantly, "it would
be very hard for Pemex to have access to fields as promising as the ones in Mexico, and
Pemex did not have the resources to support an international expansion."
Jose Angel Gomez Cabrera, one of the Pemex petroleum engineers who travelled
to Bolivia and Argentina to participate in Mexpetrol's projects, shared Lajous's
pessimism regarding the opportunities for internationalization:
I think that Mexpetrol ended because it wasn't feasible for the people in
Mexico to be travelling to Argentina or Venezuela to find oil fields. Over
there they would give us the worst fields. You would get old fields. In
Bolivia they gave us a field called Camiri, which was in complete
decline.98
3.2 Public-private relations
A second criterion to analyze the history of Pemex concerns its changing
relationship vis-a-vis the private sector. In the first decade of the twenty-first century,
Pemex was 100% owned by the Mexican state and had a complete monopoly over
petroleum exploration, production, refining, and gas processing activities in Mexico.
Other state-owned oil companies, notably Brazil's Petrobras, Italy's Eni, and Norway's
Statoil, were partially privatized in the 1990s and liberalized their domestic markets-
98 Author's interview with Jos6 Angel G6mez Cabrera, Mexico City, 16 April 2008.
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even though the state remained a significant player in the industry. In the case of Mexico,
no such liberalization took place.
The relationships of production in the oil industry, however, transcend such a
simplistic public-private dichotomy. Even in a "closed" industry such as Mexico's, the
private sector plays a significant role as a contractor for many of Pemex's activities. This
is a symbiosis that exists in every country in the world, regardless of how closed its oil
sector may be. In fact, in 2009, Pemex was the main client worldwide of the private
international oil services company Schlumberger.99 In 2009, when Pemex began large
scale operations in the Chicontepec oil field, the U.S.-based private companies
Halliburton and Baker Hughes also drew a large share of their profits from operations in
Mexico. The specialized journal Petroleum Intelligence Weekly describes the Mexican
context as follows:
Mexico enjoys a reputation as one of the last true bastions of state oil and
gas ownership, with fervent nationalism still dominating the debate over
the country's oil industry some 70 years after foreign operators were
expelled. That sense of national pride does not extend to the oil-field
services sector, however, with state Pemex highly dependent on foreign
oil-field services firms such as Halliburton, Schlumberger and Noble to
keep the oil flowing. According to an independent study, one-third
9 Author's interview with Lawrence Schwartz, Manager of Worldwide University Relations at
Schlumberger, Cambridge, MA, 19 June 2009.
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of Pemex's 2007 budget of 224 million pesos ($16.8 billion) went on oil-
field services.100
Moreover, this was not a new trend. In the late 1970s, Pemex hired the service
company Brown & Root to develop the Cantarell field discovered in the Gulf of Mexico
(Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda 1997). In short, the notion that the private sector is shunned
from the Mexican oil industry is incorrect. Instead, it is necessary to determine which
activities have been closed at different points in time. With regards to oil service
companies operating as contractors for Pemex, the Mexican oil industry has always been
open to private and foreign capital.101
The question of ownership and management of petroleum resources in the
country-as opposed to fee-for-service contracts-has been more complicated. In this
regard, two stages in the history of Pemex can be discerned. The first one, from 1938
until 1960, was ambiguous regarding the possibility of private participation and
suggested, to some, that the legislation purposefully left open the possibility of re-
allowing private ownership in case it were needed to develop the industry. The second
stage, which began in 1960, closed all legal loopholes that allowed any petroleum
resources to be controlled by entities other than Pemex.
According to Lorenzo Meyer-a historian of the Mexican oil expropriation-two
different political groups emerged in the early 1940s with regards to this question. One of
them, linked to then former President Cirdenas, pushed for the complete nationalization
1io See "Foreign Legion Underpins Mexico's Oil Nationalism," Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 5 January
2009.
101 Service contracts raised little controversy because the private companies never claimed control of the
petroleum reserves nor made decisions of when or how much to produce or refine-not to mention, as well,
that Pemex desperately needed the technical expertise that these companies could provide.
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of the industry. The other one, however, wanted to keep the option of private
participation open (Meyer and Morales 1990). The ambiguity of the legislation in the
subsequent years reflected this tension within the government. The amendment to Article
27 of the Constitution of 9 November 1940, for example, banned the emission of
concessions in the oil industry. Yet, the Petroleum Law of 1941-which served as Article
27's Enabling Law-allowed for the creation of mixed public-private companies with
domestic capital for oil production in the country. Additionally, the Petroleum Law of
1941 did not explicitly exclude foreign capital from investing in exploration and drilling
(Meyer and Morales 1990).
In this first stage of "incomplete nationalization," several instances of private
participation occurred. For example, as noted above, the Gulf Oil Company was allowed
to continue producing until 1951, since it had not been expropriated in 1938.
Additionally, in 1946 the Federal Government awarded an exploration and production
contract to a Mexican citizen in the state of Sinaloa (Bermndez 1963). The most
significant instance of controversial private investment, however, resulted from the risk-
agreements made between the government and several foreign companies between 1949
and 1951. The government allowed these companies to select drilling locations and carry
out the development of the wells. If the fields were unproductive, the companies would
pay for the losses. If they were productive, then they would be reimbursed for the
102 The contract stipulated that the Federal Government would be paid 12.5% of the production obtained.
The outcome would not be positive: in 1955, with the first well still being drilled, the government rescinded
the contract (Bermndez 1963).
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expenditures incurred and would receive between 15 % and 18% of the production during
a twenty-five year period (Bermdidez 1963).103
The loopholes for private participation were closed by 1960, when Article 27 of
the Constitution was amended to explicitly state that, with regards to petroleum and other
hydrocarbons, "no contracts will be issued and those already in existence will no longer
be valid." Two years earlier, in 1958, a new Enabling Law of Article 27 had been issued
stating that only the nation could exploit oil resources. In the words of Antonio J.
Bermddez (1963), the Pemex director-general between 1946 and 1958, at that time "the
road to nationalization" was complete.
While no major liberalization would take place in petroleum per se, the domestic
gas industry was partially liberalized in the 1990s. In 1995, the government of Ernesto
Zedillo orchestrated a reform to the Petroleum Law to allow private entities to participate
in the domestic market for transportation, storage, and distribution of natural gas.10 The
exploration, production, and processing of gas, however, remained under exclusive
control of Pemex.
3.3 Production profile
A third way to classify the history of Pemex follows from the level of crude oil
production of the company. In this regard, several major stages can be distinguished as
well. First, between 1938 and the early 1970s, Mexico did not have large potential
reserves. Production was low and scarce resources were channeled to developing a
domestic refining and distribution network that could satisfy the growing energy needs of
103 In 1952, the Attorney General's office issued an opinion stating that the contracted did not violate
constitutional restrictions (Bermidez 1963).
' See the Amendment of 11 May 1995 to the Enabling Law of Article 27 with regards to Petroleum.
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the country. This stage became unsustainable in the early 1970s due to two main factors.
First, the growth rate of the domestic demand for fuels surpassed the company's capacity
to replenish reserves (see Chapter 6). Second, the world price of oil increased drastically.
The second stage, from 1976 to 1981, corresponded to a period of rapidly rising
production. Fields discovered in the late 1960s and early 1970s proved to be among the
largest in the world. A new management, led by Jorge Diaz Serrano (Pemex CEO from
1976 to 1981), changed the old managerial policy that focused on self-sufficiency
(Bermudez 1976). This led to a significant clash with the Pemex "old guard," who
believed that producing for export would jeopardize the long-term energy security of the
nation (Diaz Serrano 1989; Szekely 1983; Morales, Escalante, and Vargas 1988). In the
end, the promise of massive rents accruing to the public treasury was too strong of a
temptation for Pemex and the government. The company became a major exporter in the
international market while it pursued heavy investments to fulfill its growth potential.
The third stage, from the early 1980s through the mid-2000s, consisted in
sustained high levels of production coming from one primary reservoir, a massive field
Cantarell in the Gulf of Mexico. During this time, the Mexican government settled on a
goal to export an average of 1.5 million barrels per day-which was determined to be the
limit of the "absorptive capacity" of the Mexican economy.10 5 This level of exports was
maintained in spite of growing domestic demand, and it would increase in the early 2000s
upon the completion of a major project to increase production in Cantarell.
The fourth stage, which started in the middle of the 2000s, seeks to manage the
decline of production in the country. After the peak of 2004, Pemex oil production has
dropped at alarming rates. This process has prompted the government and the
105 Author's telephone interview with Pedro Aspe, former Minister of Finance (1988-1994), 13 May 2009.
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management to focus on exploration and production in areas of difficult access and to
prepare for an eventual transition to becoming a net importer of oil. Figure 3.1 shows the
evolution of domestic oil production (top line) and consumption (bottom line) between
1950 and 2008. Figure 3.2 presents the production levels of the Cantarell field, the most
important in the history of Pemex.
[FIGURE 3.1 HERE]
Figure 3.1 Domestic Production and Consumption of Oil (1950-2008)
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Figure 3.2 Crude Oil Production in Cantarell Field (1980-2008)
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3.4 Relationship with Labor
Industrial relations in Pemnex have been difficult from the onset. After all, the
expropriation of 1938 followed a period of rising strength and militancy of the oil
workers' union. Through the years, the union has persevered to increase its prerogatives,
which include high salaries compared to other workers in Mexico and, more importantly,
stringent restrictions on the management's ability to hire, dimiss, or even relocate
workers. 106 The consequence of the labor relationship is a very high number of workers
in comparison to international oil companies (see Table 1.1).
For years, the power amassed by the union was represented by the strength of the
leader, Joaquin Hernindez Galicia-better known as "La Quina" (Alonso and Roberto
LUpez 1986). He rose in prominence as a union leader in the 1950s, and for decades he
106 The union's prerogatives are crystallized in the Collective Labor Agreement, a long document that is
revised periodically and which has institutionalized a very favorable regime for the union. The most
important section, Chapter 2, identifies two types of jobs in the company, "de confianza" and unionized.
Any job that is not de confianza must be filled by recommendation of the union leadership.
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focused on two goals. First, since the strength of the union relied on the number of
affiliates, he continuously negotiated to increase the number of jobs in the company that
were considered "unionized" positions and thus, per the Collective Labor Agreement,
could only be filled by someone recommended by the union leadership. Second, he
positioned the union so that it would receive a share from procurement contracts-thus
safeguarding its financial position. In return, La Quina helped to keep the oil workers
under the corporatist control of the ruling PRI and, by extension, of the government. 07
The principle of co-governance of the company proved unrealistic in practice, as
the labor representatives veiled exclusively for the interests of the union. This was the
case even in circumstances where enhancing workers' prerogatives would likely damage
the long-term viability of the company. In fact, the presence of labor representatives
pushed the management to discuss important issues outside of the Board meetings.
Adriin Lajous, for example, recounts that as head of Pemex in the 1990s he "tried to use
the Pemex Board meetings for ritualistic issues, but the Board meetings of the
subsidiaries [which do not have union representation] for the real management." 108
A content analysis of a random sample of Board of Directors meeting minutes
conducted for this study shows that, generally, union members only spoke during
sessions if workers' issues were at stake. The methodology of the content analysis is as
follows. A simple random sample of 10% of all the Board of Directors' meetings held
between the beginning of the L6pez Portillo administration (1 December 1976) to the end
107 Grayson (1988) documents the controversy regarding alleged high levels of corruption in the union with
regards to the allocation of procurement contracts.
108 Author's interview with Adriin Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2008. In the late 1970s, Board meetings
were even less important for the management of the company. Ricardo Garcia Siinz, who was a designated
Board member in the late 1970s as Minister of Planning and Budget under L6pez Portillo, states: "We
wouldn't even meet. We would meet only to fulfill some legal requirement, when there was a need to do
sign a paper that required the Board's approval." (Author's interview with Ricardo Garcia Sainz, Mexico
City, 17 July 2008.)
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of the Fox administration (1 December 2006) was selected using a random number
generator in a computer program.109 This represented 18 out of 181 meetings. These
meeting minutes were then read and coded based on several criteria. One of these was
whether or not a union representative spoke in a meeting and what he or she said. Labor
represenatatives participated in 50% of the sample (9 out of 18), but rarely to comment
on the long-term health of company. Instead, their comments focused mostly on issues
pertaining to the union.
One example, from the Board of Directors meeting of 10 December 2003, is
illustrative of the participation of the union. The actual entry in the minute of the meeting
is below:
Pablo Pav6n [a union representative], right before the end of the meeting,
requested to speak "because he had been given the task, by the Secretary-
General of the union, to comment in the midst of the Board of Directors"
an important issue. The previous day to the Board meeting, "a national
newspaper published an imprecise article that discusses some topics that
compromise the union's reputation." The title of the publication was "Oil
Workers' Union Encloses Petr6leos Mexicanos." He said that "this is
worrisome, since it is clear that the article seeks to criticize the union,
which has shown its solidarity with Petr6leos Mexicanos and with the
Nation by accepting revisions to the Collective Labor Agreement that have
led to salary increases well below the rise of inflation and the needs and
109
109Stata 10 was used.
purchasing capacity of the workers." He asked for the solidarity of
Petr6leos Mexicanos so that a clarifying statement could be issued.
Twice, the government has pushed back to restore a more flexible labor structure
for the company. The first, referenced above, occurred in 1947 under the Pemex
administration of Antonio J. Bermddez (Alonso and Roberto L6pez 1986). The second
one took place in 1989, early in the presidential administration of Carlos Salinas, and led
to the removal of La Quina from the union. 10
Ironically, in spite of the popular conception of the strength of the union, labor
leaders were rapidly dismissed in both occasions and union prerogatives curtailed.
Francisco Rojas cautions against blaming the union for all the problems in the company
and points out to the low strength of the union during his administration as proof that it is
possible to dismiss workers who do not increase productivity. "We're the ones who have
created the myth of the union," he explains. "Why were we able to cut back the size of
the workforce in half? Why were we able to re-write the collective labor agreement? Why
can't they do these things now?" Additionally, he emphasizes that the payroll has
historically been very small with relation to the company's revenues-approximately
4%.111
The relative weakness of the union lasted until the year 2000. In that year,
negotiations with the leaders that replaced La Quina led to an increase in the type of jobs
110 This event became known in the Mexican political lore as "El Quinazo," and the word would later
become a common term to refer to a major action by a president to assert his authority early in the
administration. La Quina was imprisoned after a controversial legal process (Hernindez Galicia 2000).
I Author's interview with Francisco Rojas, Mexico City, 30 July 2008. Adrian Lajous commented that
"everyone was always very afraid of the power of La Quina, but when he was finally removed by the
government, nothing happened" (author's interview, 7 July 2008).
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under control of the union. Three years later, in 2003, the union threatened to go on
strike, but the impasse was resolved. By 2010, the number of workers and the union
prerogatives were similar to those in place in 1989.
4. The Policy Value of Pemex for the State
4.1 Fiscal Policy
Arguably, the policy value of Pemex has been highest in the fiscal realm. The
development of Cantarell in the 1970s coincided with the rise in the international price of
oil and, almost overnight, brought vast sums of foreign exchange to the Mexican
government. Since the presidential administration of Jose L6pez Portillo (1976-1982), all
Mexican governments have heavily relied on the proceeds of oil exports to finance their
activities.
[FIGURE 3.3 HERE]
Figure 3.3 shows the percentage of government revenues coming from duties
levied on Pemex (excluding taxes on gasoline consumption). A dramatic rise takes place
in 1980, when as much as one-third of the federal budget is financed by the oil sector.
Swings in the price of oil and the volume of exports made the percentage fluctuate in the
1980s and 1990s between 10% and 30%, before reaching a staggering 48% in September
of 2008.
Fiscal extraction from Pemex rose continuously in the 1980s and 1990s. The
Ministry of Finance (known in Spanish as Hacienda), in control of government revenues,
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also acquired control over the finances of Pemex. Adrian Lajous explains that "Pemex's
budgetary decisions were made based on macroeconomic objectives... It wasn't that
Hacienda wanted to bureaucratize Pemex. It was that we were in such a difficult financial
situation that questions of short-term financial equilibrium were central." 1 2 As taxation
from other sectors of the economy decreased, the Ministry searched deeper into Pemex to
compensate for lost income. It would not be until the late 2000s when Hacienda's power
to levy taxes and duties on Pemex would be somewhat curtailed-a point which is
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Figure 3.3 Percentage of Government Revenues from Hydrocarbon Duties
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0.60
0.50 --
0.40 - ------------------
0.30 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
0.10 - -
0.00
00 O 0 N e 00 m - m o . Oi 0 W M 00 0
M N 00 00 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 O OW 0 0
Source: Banco de Mdxico
Figure 3.4 shows the percentage of total sales revenue that Pemex has paid in
taxes and duties to the government from 1950 to 2008. Until the mid-1970s, Pemex was
112 Author's interview with Adriin Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2008.
112
not taxed very heavily. A spike occurs in the late 1970s, as the Ministry of Finance
begins to collect more money. The highest levels occurred during the administrations of
Ernesto Zedillo and Vicente Fox, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, respectively.
[FIGURE 3.4 HERE]
Figure 3.4 Taxes Paid by Pemex as a Percentage of Total Sales (1950-2008)
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The financial subordination of Pemex to the Ministry of Finance raised many
complaints among the company's managers, who felt that entrepreneurial decision-
making was hindered by the lack of investment resources. Francisco Rojas complained
that "we reached the extreme where Hacienda would tell a productive enterprise like
Pemex that it had to spend 35% of its budget in the first quarter of a year and 40% in the
last quarter. It is truly insane for Hacienda to set rules on how a productive enterprise
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should allocate its budget throughout the year."" 3 Adrian Lajous agrees with Rojas and
emphasizes that the Ministry of Finance exercised a line-by-line control over the
company's budget.
4.2 Industrial Policy
Industrial policy in Pemex was pursued actively until the early 1980s.
Domestically, the price of fuel was heavily subsidized for the benefit of industrial and
household customers (Bermi dez 1976; Meyer and Morales 1990). Additionally, national
engineering firms were often preferred when awarding procurement contracts. With
regards to international marketing, Pemex offered supply contracts to several country-
primarily Japan and France-in exchange for pledges to pursue foreign direct investment
and participate in technological exchange programs (Wionczek, Shinohara, and Serrato
1982; Snoeck 1988).
The economic policy program in Mexico at the time, import-substitution
industrialization (ISI), viewed industrial policy favorably. Import-substitution was a
fundamentally statist paradigm, marked, as Baer (1972) points out, by
[P]rotective tariffs and/or exchange controls; special preferences for
domestic and foreign firms importing capital goods for new industries;
preferential import exchange rates for industrial raw materials, fuels and
intermediate goods; cheap loans by government development banks for
favored industries; the construction by governments of infrastructure
especially designed to complement industries; and the direct participation
113 Author's interview with Francisco Rojas, Mexico City, 30 July 2008.
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of government in certain industries, especially the heavier ones, such as
steel, where neither domestic nor foreign capital was willing or able to
invest. (p. 98)
The Mexican government implemented ISI vigorously between the presidential
administrations of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) and Jose L6pez Portillo (1976-
1982). All of these governments were generally associated with a left-of-center ideology,
which at the time was dominant in the ruling PRI. However, in the 1980s, a generational
change would bring new leaders that espoused a different set of economic views.
Scholars of Mexican economic policy argue that the transition in the balance in
the ruling coalition's support from import-substitution industrialization to
neoliberalism-which advocated the retrenchment of the government from industrial
promotion-occurred in 1986, when Gustavo Petricioli was appointed to lead the
Ministry of Finance replacing Jesus Silva Herzog (Babb 2001). Petricioli had studied
economics in the Instituto Tecnol6gico Aut6nomo de Mixico (Autonomous
Technological Institute of Mexico, known as ITAM), a private university that had been
the bastion of neoliberal economic thinking for some time. Silva Herzog, on the other
hand, had been trained in the National University and represented the "old guard,"
looking more favorably at the role of the state in the economy (Babb 2001; Camp 2002).
From that point forward, Ministers of Finance have come from the ranks of
ITAM, and several of them have received doctorates from the Department of Economics
of the University of Chicago-perhaps the best known neoliberal training institution in
the world. This was the case of Francisco Gil Diaz, minister between 2000 and 2006, and
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his immediate successor, Agustin Carstens. While industrial policy did not fully
disappear, the government entity in charge of approving Pemex's budget had an
ideological aversion towards it.
4.3 Political Patronage Objectives
An analysis of the policy value of Pemex cannot neglect the negative aspects of
the company's policy utilization. Pemex has a long history of corruption that has
tarnished the reputation of the company considerably. Moreover, since it operates in most
parts of the country, Pemex is wide open to pressures for political favor from both local-
and national-level politicians.
One of the most infamous scandals involving Pemex and the pursuit of political or
electoral gain occurred in the year 2000, in the midst of that year's presidential election.
In what would later become known as the "Pemex-gate," the administration of Vicente
Fox accused high-level officials in the Zedillo administration, in particular the CEO of
Pemex at the time-Rogelio Montemayor-and the top leaders of the oil workers' union,
of embezzling millions of pesos and illegally transferring them to the war chest of the
PRI's presidential candidate." 4 In all likelihood, that incident was just the most visible
one of many that occur away from the attention of the media and that hurt both the
company's business efficiency and Hacienda's revenues.
114 See "Mexico's Attorney-General is investigating allegations of money laundering," Petroleum
Intelligence Weekly, 28 January 2002.
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5. Conclusion
This chapter has provided an overview of Pemex, including the history of its
founding, its symbolism for the Mexican public and the political elite, and its value as an
instrument of policy. The objectives have been two-fold. First, this chapter has sought to
explain the common features to all the subsidiaries of the firm, so that an analysis of the
differences among these different companies can focus on the differences. Second, it has
attempted to underscore the importance of the petroleum industry to the Mexican state
and the people.
Since its creation in 1938, Pemex has changed in significant ways. In terms of its
corporate structure, it was split from a fully vertical enterprise into a group of relatively
autonomous subsidiaries coordinated by a corporate office. The participation of the
private sector in company activities also changed, once risk agreements were disallowed
in the 1950s. With regards to production, Pemex discovered massive fields in the 1960s
and 1970s that turned Mexico from a slight importer to one of the most important oil
regions in the world. As a result, Pemex in the 2000s was much larger and more
influential in the international oil industry than it had been in the 1940s, 1950s, and
1960s.
At the same time, by 2010, seven decades after its founding, much remained
constant in the company. As the demonstrations led by the Adelitas showed, petroleum
affairs in Mexico remained highly symbolic for the population at-large and could easily
triggered popular mobilizations. Additionally, the company's relationship with the union
continued to be tense. Throughout the history of the company, labor representatives sat in
the company's board of directors; yet, their role as a co-governing party was curtailed by
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their understandable incentive to advocate for greater union prerogatives first and
foremost.
Finally, in its role as one of the most important state-owned enterprises in the
country, the Mexican state continued to utilize Pemex as an instrument of policy. The
type and extent of policy utilization, however, varied over time. Starting in the late 1970s,
but especially in the 1990s and 2000s, Pemex became the preeminent fiscal policy tool of
the Ministry of Finance. Previously, it had played an explicit industrial development role
that was attenuated after the mid-1980s. Furthermore, governments used Pemex as a
vehicle to increase their clout over political clienteles throughout the country and to
channel resources away from productive activities in order to influence elections.
The next three chapters present detailed accounts of the subsidiaries of the
company, following the sub-organizational analytical method that was described in
Chapter 1. In the following chapter, Pemex's international marketing branch, PMI, is
examined. Subsequent chapters discuss the history of the exploration and production
subsidiary and the two downstream branches: Pemex-Gas and Pemex-Refining.
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CHAPTER 4
HOW PMI BECAME A SUCCESSFUL COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE
1. The Argument in Brief
The history of PMI Comercio Internacional (PMI, for short), the international
marketing and trading of Pemex, illustrates a wide range of outcomes of the theoretical
argument advanced in chapter 2 and provides an opportunity to observe the mechanisms
that led a state-owned enterprise to attain high levels of business efficiency. The path
towards becoming a successful commercial enterprise, however, was not without hurdles.
In fact, the history of PMI reveals how a combination of exogenous shocks and
endogenous political development transformed a government entity over the course of
thirty years.
This chapter makes the following arguments. First, PMI evolved from a
disorganized branch into a highly specialized, productive, and innovative
commercialization organization. Second, market competition and managerial
specialization-at different points in time and to different degrees-contributed to
improve the firm's efficiency and decrease the government willingness and ability to
introduce political intervention that was not aligned with the business interests of the
company. Third, starting in the mid-1980s, PMI has not been utilized as an instrument of
industrial policy. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the government sought to exchange
supply contracts for foreign direct investment (thus promoting domestic
industrialization), but soon after the rise to the presidency of the conservative government
of Miguel de la Madrid in 1982, the company's the goal centered strictly on maximizing
government revenues.
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The case of PMI shows the effects of changes in the level of market competition
on the behavior of a state-owned enterprise. Over time, the international oil market has
moved from periods when demand for oil outpaces supply to others when a supply glut
pushes prices down. The latter are instances of high competition, as firms must excel in
their practices to displace rivals in global supply chains. Interestingly, in the period under
study, PMI implemented three novel and successful marketing strategies and they all
coincided with periods when market competition became more severe. This occurred at
three different points in time and under three different directors-general. A close
examination into the process leading to those successful innovations opens a window into
the incentives for business efficiency brought my market competition and illustrates how
a state-owned enterprise from a developing country can achieve world-class levels of
performance.
2. An Overview of the Business of PMI
PMI was created in 1989 as a subsidiary company of Pemex out of the General
Division of Foreign Trade. For the purposes of this chapter, the Division of Foreign
Trade and PMI proper are considered the same organization, since the new subsidiary
comprised the same staff and offices as its predecessor. The legal tie to the parent
company, however, changed in ways that are more fully described later in the chapter.
Previously, commercialization activities were a division of Pemex; starting in 1989, they
were conducted by a company controlled by Pemex as its majority owner.
PMI is charged with all foreign trade activities of Pemex, which can be divided
into three main categories. First, it sells (i.e., "markets") Mexican crude in international
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markets. Historically, this has been the most important activity of the company: Second,
it undertakes "trading" of refined products such as gasoline, diesel, and petrochemicals-
but not of crude oil." 5 Compared to marketing, trading constitutes a small part of the
business. Third, it looks after Pemex-owned foreign assets, such as refineries, that are
operated by partner companies. Regarding marketing, PMI can be compared to other
companies that engage in first-hand oil sales-that is, only to companies with oil
exploration and production activities. Trading and asset management, on the other hand,
are conducted by many different kinds of companies, both standalone trading firms and
subsidiaries of oil companies.
PMI, like any marketing branch, faces challenges largely determined by the fact
that the international oil market consists in many slightly differentiated streams of crude
oil and that customers-the refineries-are customized to process particular types. Some
of these crudes are sufficiently similar that the commodity is, in practice, relatively
fungible. Other times, crude streams vary considerably and refineries can only process
them profitably if they undertake costly and lengthy capital investments. For example,
those companies that produce more viscous crude (called "heavy," as opposed to "light")
and with higher sulfur content (known as "sour," as opposed to "sweet") pay a penalty
since typical refineries using them are unable to yield high percentages of gasoline,
diesel, and jet fuel-the refined products that command the highest market value.ii6
115 "PMI does not make trades with speculative purposes, only for hedging purposes," explained a trader in
PMI. Author's interview, Mexico City, 17 April 2008.116 These are measured in terms of the viscosity of the oil (measured in degrees API, after the classification
of the American Petroleum Institute, where higher degrees indicate "lighter," less viscous, oil) and the
content of metals, particularly sulfur, which are generally corrosive to refineries and thus decrease the value
of each barrel. Heavy, sour crudes are considered "specialty"-as opposed to general purpose-crudes.
They are different because they carry "a very high value in specialized plants and a considerably lower
value in general purpose refineries" (Boud 2002, p. 11).
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Marketing success relies on commercial strategies for both spot sales and the
development of long-term supply contracts. Competitiveness is not only achieved via the
price and quality of the product, but also with the quality of the service. In the
international oil market, reliability of the supplier carries value-since it diminishes
supply risk for the refinery (Boud 2002). Customers that feel unfairly treated at times of
excess demand may be more willing to make investments to switch to other crudes or
may make negotiations more difficult during cyclical periods of oversupply.
Thus, the tools to develop commercial strategies are varied. The fact that
refineries are customized to process certain types of crude oil allows marketing
companies to engage in spatial arbitrage. Arbitrage consists in exploiting short-term
differences in the price for the same product. In the case of heavy oil, a company like
PMI may choose to raise its price for a geographic region-say, the Gulf Coast of the
United States-where demand is temporarily higher while keeping it lower for Europe or
Asia. In these instances, additional costs and delays due to transportation ensure that the
price discrepancy does not close instantly.
In theory, PMI could also engage in time arbitrage, increasing its inventory of
crude oil when its price relative to that of a competitor's price is low and selling the
inventory when it is high. However, the high costs of carry discourage this practice.
Bernardo de la Garza, chief of crude oil marketing at PMI from 2001 to 2010, explains as
follows:
The basic problem that I face is that I have the obligation to sell all of the
company's production each month. If I do not sell all the crude oil that I
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am supposed to and thus lead to a situation of high inventories, the cost is
higher than if I underpriced slightly and sold the extra oil. The issue is
how to play with the price so that you meet the objectives of clearing the
market and maximizing value. In this tradeoff, there are cents at stake; but
when you are placing 1.7 million barrels of crude in the market every day,
cents make a big difference.! 1
The quality of the products is generally fixed, pre-determined by the geological
conditions of the reservoirs. Still, a marketing company may blend different crude
streams and put to market a product with higher captive demand. Other times, marketing
companies will pursue upgrading projects in conjunction with their E&P counterparts and
pre-process the crude into a lighter blend before shipping it to the customers.
In short, there are several paths to improve a company's competitiveness as it
seeks to meet the dual goals of price and volume maximization. Innovations in
commercial strategies result when a company develops a new mechanism to create and
exploit price arbitrage opportunities or to improve the quality of its service. As the rest of
this chapter makes clear, the innovations of PMI have occurred precisely in the moments
when market competition has increased.
Since the early 1980s, most of Mexican oil production has consisted of a heavy,
sour crude stream labeled "Maya," originating in the supergiant Cantarell field off the
Bay of Campeche, which has API gravity of 21.8 and 3.33% sulfur. For comparison, the
117 Author's interview with Bernardo de la Garza, Mexico City, 7 April 2008. If production decisions are
made in conjunction with marketing strategies, then production could be curtailed at the wellhead based on
the outlook of the market. However, this is generally not the case, given the time lag involved in making
such production decision, which would likely eliminate the arbitrage window.
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benchmark crude West Texas Intermediate (WTI)-a light, sweet crude-has an API
gravity of 39.6 and 0.24% sulfur. Production of Maya rose steadily in the early 1980s,
stabilized later in the decade, and rose again considerably in the late 1990s and early
2000s. In the 1990s and 2000s, Maya was one of the most important crude streams in the
world. In the year 2006, for example, only two other streams of crude oil were produced
in greater volumes that Maya: Russia's Urals and Saudi Arabia's Arabian Light." 8
Mexico also commercializes the lighter crude streams Olmeca and Isthmus, although in
smaller volumes, and often these are blended with heavier crudes to produce a Maya-like
crude.
Figure 4.1 shows the long-term trend in exports of Maya from 1980 to 2010.
From an average slightly below one million barrels per day throughout the 1980s and
1990s, the level of exports grew rapidly in the early 2000s, peaking in 2003 and then
declining. Production from the Cantarell field has declined even more rapidly (Adrian
Lajous 2009), but Pemex has chosen to blend heavier crudes from different fields with
light crudes to produce a Maya-like mixture. This commercial strategy has maintained a
higher level of exports.
[FIGURE 4.1 HERE]
118 Source: Energy Intelligence, 2007, The Crude Oils and their Key Characteristics, available online at
http://www.energyintel.com/DocumentDetail.asp?documentid=200017 (accessed on 7 April 2010).
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Figure 4.2 displays the nominal monthly F.O.B. price of Maya from 1983 to
2010.119 Figure 4.3 shows the difference in the average monthly prices of WTI (spot price
at Cushing, Oklahoma) and Maya (F.O.B.). Throughout the entire time period, Maya has
sold at a discount with regards to Maya due to its inferior characteristics. Yet, the gap has
widened or narrowed at different points due to oil market "fundamentals" of supply and
demand, as well as commercial strategies adopted by PMI.
Figure 4.1 Total Exports of Maya Crude (1980 - 2010)
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[FIGURE 4.2 HERE]
119 The term FOB means "free-on-board" and denotes the price of a cargo at the port of shipment, exclusive
of transportation costs. When the latter are included in the price, this is generally referred to as "landed."
Often times, although not always, transportation costs are paid for by the customer.
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Figure 4.2 F.O.B. Price of Maya Crude (1983-2010)
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Figure 4.3 Difference in Prices between WTI Spot and Maya F.O.B. (1986-2010)
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3. Measurement of Variables
How to measure the relevant dependent and explanatory variables? As mentioned
in chapter 2, some variables are intrinsically different depending on the segment of the
value chain under study. That is, market competition in exploration entails different
activities than in refining and so on. Additionally, in other instances, there is an explicit
choice not to quantify variables that are inherently qualitative or for which data is not
available and expert opinion provides as good a metric as possible. Nevertheless, an
attempt is made to be clear regarding the methodology employed in all cases.
3.1 Business Efficiency
The efficiency of PMI's marketing and trading activities is done qualitatively,
based on the opinion of Mexican and international experts. Additionally, productivity and
innovation in marketing are gauged quantitatively by comparing the price of the main
Mexican export, Maya, to a relevant counterfactual-in this case, the benchmark crude
known as Alaska North Slope (ANS). If PMI's behavior were assessed based only on the
price of Mexican oil, it would not be possible to disentangle changes due to fluctuations
in the global oil market from those due to the implementation of commercial strategies.
The causes of these changes are identified thanks to the econometric analysis of a time
series of monthly price and volume data for Maya and international crudes from 1983
through 2009. Some of the findings are included in the text throughout the chapter, and
the full methodological discussion is provided in Appendix A.
120 The econometric technique used is a combination of vector-autoregression and intervention analysis
(here labeled VARIA). The essence of vector-autoregression analysis consists in estimating the relationship
among variables that are jointly endogenous, such as supply, demand, and prices. Intervention analysis
simply tests for whether the implementation of a policy changes the mean of a (detrended) series.
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These results are also compared to those previously published by Bou6 (2002),
measuring the success of PMI relative to that of its main competitor in the market for
heavy, sour crude: Venezuela's Petr6leos de Venezuela (PDVSA). Quantitative analysis
of trading practices is not possible due to the confidentiality of the transactions. In any
event, as explained above, trading has not traditionally been as significant for PMI's
business volume as marketing.
3.2 Non-Commercial Policy Outcomes
Policy outcomes in the case of the commercialization subsidiary can take several
forms. An industrialist orientation seeks to use oil pricing and the allocation of contracts
towards the promotion of domestic industry. A lower price, for example, can be
negotiated in exchange for the commitment to make a direct investment in the country or
to enter into a technological supply agreement. In the absence of industrial policy, no
extra-commercial supply agreements are made.
Data on supply contracts are generally not publicly available, thus complicating a
systematic quantitative assessment of policy outcomes. Hence, participant accounts and
secondary sources are used to determine whether or not extra-commercial quidpro quo
clauses were included.
3.3 Market competition
The case of PMI is unique among those included in this study, from a
methodological standpoint, for two reasons. First, the presence of a competitive market
environment does not depend on decisions made by the Mexican government or by
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Pemex that could be regarded as endogenous to the subsidiary's performance. PMI's
mission has been to commercialize crude oil and to trade oil products in the international
market, and the degree of market competition has thus been outside its control. Second,
the degree of market competition in the international milieu has changed several times-
sometimes drastically-thus permitting a systematic analysis of the effects of different
levels of competition on the performance of the company and on the capacity of the
government to intervene in its internal operations.
Market competition in the international oil market is measured as follows.
Qualitatively, industry specialists have identified the times when market competition is
high or low based on the ease with which they can sell crude in the market. Adriin
Lajous, who was chief of the Division of Foreign Trade between 1982 and 1988 and who
would later become director-general of Pemex, speaks in terms of "inflection points"
where the market shifts from a "sellers' market" to a "buyers' market" and viceversa.m
A consensus on these points exists in the secondary literature, as follows:
* 1973: Change of regime (Parra 2005; Yergin 1991)
* 1979: Decrease of competition (Parra 2005)
* 1981: Increase of competition (Parra 2005)
* 1985-86: Increase of competition (Lajous 2006; Mabro 1987)
* 1998: Increase of competition (Mabro 1998)
* 2002-03: Decrease of competition (Fattouh 2010)
The use of a quantitative measure generally confirms the cutoff points above. A
measure of competition must capture the swings in the difficulty of oil companies to sell
121 Adrian Lajous, personal interview, Mexico City, 7 July 2008.
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barrels at the margin. An intuitive method to estimate increases in international
competition would be to analyze the balance of global petroleum supply and demand. In
periods of global economic expansion, the demand for oil increases and, all else held
constant, competition decreases. By contrast, during global downturns, competition
increases as the demand for oil shrinks.
Unfortunately, monthly data for this indicator is unavailable for most of the
period under study and a proxy must be used instead. Under the reasonable assumption
that oil supply is fixed in the short run, changes in global aggregate economic activity
provide a good approximation. 12 3 When economic activity rises, so does the demand for
crude oil. Following Kilian (2009), global aggregate industrial activity is measured by
taking the natural logarithm of average shipping freights around the world.124
Letting periods of high demand (i.e., low competition) be those for which the
values are one standard deviation above the mean, and focusing only on the 1980s (i.e., to
avoid potential issues with the volatility of the 1970s), the threshold is crossed in October
of 2003. After that month, most monthly time periods are above one standard deviation
122 The standard indices used in the industrial organization literature to measure competition-such as the
concentration ratio of the four largest companies or the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index-are not as helpful for
our purposes given that those are intended to gauge the presence of oligopolistic competition. Few, if any,
dispute that the oil market is not perfectly competitive.
123 Changes in supply help determine the competitiveness in the market as well, although in the oil industry
they have historically been less helpful. As Kilian (2009) explain, oil supply decisions usually respond
slowly to changing market environments. In fact, Kilian argues that, in the short-run, the oil supply curve is
perfectly inelastic. The implication is that increases in global demand are only slowly met by increasing
production. Kilian's interesting finding is that supply shocks have a very temporary effect on prices.
However, there have been moments where an exceptionally high increase of crude appears to enter a
particular submarket, such as when Mexican oil exports rose sharply beginning in 1999-2000.
1 Shipping freights rise when global economic activity increases and decline during times of global
recessions. Kilian (2009) argues that "it is widely accepted that world economic activity is by far the most
important determinant of the demand for transport services" (p. 1055). See Appendix A in this dissertation
for a more detailed explanation.
130
125
until September of 2008. Conversely, the critical months for low demand (i.e., high
competition) are considered to be those that are one standard deviation below the mean.
These are between July of 1985 and February of 1987, between February of 1998 and
July of 1999, between August of 2001 and August of 2002, and after November of 2008.
While these figures come from one particular proxy for global demand for oil, it is
reassuring that they roughly match the assessments of industry analysts.
Pemex entered the international market as a seller in 1975. Between 1972 and
1974, Mexico was a net importer of oil, and previously its production barely met
domestic consumption needs. The timing was advantageous if the objective was to
maximize rents: oil prices were high and market competition was low. Afterwards, the
global level of competition changed four times: in 1981, 1985, 1998, and 2003. The first
three times competition increased; the fourth, it decreased.
3.4 Managerial Cohesion
Unlike market competition, specialization cannot be introduced by a rapid
exogenous shock. Instead, by definition, it results from a long and gradual process.
Accordingly, the presence or absence of high managerial cohesion is more complex, and
the identification of the effects on the behavior of the company are more controversial-
albeit not less important. In fact, identifying the presence of cohesion is very different
from market competition in the sense that the exact moment of the change is unclear.
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify moments of high and of low cohesion, even if there
are gray areas in between.
125 This cutoff roughly corresponds to the beginning of the global financial crisis. The investment bank
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy precisely on that month.
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As explained in Chapter 2, several questions are useful to assess the degree of
cohesion of the managers of the company. Have most of the managers worked together
for a long period of time? Do they share a common technical language, as members of
the same profession usually do? Do they share experiences of high risk that developed
bonds among themselves? Are the managers a small group that belongs to the same social
circle or is their life outside of work independent of each other?
The assessment of the level of managerial cohesion in this chapter is made
qualitatively. Managerial cohesion in the late 1970s and early 1980s is low. In the early
to mid- 1980s, a process of professionalization of the staff is undertaken. Managers and
staffers acquire technical knowhow, and the younger, better trained generation begins to
replace the older one. By the early to mid-1990s, PMI has achieved a high level of
specialization. A small group of staffers has moved up through the ranks of the company
and has learned advanced techniques on trading, refining economics, and crude oil
markets. By 2010, this high level of cohesion remained high.
Cohesion, however, has likely been lower than in Pemex-Exploration and
Production. There is no dominant profession in PMI. In 2008, the director-general was a
chemical engineer, and the deputy directors included a lawyer, an economist, a specialist
in business administration, and another chemical engineer. Yet, specialization in the
analysis of the oil market is high and promotions are almost always made from within.
Working in a small environment, managers of PMI develop a strong professional bond
from the moment they join the company. For many of them, PMI has been their only
employer, 15 or 20 years after graduating from college.
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3.5 Auxiliary Variables
In the history of the relationship between the Mexican state and PMI, fiscal
jeopardy played an important role to diminish the willingness of the politicians to
introduce non-aligned government intervention in the operations of the firm. The high
need for fiscal revenues increased the stakes of errors in marketing decisions, and
politicians were less willing to upend the recommendations of the technical staff. For
theoretical purposes, this variable enhances the effect of market competition in
diminishing the willingness of the politicians to get involved in technical decisions.
Moments of fiscal jeopardy can be measured qualitatively based on participant
accounts. In their memoirs, Presidents De la Madrid and Salinas both emphasize the
moments when they thought that a moratorium on debt payments was an imminent
possibility. These accounts, however, can be complemented with a simple quantitative
analysis. Figure 4.4 presents the monthly averages from 1980 to 2010 of the net debt of
the Mexican public sector, shown in 2002 constant prices (adjusted using the Mexican
Consumer Price Index). It is not until early the 1990s that the deficit declines
considerably, after a sustained high level beginning in 1982 and a peak in early 1987.
[FIGURE 4.4 HERE]
4. Summary of the Evolution of PMI Across Time
PMI evolved over time as it became an efficient state-owned enterprise. This
section describes the variation in the main explanatory variables-market competition,
managerial cohesion, and political ideology--and shows how these changes led to
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different outcomes in terms of economic efficiency and policy orientation. As the reader
may recall from chapter 2, market competition and managerial cohesion jointly help to
determine both the capacity of the firm to perform efficiently and the ability of the
government to intervene in the internal operations of the SOE. Likewise, political
ideology and the government's willingness and ability to intervene in the firm determine
its policy orientation.
Figure 4.4 Deficit of the Mexican Public Sector (1980-2010)
(2002 Constant Prices)
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Table 4.1 describes the qualitative changes in market competition and managerial
cohesion over time. The high-high quadrant leads to a finn that behaves like a
commercial enterprise, the low-low quadrant leads to a firm that behaves like a
government agency, and the high-low and low-high quadrants lead to intermediate
outcomes. In these latter instances, the capacity of the government to intervene in the
company is moderate, and the performance of the finn is lacking in at least one regard.
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[TABLE 4.1 HERE]
Table 4.1 Evolution of
Market Competition and Managerial Cohesion
Market Competition
Low
High
Table 4.2 The Policy Utilization
Low
Moderate
High
Industrial Policy Mandate
Low High
1986-2003 1985-1986
2003-2010 1981-1985
1976-1981
Table 4.2 describes the changes in the political ideology of the government and
how these interrelate with the government's intervention in its internal operations. The
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Low High
1976-1981 1981-1985
2003-2010 1985-2003
ideological placement is determined by the ruling coalition of the country. It is worth
pointing out that the case of PMI does not allow examining one type, a rightist ideology
with a high level of non-aligned interference. Similarly, the instance of an industrial
policy mandate with a low level of intervention covers only one year and thus does not
provide as rich an account as the other cases in the table.
[TABLE 4.2 HERE]
5. A Political and Economic History of PMI
The price cut that cost a presidency
On June 1, 1981, Jorge Diaz Serrano, the director-general of Pemex, made a
decision that would cost him his job, an eventual run for the presidency, and ultimately,
his liberty. As head of Pemex, he brought down the price of Mexican crude sold in
international markets by 11.5%. The decision, he argued, was of vital importance to keep
Mexican crude competitive.
The move offered rivals in the highest political circles the opportunity to try to
topple him. Jose Andr6s de Oteyza, the Secretary of Patrimony and Industrial Promotion,
strongly criticized the Pemex director with President L6pez Portillo (Diaz Serrano 1989).
Lowering prices, Oteyza argued, showed that Diaz Serrano was pandering to U.S.
interests, undermined Mexico's commitment of solidarity towards the Organization of
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Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and, more importantly, would hurt the
government's revenue base at a time of rising financial instability (Buendia 1985).126
L6pez Portillo, aware that the economy was slipping into the worst economic
crisis in decades, was already concerned about Diaz Serrano's power. Pemex, as some
observers argued, had become "a state within the state."127 Yet, Diaz Serrano was the
president's childhood friend, and during the last few years had turned Pemex from a
small company into a global oil giant. He was the leader of the petro-boom: a sort of
Mexican Midas.
According to the unwritten rules of the Mexican political system, the outgoing
president had the prerogative to handpick the candidate of the ruling Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI).128 The PRI's candidate was virtually assured to win the
presidency, as the party customarily used all legal and extra-legal means to win elections
(G6mez Tagle 1994; Craig and Cornelius 1995). Oteyza and other prominent members of
the cabinet feared that Diaz Serrano was L6pez Portillo's favorite to win the nomination;
with elections a year away, time was running out for the detractors of the Pemex chief
executive.
Tragedy soon beset Diaz Serrano. On June 6, 1981 he was forced to present his
resignation to the Board of Directors of Pemex. The president's friend was removed from
126 Oteyza testified on June 16, 1981 in the Mexican Congress and spoke extensively against what he
considered to be Diaz Serrano's poor business judgment. Miguel de la Madrid recalled in particular the
claim that Diaz Serrano's decision was weakening OPEC's market position (Castafieda 1999).
127 Riding, Alan, "The Political Background of Resignation at Pemex," The New York Times, 8 June 1981,
p.D1.
128 Jorge Carpizo (2002), who served as attorney-general and secretary of the interior during the Salinas
presidency (1988-1994), wrote in reference to the twentieth-century Mexican political system: "The actual
head of the PRI is the president of the country, and no one denies or doubts this... The fact of being the
actual head of the PRI gives the president a series of prerogatives that go beyond those outlined in the
constitutional framework, which are, as we have mentioned before, the designation of his successor, the
appointment of governors, senators, of the majority of the deputies, of the principal municipal
presidents..." (p. 191).
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the political scene in Mexico City and appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union. On
September 22, Secretary of Planning and Budget Miguel de la Madrid, an ally of Oteyza,
was selected as the candidate of PRI, and soon after taking office in 1982 prosecuted
Diaz Serrano for alleged corruption charges. On July 30, 1983, then Senator Diaz Serrano
was impeached by Congress and put behind bars. He would remain in jail until the end of
De la Madrid's administration.129
The fate of Diaz Serrano would resonate strongly among the Mexican political
elite. Jose Antonio Ugarte, Lopez Portillo's chief of staff, later would say: "If oil prices
hadn't fallen, I have no doubt that [the candidate] would have been Diaz Serrano"
(quoted in Castafneda 1999, p. 393). How could everything unfold so rapidly? How could
a price cut of 11.5% wreak havoc in the architecture of the Mexican petroleum industry
and bring down the top contender for the presidency?
The international petroleum market, 1976-1981
The commercial policies of Diaz Serrano ought to be understood in the context of
the international oil market of the time. It was a time of political conflict in oil-rich
regions, apparent scarcity, and rising prices. Diaz Serrano became the chief of Pemex in
December of 1976 and never faced difficult conditions in the international market until
the crisis that led to his demise.
The peak of the oil crisis ensued after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which
pushed prices to levels never seen before. The high volatility was due to events in the
129Diaz Serrano was accused of embezzlement in the purchase of two oil tankers. The case against Diaz
Serrano was highly controversial, and many argued that it was nothing but a political vendetta by De la
Madrid. Even though Diaz Serrano's two top lieutenants, Jorge Chavarria and Ignacio de Le6n, fled the
country when their massive corruption was exposed, the evidence against the Pemex director-general was
weaker.
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Middle East in early 1979 that fell upon an industry psychologically predisposed for the
worst. As Francisco Parra, former secretary-general of OPEC documents, by 1977 there
was a widespread belief among international experts that the world was running out of
oil. "The community of energy analysts," he writes, "was obsessed with the notion that
an oil crisis was around the corner, and that it would take the shape of (most likely)
physically or (perhaps) politically constrained supplies of oil" (2005, p. 218). In March of
1977, the chairman of the International Energy Agency disclosed the results of an
"alarming" internal study that predicted a serious global shortage of petroleum by
1985.130 Similarly, in an interview published in The New York Times a full year before
the fall of the Shah, the chairman of the Royal Dutch/Shell committee of managing
directors remarked: "It becomes more difficult year by year to meet the potential demand.
The crisis is with us now." 131 Producers worried about early depletion, occurring years in
advance of their development timetables; consumers feared spiking prices and armed
conflict over scarce resources.
At the time, no reliable international spot market existed to reveal the market
clearing price.m Instead, the vast majority of oil sales were made by long-term contract
and oil producers set prices by decree. It would be years before the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX) and the International Petroleum Exchange of London introduced
paper transactions and provided the liquidity necessary to turn the marker crude markets
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent into credible indicators of supply and demand
130 "Agency Study Warns of 1985 Oil Shortage," The New York Times, 17 March 1977, p. 96.
131 "The Crisis No One Believes," The New York Times, 5 February 1978, p. IES6.
132 There were certainly skeptics regarding the fear of a severe oil shortage. The Oil and Gas Journal, for
example, published an article in mid-1978 with the title "Global Oil Deficit Seen Unlikely before Late
1980s."
133 In fact, OPEC countries had a policy of not selling at all in the spot market, limiting spot transactions to
a negligible fringe.
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conditions (Yergin 1991). Moreover, the existence of many different varieties of crude-
each with its own specific viscosity and content of metals-meant that the relative worth
of one particular grade against others was often ambiguous. Countries responded to
political considerations and business hunches in order to set prices, hoping not to be
undercut by a rival seeking a larger share of the market. To the extent that rigorous
technical analysis took place, it was constrained by the lack of reliable statistical
indicators.
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries served as a forum where
states-many of which had only recently nationalized their industries-could discuss
prices and try to cooperate (Ghanem 1986). OPEC had been formed in 1960 as an attempt
to form a common front against companies that were perceived to play one country
against another in their search for better concessions (Skeet 1988). Once nationalizations
occurred, however, oil exporters resorted to OPEC to agree on prices and, subsequently,
allocate production quotas among themselves, although with questionable levels of
success (Adelman 1980; Parra 2005).34
This tradition of "administering" prices came from the time when the so called
"Seven Sisters" dominated the international oil market.135 As vertically integrated
companies that controlled most of the production, refining, and distribution facilities, the
Seven Sisters determined prices through more or less open production negotiations (Parra
2005). Companies with low crude stocks relative to their refining capacity would call for
supply increases, while those with high relative crude stocks would ask for the contrary.
114 In 1985, OPEC adopted a market share system to replace its posted price system (Parra 2005).135 The "Seven Sisters" was the informal name given to the largest oil companies in the world. These
companies were Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, Texaco, Gulf, British Petroleum, and Royal Dutch/Shell. The
classic reference on their role in world energy markets is Sampson (1976).
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For the most part, the iteration of the exchange across time ensured that petroleum
production remained fairly stable and competition was largely relegated to the final
product markets. At other times, the Seven Sisters modified crude prices as they sought to
transfer earnings to fiscal homes with less onerous tax burdens (Skeet 1988).
When national governments took over their petroleum industries in the early
1970s, they simply adopted the existing pricing system, despite not having the global
refining perspective of the private companies to dictate market conditions. After all, their
goal was to obtain control of the production decisions, and they were not quite ready to
relinquish any of the prerogatives, including setting prices. Perhaps more importantly,
they did not know of any alternative price setting mechanism in the oil industry. Parra
(2005) writes about these years:
OPEC member countries believed it was their function and prerogative to
administer prices. In their experience, oil prices had always been
administered... After 1973, it never occurred to them to do otherwise, that
is, to leave the settlement of oil prices to the market. There was not even a
whisper of discussion of such a possibility from any quarter of the
industry. But even if it had occurred to them, it is not at all clear how they
would have gone about it. There was no independent free market in crude,
such as later developed for North Sea oil, that could provide market-
oriented benchmark crude prices or a reference point on which to base
term contract prices. (p. 216)
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The result of these two factors, fear of early depletion and lack of a reliable
market-based price system, was a fragile price-setting regime that began to crumble in
January of 1979 with the fall of the Shah. Skeet (1988, p. 151) argues that, in hindsight,
the system of administered prices survived in the 1974-1978 period given the capacity of
the largest producer-Saudi Arabia-to dictate production goals and the absence of
incentives for other members to violate agreements. In December of 1978, OPEC met in
Abu Dhabi to agree on a price schedule for all of the following year and announced that
the designated marker crude, Arabian Light, would rise from its price of US$12.77 by an
average of 10% every month of 1979.136 Yet, the price structure changed rapidly the
following month.
Throughout 1979, OPEC unsuccessfully tried to keep up with changing market
conditions. Iranian production dropped drastically, increasing the fears of scarcity among
consumers, and official posted prices kept rising without the apparent coordination of
previous years. The speed with which economic and political events unfolded far
outpaced the capacity of the cartel to set up meetings to discuss price adjustments. A gap
emerged between the official posted prices of OPEC member countries and the prices of
the small spot market.1 37
Incentives to violate agreements within the cartel increased and resulted in the
establishment of a premium on top of the official prices that customers had to pay in
order to secure a shipment. Kuwait was the first country to do this, adding a US$1.20
surcharge per barrel in late February (Skeet 1988). With the exception of Saudi Arabia,
136 Parra (2005, p. 219) notes that in the press release of the OPEC conference the price increase is justified
not by changing market conditions, "but by member countries' need to compensate for the decline of the
dollar against other currencies and the high rate of international inflation prevailing at the time."
137 During February and March, this gap was approximately US$10 (Skeet 1988).
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all other members followed suit, and it soon became evident that OPEC had lost its
ability to set the pace of price changes under the existing circumstances. An extraordinary
meeting of OPEC took place in late March that increased the official price for April 1979.
As a signal that discipline had broken down, the final communique acknowledged that
member countries had the sovereign right to add surcharges to their official prices (Skeet
1988). Another OPEC conference took place in June, again seeking to catch up with a
market situation of increasing supply concerns and rising prices.
Prices continued to increase throughout 1979, and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980
fueled concerns about the availability of oil supplies. The F.O.B. nominal price of Saudi
crude (Arabian Light) rose from US$12.77 in December of 1978 to US$23.12 in
December of 1979 and US$31.99 in December of 1980. Prices rose continuously until
June of 1981, dropping slightly from July through September before rising again. By
contrast, in the relative stability between December of 1974 and December of 1978,
roughly the period between the two oil shocks, prices only increased by US$2.26.
Mexico's commercial policy under Diaz Serrano
The goal of oil commercial policy under Diaz Serrano was industrialist, seeking
to promote the development of other domestic industries. Pemex often negotiated directly
with foreign governments and actively pursued technological exchange programs and
foreign direct investment. 138 The governments of France and Japan were among those
138 Adrian Lajous, author's interview, Mexico City, 12 January 2009.
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that acquiesced in order to secure contracts of Mexican crude (Snoeck 1988 pp. 76,
77).139
At the same time, the execution of the policy was disorganized, lacking both a
professionalized staff and established decision-making institutions. The absence of
market competition meant that few signals of performance could reveal these underlying
problems. Pedro Haas, director-general of PMI from 1989 to 1994, commented on the
practices of the company's marketing staff as follows:
Their method was to sit down, casually, with several companies, and try to
guess what they wanted, complain a little bit, and end up setting a price
very similar to the one that the companies wanted initially. It could or
could not be a reasonable price.14 0
Diaz Serrano managed the company without much oversight, but the events of
June of 1981 showed that with regards to commercial policy the government reserved the
right to meddle in the firm's operational decisions. During the five years he was in
charge, he had increased prices without having to seek consensus in the cabinet or the
company's Board of Directors (Meyer and Morales 1990). However, his first decision to
lower prices would also be his last. "But this is the way that prices have always been
determined!" pleaded Diaz Serrano at a cabinet meeting convened to reprimand him for
139 Foreign policy considerations were also at stake, manifested in a decision made in 1979 that no single
country would receive more than 50% of Mexican exports. In Mexico and in the United States-by far the
primary customer-this decision was understood as decidedly anti-American.
40 Author's interview with Pedro Haas, telephone communication, 14 January 2009.
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cutting prices. L6pez Portillo assented. "It's true," the president said. The next morning,
L6pez Portillo appointed a new director-general (Diaz Serrano 1989). 141
The absence of an institutionalized commercial strategy in Pemex can be
explained by three characteristics of Mexico's shift from being a slight importer to a
major exporter. First, the change took place in the midst of a strong sellers' market. As
one observer recalls about those years, "the demand for Mexican crude was such that
there were even people who would camp outside the offices of Pemex trying to make a
purchase. We didn't even have to seek out clients. The clients would literally beg for
barrels of oil."142 Inefficiencies in the commercialization process were easily concealed
by the vast rents accruing to the government.
Second, it occurred very rapidly. In 1974, two years before Diaz Serrano's
appointment, Mexico was a net importer of 380 barrels in the entire year. By 1981,
Mexico was exporting almost 1,100 barrels per day. This increase took place
simultaneously as the giant oil field Cantarell was being brought into production, two
refineries were planned and constructed, and a major gas pipeline from southern Mexico
to the U.S. border was laid out. The staff of Pemex was spread thin, as the company was
growing in several different directions at once.143
Third, it happened at a moment when Mexico was trying to play an active foreign
policy role around the world (Herrera and Ojeda 1983; Ojeda 1976). President Luis
141 Other actors recount the story differently from Diaz Serrano's autobiography. Adrian Lajous, for
example, worked directly under Oteyza at the time and emphasizes that Lopez Portillo had warned Diaz
Serrano to seek the consent of the economic cabinet before cutting prices. (Adrian Lajous, personal
interview, 12 January 2009.)
142 Author's interview with Adriin Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2008. In the early 1980s, Lajous was an
official in the Ministry of Patrimony and Industrial Promotion.
143 Lajous recounted his surprise to learn when he arrived to Pemex that the Foreign Trade Division had
"designed the first contracts to export crude simply by taking the same contracts that they had used to buy
crude and changing the names of the buyer and the seller." (Adriin Lajous, personal interview, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 12 January 2009.)
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Echeverria (1970-1976) sought to become a leader of the Third World, chairing the
Group of 77 in 1974-1975 and adopting a strong nationalistic rhetoric. By and large,
L6pez Portillo followed the same foreign policy doctrine. At the same time, Mexico's
proximity to the United States meant that much of the rhetoric could not turn into policy.
While Mexico was cognizant of the limitations imposed by its much stronger neighbor, it
pursued an independent geopolitical strategy whereby it was important to appear as an
honest broker with OPEC nations.144
Diaz Serrano issued quarterly price statements that consistently put Mexican
crude (medium-light Isthmus at first and, starting in September of 1979, also the heavy
Maya) higher than comparable OPEC oil, under the argument that, being outside of
OPEC, Pemex was more reliable as a supplier and thus its long-term contracts carried
less risk. In July of 1980, for example, Mexican Isthmus, with viscosity of 33.4* API and
sulfur content of 1.25%, sold at US$34.50, while Arab Light, of 32.80 API and sulfur
content of 1.97%, was fixed at US$28. In that same month, Mexican Maya, an especially
hard to refine heavy crude of 21.80 API and 3.33% sulfur, was given a price of US$29
(Snoeck 1988). Unfortunately, given that OPEC countries were selling crude at a
premium above the official prices, it was not possible to make direct comparisons to
gauge the success of the Mexican pricing policy.
In short, Diaz Serrano lacked a specialized staff to study the international market
and sell Mexican crude, as there had been no time to develop one. Moreover, he probably
did not feel the need for one, since he had never had difficulty selling a barrel of oil.
When things turned sour and competition suddenly appeared, the weaknesses inherent in
the system became apparent.
14L6pez Portillo expressed that view in public statements (Buendia 1985).
146
Exogenous shock: The oil market inflection of 1981
The consensus view about an impending global oil shortage was misguided. A
global economic slowdown meant that demand for oil was receding, production from
new investments was coming onstream, and inventories were larger than ever (Parra
2005). What seemed unthinkable occurred in early 1981: oil prices shifted downward.
From the peak of US$39 in February of 1981, oil sold at US$36.58 in July, and it would
not stop there. By July 1982, it was at US$33.44; in July 1983, it stood at US$28.73. The
oil crisis for the industrialized world had come to an end, but for oil exporting countries it
was just beginning.
Mexico's response: commercial and political disarray
Mexico was ill prepared for the transition from a sellers' market to a buyers'
market. The losses to the public treasury would be massive. Pemex responded slowly to
changing market conditions and received a wake-up call in April of 1981, when the
Ashland Oil Company announced that it would suspend the purchase of 90,000 barrels
per day. According to Ashland, Mexican crude was no longer economical for its
operations (Snoeck 1988). Other customers were vocal about the poor relative quality of
Maya, and urged Mexico to cut the price by US$6 per barrel (Morales et al. 1988).
Pemex lowered the price of Maya by US$2.50, but kept the price of Isthmus steady. This
appeared risky at the moment, since by then the official spread between Isthmus and
Arabian Light was US$6.50 per barrel. Throughout April and May, Pemex failed to sell
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an estimated 100,000 barrels per day (Morales et al. 1988), presumably because of this
overprice.
The stage for the fall of Diaz Serrano was set by an OPEC summit held on May
25-26, 1981 where member countries agreed to hold prices steady and only cut
production slightly (Skeet 1988). The downward pressures in the price were too strong
for this action to have substantive effects. Rumors surfaced that some OPEC nations-
Libya in particular-were offering customers discounts of US$4 per barrel below the
official prices. 145
Pressures on Pemex from customers mounted rapidly, eventually forcing Diaz
Serrano to make a rash decision (Diaz Serrano 1989). He opted to keep Isthmus at
US$38.50, but to cut a blend of 40% Isthmus/60% Maya from US$34.60 to US$30.60.
Mexico, officially at least, became the first major exporting country to lower its posted
146prices. This is how Diaz Serrano (1989) recounted the events of the last days of May of
1981, when he decided to lower prices:
One day, Mr. De Leon came to see me very alarmed to show me telex messages
from several clients that had received offers from Arab sellers discounting the
marker crude by four dollars. They asked for similar treatment and gave a
deadline for our decision. I summoned the experts to a working meeting that
would extend through the weekend in my house. All options were analyzed and
the conclusion was that there was nothing better than to lower prices, or else we
would lose a clientele that we had worked very hard to get. On the next day,
145 Martin, Douglas, "Cheaper Oil from Libya Is Reported," The New York Times, 4 June 1981, p. Dl.
146 Martin, Douglas, "Cheaper Oil from Libya Is Reported," The New York Times, 4 June 1981, p. D1
148
Monday, June 1 , we would go to Veracruz to celebrate the Day of the Navy.
Moreover, the deadline to respond to the customers was coming up. If we did not
cut prices, they would go over to the OPEC sellers. We had no time to spare. De
Leon was already waiting for my orders at the Veracruz airport. I told the
president that I urgently needed to speak with him before we landed. I explained
our problem and told him that we had to act immediately, as the situation was
very delicate.
"All right," he said, "but work things out with the economic cabinet." To me, that
was a clear signal to move forward and, upon getting off the plane, De Leon was
waiting for me, looking anxious.
"Send the telex immediately," I told him. He did not hesitate and went away.
(Diaz Serrano 1988, p. 106).
Diaz Serrano's decision to lower prices before reaching an agreement with the
economic cabinet opened the door for sharp criticism in a cabinet meeting on June 4*.
The rest of the cabinet, fierce political rivals of Diaz Serrano, saw a weakness in the
latter's standing with the president and criticized him harshly.1 L6pez Portillo, already
concerned about Diaz Serrano's lack of accountability, asked him to resign on June 6 and
named Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid in his place.
147 According to Lajous, who participated in these events as a high ranking official in Oteyza's ministry, the
economic cabinet had bonded due to their frustration with the lack of understanding of basic economic
concepts among Diaz Serrano and his top commercial advisers (Author's interview with Adriin Lajous,
Cambridge, MA, 12 January 2009.)
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The importance of the absence of market competition and the lack of a specialized
staff cannot be underestimated. The attacks on Diaz Serrano were primarily motivated by
the politics of the presidential succession, and they would have certainly continued if the
Pemex chief had not been faced with a downturn in the international oil market.
Nevertheless, the vulnerability that ultimately brought him down was the lack of an
institutionalized decision-making framework to deal with competitive markets.148 In this
instance, the personalistic approach meant not only that decisions lacked technical
backing, but also that the political liability for mistakes was high and directly attributable
to Diaz Serrano.
Commercial policy throughout the rest of 1982 displayed even greater disarray.
After all, Diaz Serrano had acquired some expertise that other members of the cabinet
lacked. In the aftermath of the resignation, Oteyza took control of the pricing policy, but
he was inexperienced in oil market issues and his decisions proved to be disastrous. On
June 16, Oteyza announced a US$2 increase effective on July 1st. Unaware that the
bargaining power had now shifted to the buyers, he threatened customers unwilling to lift
Mexican oil at that price that "a barrel of Mexican oil foregone at this moment will be a
barrel of oil foregone forever" (qtd. in Morales, Escalante, and Vargas 1988, p. 161).
Exxon Corporation, the largest purchaser of Mexican crude, suspended lifting 175,000
barrels a day, which amounted to 12% of total Mexican exports. Shell Oil Company,
Mexico's second-largest customer, warned that the price increase was unjustified given
market conditions.149 France's state-owned Compagnie Frangaise des Petroles halted
148 The decision to lower prices, according to several actors, was correct. However, the extent of the price
cut and the process reflected a lack of expertise among Diaz Serrano and the commercialization managers
(Author's interview with Adriin Lajous, Cambridge, MA, 12 January 2009).
149 Friedman, Thomas L., "Libya Lowers Oil Price a Slim $1.10," The New York Times, 1 July 1981, p. D1.
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imports from Pemex, prompting Mexico to threaten the cancellation of French contracts
in the country in other industries.15 0 A high-level envoy was sent by Lopez Portillo to
negotiate directly with the Mitterrand government but failed to secure the resumption of
purchases.m In the month of July alone, lost exports amounted to one billion dollars of
missed government revenues (Morales et al. 1988).
By August, Oteyza finally accepted the new reality and agreed to cut prices,
essentially to the level Diaz Serrano had decreed for June. 2 Customers resumed
purchases of Mexican crude, and government revenues increased accordingly. For the
rest of the L6pez Portillo administration, Pemex treaded carefully, decreasing its
production and making sure not to overcharge buyers.153
Pemex in transition: 1982 - 1985
On December 1, 1982, Miguel de la Madrid replaced L6pez Portillo as president
of Mexico and appointed Mario Ramon Beteta as director-general of Pemex. In the
Mexican government of those years, no civil service protections existed and a new
presidential administration inevitably triggered the reshuffling of the top and middle
levels of the bureaucracy. Pemex was not an exception, and Beteta arrived with hundreds
150 "Mexicans' Rift Grows with Paris," The New York Times, 6 July 1981, p. D1.
151 Authors interview with Ricardo Garcia Sainz, Mexico City, 17 July 2008. Garcia Sainz had been
Secretary of Budget and Planning earlier in the L6pez Portillo administration.
152 Friedman, Thomas L., "Mexico Lowers Its Oil Prices," The New York Times, 5 August 1981, p. D2. It
should not be concluded from this that Diaz Serrano's price cut in early June had been of the right amount.
It is possible that while a drop of that magnitude was justified given August market conditions, in July it
was not correct. The answer to this question, however, is virtually impossible to determine given the lack of
reliable market data and the high proportion of the transactions that were made in kind between
fovernments and which are very difficult to quantify.
3 During the De la Madrid presidency, Oteyza did not have an influential position in the government.
Between 1982 and 1986, he was appointed Ambassador to Canada.
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of new staff members.154 He often referred to the need to create a "New Pemex," and the
change in cadres was a step in that direction.
With regards to oil marketing, Beteta's arrival had two immediate
consequences-one with regards to the creation of a professional staff and another
concerning the decision-making framework for pricing policy. First, almost by accident,
he appointed Adriin Lajous-a young economist who had risen to a high position in
Oteyza's Ministry of Patrimony-as Oil Trade Coordinator, where he would supervise
the activities of the Foreign Trade Division of the company. Lajous was not very
experienced in oil trade matters, but Beteta esteemed that he knew more than alternative
candidates. "I was not very qualified at all," Lajous himself admits. "I was an
amateur."156
As it turned out, Lajous's tenure would become one of the most transformative
periods in the history of the Mexican oil industry, as oil marketing became
institutionalized. He sought to work at first with several of Diaz Serrano's old
collaborators in foreign trade matters, but gradually brought in fresh faces. Among other
things, he created a subdivision of market analysis so that Pemex could make informed
decisions about the changing market conditions.
In the words of Pedro Haas, one of Lajous's closest advisors at the time, the latter
had two main accomplishments during his tenure (1982-1988). First, he changed the
composition of the staff by adding young professionals versed in microeconomics.
154 This group was nicknamed pitufos ("smurfs") by the oil people that had traditionally filled the ranks of
the company. The origin of the term is unclear, but some argue that it was because the new employees were
many and no one knew exactly where they came from (Grayson 1988).
1 Lajous relates that he was paying a "courtesy visit" to Beteta when the director's staffers were
discussing issues relating to the fiscal standing of Pemex. Lajous helped them resol
156 Adriin Lajous, personal interview, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 12 January 2009.
157 Pedro Haas, personal interview, 14 January 2009.
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"Getting the old guard to understand that market prices are established on the basis of
marginal microeconomics was quite hard," explains Haas. "Lajous got rid of all those old
petroleros, who supposedly knew but didn't really know and who were actually quite
shady."158
According to Lajous, the very nature of marketing activities demanded a different
kind of employee. "The work also required very different skills," he explained, "such as
marketing skills that the rest of the company lacked and languages. People needed to
operate in a language other than Spanish, and very few people in Pemex could do
that."' 59 Long-time Pemex employees often voluntarily transferred to other areas of the
company upon realizing that their qualifications did not match the requirements of
commercialization jobs.
Second, Lajous "set up the legal and regulatory scaffolding" to operate
efficiently.'6 One of the central aspects of this transformation was the drafting of
international standard contracts, which grounded decisions on contractual obligations
rather than circumstantial factors. A second key feature was the creation of an
institutionalized decision-making structure for the presidential cabinet to approve
changes to the price of Mexican crude. The Foreign Oil Trade Committee (Comite de
Comercio Exterior del Petrdleo or COCEP), an inter-ministerial committee, was
established to meet periodically to approve changes to the official market price of
Mexican crude. 161
158 Author's interview with Pedro Haas, telephone communication, 14 January 2009.
159 Author's interview with Adriin Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2009.
160 Author's interview with Pedro Haas, telephone communication, 14 January 2009.
161 Author's interview with Bernardo de la Garza, Mexico City, 30 October 2008.
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Beteta, aware of the reasons that led to the downfall of Diaz Serrano, feared that
oil pricing policy carried high political risk and agreed to set up the committee.
Accountability would be diffused, so political costs of price cuts could not be blamed on
a single person (Grayson 1986); moreover, given the importance of oil revenues for the
government balance sheet, the relevant ministers-in particular the Secretary of Finance
and the Secretary of Planning and Budget-would be directly engaged in pricing
decisions (Morales, Escalante, and Vargas 1988).
According to COCEP's official minutes, the first meeting took place on
December 22, 1982-in other words, only three weeks after the new administration took
office. It was attended by Beteta, Lajous, and under-secretaries from the ministries of
Foreign Relations, Finance, Planning and Budget, Commerce, and the newly created
Ministry of Energy, Mines, and State Enterprises (which replaced Patrimony and
Industrial Promotion). The committee voted to set official prices on a monthly basis-as
opposed to the quarterly basis that was in place before-due to the rise in volatility in the
market and to keep prices unchanged from the month before. 162
The minutes of the COCEP meetings reveal both the workings of the system of
"administered prices" and the new framework of shared political responsibility for
determining prices. "The attendants agree unanimously," reads the minute from the first
meeting, "to make a public announcement tonight whereby the prices for January of 1983
will remain at the levels of the previous ten months, with a blend of 54% Isthmus and
46% Maya at US$32.50 and US$25.00 per barrel, respectively, which gives a weighted
162 See Acta del Comiti de Comercio Exterior de Petr6leo (COCEP), llevada a cabo en la Ciudad de
Mixico el dia 22 de diciembre de 1982 a las 17:00 hrs, pp. 1, 2.
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average of US$28.45." In order to set prices, discussions focused on the behavior of
OPEC. For instance, the minute from the meeting on March 8, 1983 states that:
Jorge Eduardo Navarrete [under-secretary of Foreign Relations] is in
London and has been in continuous communication with OPEC ministers.
He noted the internal division within OPEC, especially regarding the
Iranian position, which refuses to cut its production from 3 million barrels
per day and which, in spite of selling at the price of US$28 per barrel,
refuses to agree on a decrease in the price of the marker crude. Similarly,
he mentioned that Nigeria refuses to raise its price by US$1.50 per barrel,
which may entail that Saudi Arabia will cut its price to US$29.00. (p. 3.)
How was Lajous able to implement these changes in the subsidiary? Part of the
freedom to maneuver emanated from the risk that errors at foreign trade entailed.
According to him, "everyone respected and feared the work with this potentially
dangerous task," which provided autonomy both from the political superiors and
prevented interference from the powerful oil workers' union. 163 Yet, the process whereby
politicians learned about the danger of meddling in the operations of a company facing
market competition would be slow. It would not be until the middle of 1985 when the
political elite realized that neglecting the advice of the technical experts carried a heavy
price.
163 Adriin Lajous, personal interview, 7 July 2008.
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Exogenous shock: The decline in demand of mid-1985
By mid-1982, Mexican oil exports had stabilized around 1.5 million barrels per
day. This was the government's explicit goal, determined as the limit of the economy's
"absorptive capacity" in the National Energy Plan published in 1979 .1 The government
aimed to decrease its dependence on oil revenues, and keeping export volumes fixed in
the context of a growing economy would achieve exactly that. Between May of 1982 and
May of 1985, the volume goal was met as exports averaged 1.581 million barrels per day.
In June of 1985, however, exports dramatically plunged by half, to 783,000
barrels per day. The cause was a misjudgment by the members of COCEP regarding
market conditions, which led them to price Mexican crude above its proper value in a
context where global supply was outpacing demand. The immediate consequence was a
massive loss of revenue, estimated in 528 million dollars in that month alone. 65 The
long-term consequence was a further realization by politicians that oil pricing decisions
carried great risk and that it was politically and economically safer to yield them to the
technical staff.
What led to the mishap by COCEP? In the first half of 1985, falling demand in
the international oil market created downward pressures on prices but OPEC refused to
lower official prices. Negotiations with non-OPEC countries failed to reach agreements
as well. In his memoirs, President Miguel de la Madrid laments that his Energy Secretary,
Francisco Labastida, was treated dismissively by Saudi officials during a trip set up to
discuss the possibility of cutting prices (Madrid Hurtado 2004). While Saudi Arabia,
1 Pedro Aspe, personal interview, 13 May 2009; Adrian Lajous, personal interview, 12 January 2009.
165 This estimate is obtained by subtracting the actual exports (783 mbd) from the desired exports (1.5
mmbd) and multiplying by the realized price of Mexican crude from July (US$24.55). The July price was
lower than the June price by US$0.64 and, arguably, would have prevented a large percentage of the
customers from cancelling their purchases from Mexico.
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Mexico, and a few other countries sold crude at official prices, many OPEC nations were
violating quota restrictions and offering discounting shipments below posted prices
(Skeet 1988).166
In early June of 1985, a dispute arose between the technical staff at the Foreign
Trade Division of Pemex and Energy Secretary Labastida in the midst of COCEP.167 The
members of the committee and President De la Madrid supported Labastida's proposal,
which called to keep prices constant for another month (Grayson 1988). During the
previous two years, Mexico had shown solidarity to OPEC's lead in pricing decisions,168
and a price decrease would be perceived as an attempt to undercut the cartel. The analysts
at the Foreign Trade Division, however, believed that a price drop was critical in order to
keep the export goals. In fact, it was publicly reported that customers had been
threatening to suspend lifting shipments of Mexican crude unless prices were lowered. 169
The distribution of influence within COCEP changed in favor of the technical
staff. The drastic loss of revenue resounded throughout the federal bureaucracy, and the
Secretary of Energy's credibility in COCEP was tarnished. Thanks to the institutionalized
price-setting process, final responsibility for the decision was shared among all the
members of the committee and no single member suffered a fate similar to Diaz
Serrano's four years earlier. Nevertheless, the collapse of exports painfully reminded the
politicians who attended the meetings that pricing policy was treacherous. As the loss of
revenues became more severe in June, the Secretary of Energy told Pemex: "Do whatever
166 Ibrahim, Youssef M., "OPEC Meets on Weakening of Cartel Unity," The Wall Street Journal, 3 June
1985, p. 2 .
167 Pedro Haas, personal interview, 14 January 2009.
168 Ibrahim, Youseff M. and Richard B. Schmitt, "Mexico Lowers Prices of Heavy and Light Crude Oil,
Signaling End of Two-Year Solidarity with OPEC," The Wall Street Journal, 12 July 1985, p. 3.
169 Ibrahim, Youssef M., "OPEC Meets on Weakening of Cartel Unity," The Wall Street Journal, 3 June
1985, p. 2.
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you have to do, but raise exports." 170 Prices were finally adjusted on June 17, 1985 with
an announcement that Maya exports would be US$1.50 cheaper.171 Another price cut
followed two weeks later. By July, PMI had raised the export volume back to the target
of 1.5 million barrels per day.
The exogenous shock is aggravated: Saudi Arabia "declares war" in October of 1985
The years of 1985 and 1986 would be momentous for the international oil
industry, as the downturn in prices was even more sudden and severe than in 1981. In
November of 1985, oil prices were at US$27.12, but by February of 1986 they had
dropped to US$18.11, and in July of that same year they plunged to US$10.91. It was a
reduction of 60% in slightly more than six months. Oil producing countries, already
hurting from the contraction in demand and high cost of lending of the early 1980s, now
had to face a reality of record-low oil prices. Mexico, producing a heavier variety of
crude, suffered more: in June of 1986, the price of Maya dropped to US$7.63 a barrel
(Adrii.n Lajous 2006).
The collapse of oil prices began with the downturn in global demand of mid-1985
and was aggravated by two decisions made by Saudi Arabia: to increase production and
to introduce a novel commercial strategy known as "netback pricing" (Mabro 1987). In
essence, netback pricing consists of guaranteeing the client-the refiner-a specific
profit margin on the sales of its product, charging for the oil the remainder after
subtracting profits and operational costs from the sales price. It was highly attractive for
customers, since earnings would be protected in the competitive refining industry.
170 Author's interview with Pedro Haas, telephone communication, 14 January 2009.
171 Ibrahim, Youseff M., "Mexico Cuts Heavy Crude Price to $24, Raising Pressue on OPEC for
Reduction," The Wall Street Journal, 18 June 1985, p. 3.
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Saudi Arabia's turn to netback resulted from a frustration with OPEC's behavior
that had been accumulating for several years. After the inflection of the market in 1981,
the world had seen an oversupply of petroleum. Not only did OPEC have excess capacity,
but non-OPEC countries such as Norway, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were
increasing production and gaining market share at OPEC's expense. OPEC called
emergency meetings in 1982, first in Qatar and later in Vienna, in order to restrain
production and defend prices. However, indiscipline was rampant, with Iran, Libya, and
Venezuela significantly violating their volumetric commitments (Parra 2005).
OPEC countries met again in March of 1983 in London to renegotiate on volume
restrictions. They agreed to set Arabian Light as the marker crude at US$29, with other
grades adjusted based on quality, and they decreased their overall production quota to
17.5 million barrels per day (Skeet 1988). However, unfavorable market conditions
meant that OPEC's quota exceeded demand requirements. Cheating was widespread, via
discounts off the official prices, attractive credit terms for customers, and paying for
transportation costs. Moreover, the system of negotiated price differentials proved
unrealistic in practice. As Parra (2005) explains:
The value of crude oils relative to each other depends largely on their
product yields, lighter crudes yielding more of the higher value gasolines
and distillates than heavier ones. But the prices of the various refined
products vary over time, depending on seasonal and other factors, so crude
price differentials that may be realistic in one situation rapidly go askew in
another. OPEC could not possibly keep up with the shifting market, and
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even if it could, frequent renegotiation of the differentials would have
been politically impossible. (Parra 2005, p. 281.)
Throughout this time, the only OPEC country that consistently fulfilled its
obligations was the one with the largest reserves and production capacity: Saudi Arabia.
Yet, good behavior came at a cost, primarily in the form of diminished market share.
Saudi Arabia knew that others were cheating, but its oil minister, Yamani, supported an
OPEC fixed-price policy and had turned the country into the defacto swing producer of
the cartel, trying to stabilize prices by decreasing or increasing production as needed.
Production dropped to dangerously low levels, from 43% of total OPEC production in
1981 to 20% in 1985. This took place while total OPEC supply dropped from 22.8
million barrels per day to 16 million.172 The Saudi quota approved by OPEC was 4.3
million barrels per day, but in May of 1985 the Kingdom was producing only 2.4 million
barrels (Skeet 1988).
By mid-1985, Saudi Arabia made final warnings to other OPEC members to meet
their obligations, to no avail. In May of that year, King Fahd convened a meeting of oil
producers and stated that Saudi Arabia would feel free to act to secure its own interests
unless cheating was brought to an end. In July, at OPEC's ministerial meeting in Vienna,
Yamani repeated that they were ready to abandon the role of swing producer and would
push to gain back their allocated quota of 4.35 million barrels per day for 1985 (Parra
2005). Then, in September, at the meeting of the Oxford Energy Seminar, Yamani
confirmed the news: Saudi Arabia was officially abandoning its policy aimed at
72 Source: Energy Information Administration,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/intemational/oilproduction.html, accessed on 2 November 2008.
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protecting prices in favor of one aimed at increasing its market share (Adrian Lajous
2006).
Saudi Arabia adopted netback because it worried that, in the oversupplied market
of the mid- 1980s, additional barrels produced would not find customers so easily.
Moreover, much of the refining capacity was tied by long-term contract to other OPEC
nations. Thus, Saudi Arabia had to offer very attractive terms to clients to encourage
them to lift greater quantities of its crude. While it succeeded in gaining clients back, the
combination of their increased production with the netback pricing policy had
catastrophic consequences for prices.
Netback pricing distorted the crude oil and products markets in at least three
ways, slashing the price of oil in the process. First, by guaranteeing a profit margin, it
eliminated incentives for the refiner to minimize costs. Operational inefficiencies could
be passed on to the seller of crude rather than be absorbed by the refiner in order to keep
the price of the products competitive. Second, netback pricing was blamed for
encouraging refiners to overproduce. Thanks to netback, lower sales prices caused by
excess supply could also be passed on to the seller. Finally, netback pricing introduced
transaction costs where previously few existed. The determination of "fair" profit
margins and "accurate" operational costs had to be done through constant re-negotiation
between producer and consumer, in a context where asymmetric information tended to
benefit the refiner.
The rest of OPEC soon followed Saudi Arabia's strategy, and in an OPEC summit
in December of 1985, oil ministers changed their long-standing doctrine of price
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administration for one of increasing market share. 7 3 Netback pricing was the natural
alternative for these countries, which finally abandoned their hope of setting prices by
decree. As Parra (2005) recognizes, there were then two netback wars being fought
simultaneously: one by Saudi Arabia against the rest of OPEC, and one by OPEC against
the oil exporters outside of the cartel, as reluctant as ever to curtail their production.
Mexico's response: world-class innovation
In response to the declaration of a price war by Saudi Arabia and its subsequent
increase in oil exports via netbacks, the Foreign Trade Division at Pemex responded with
formula pricing, an innovative commercial strategy that would transform the landscape of
the international market and help Pemex win customers back (Bou6 2002). Two years
later, in an implicit recognition of the drawbacks of its commercial policy, Saudi Arabia
abandoned netback pricing and adopted formulas similar to those pioneered by Pemex
(Parra 2005). Algeria and Libya introduced formula pricing by September of 1989,
Nigeria and Egypt followed in December of 1990 and October of 1991, respectively. To
this day, formula pricing is the preferred method of setting prices among companies that
do not sell crude in spot markets (Horsnell and Mabro 1993; Adrian Lajous 2006; Fattouh
2006).
Formula pricing consists in constructing an equation that approximates the yield
that a refinery obtains from running a crude not sold in spot markets with a combination
of crudes that are-such as Brent, West Texas Intermediate, or Alaska North Slope-and
refined products such as fuel oil. The different marker crudes are given specific weights,
173 Skeet (1991) points out that by then the system of administering prices existed only on paper, given that
the discounts offered surreptitiously by many oil exporters had already created a shadow market-based
pricing system.
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which then determine the new price, with an added adjustment factor to account for
errors in measurement and for small variations necessary to decrease high inventories or
to exploit short-term market conditions.174
In hindsight, the concept was extremely simple, but at the time it was very
difficult to devise and implement for at least three reasons. First, and contrary to what it
could seem at first, reliance on spot market prices did not necessarily mean that the actual
market clearing prices were being used. The vast majority of the oil was sold by long-
term contracts, meaning that spot transactions only reflected a small share of the existing
supply and demand. Relying on spot markets for pricing crude oil had the risk of
following potentially misleading information. Second, it entailed relinquishing the ability
to set oil prices by decree, which had been a fundamental prerogative of the Mexican
government for years. Third, every other oil exporting nation was rapidly adopting
netback pricing, in a panic not to be displaced by Saudi oil.
The process that led to the development of formula pricing began in Oxford in
September of 1985. Five top Pemex executives, including Lajous, were present when
Yamani confirmed that Saudi Arabia was introducing netback to regain its market share.
They decided that a new strategy had to be designed to counter the Yamani's "implicit
declaration of a price war" (Lajous 2006, p. 18).15 Lajous hired the services of the
174 The introduction of formula pricing meant that the market would be divided into regions in order to take
advantage of price differentials across markets. The first formula introduced for the North American market
was:
Price of Maya = 0.21(WTI+WTS+ANS) + 0.37(F.O. #6 3%) - 0.28(F.O. #6 1% - F.O. #6 3o) + K,
for West Texas Intermediate (WTI), West Texas Sour (WTS), Alaska North Slope (ANS), High Sulfur Fuel
Oil (F.O. #6 3%), and Low Sulfur Fuel Oil (F.O. #6 1 %), plus the constant of discretionality. The formula
would be changed in 1989, 1990, and 1996 (Bou6 2002).
175 This, of course, was the view from the Mexican side. The Saudi perspective was that they were simply
claiming the market share that was rightfully theirs according to OPEC officials quotas (Skeet 1991).
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consulting firm McKinsey & Company to help in designing an alternative mechanism.
McKinsey's advice, to his disappointment, was to adopt netbacks. Lajous and his
advisors resisted, and only after further work was formula pricing agreed upon.
Lajous settled with formula pricing for several reasons. Juan Carlos Bou6 (2002)
emphasizes the interest of managers in the Foreign Trade Division to give up
discretionality in order to avoid being susceptible to lawsuits brought against them under
the Federal Law of Responsibilities for Public Servants. Lajous agrees that this factor
played a role, but he affirms that the main reason was the need to economize on
analytical and managerial resources, which were scarce in the small Foreign Trade
Division, and which would be allowed to focus on other matters once the "transparent,
semi-automatic pricing mechanism" was introduced (Lajous 2006).176
An overview of the context in late 1985 and early 1986 reveals the constraints on
human capital faced by the Foreign Trade Division and which Lajous had to face. In the
end, his task was to accomplish the most he could with the resources he had (Bou6 2002).
They could not resort to selling Mexican crude in the spot markets because "it [was]
doubtful that Pemex [had] personnel sufficiently experienced to wheel and deal as deftly
as required of successful spot market traders" (Grayson 1986, p. 55). Moreover, these
markets carried higher volatility than long-term contracts, and this entailed an
unacceptable level of risk for fiscal authorities.
Adopting netbacks was also discarded, since it would have stretched the staff thin
negotiating with refiners the terms of the contracts. Customers knew their operational
costs better than Pemex staffers, and they could credibly threaten to switch over to OPEC
oil in the event of discord. Pedro Haas adds:
176 Author's interview with Adriin Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2008.
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We had reached the analytical conclusion that netbacks were completely
destructive for the market, since they didn't permit arbitrage between
crude oil and products. I mean, refineries won't run crude if profit margins
are negative. But if you sell crude via netbacks, profit margins are
guaranteed, so volume is always increasing and nothing can stop that. You
have a downward spiral. Thus, opposing what every other country was
doing in the market was a huge struggle, and in Mexico there was a big
debate about it. Adrian had the courage to stand firm and argue what he
believed, and the Ministry of Finance ended up supporting him.m
Finally, doing nothing and continuing to administer prices was not an option. By
February of 1986, Pemex had already lost sizable sales to netback-priced deals, and it
was both impractical and unrealistic for staffers to spend their time trying to understand a
market that was changing at a very fast rate. As an observer noted at the time: "In the
fast-moving world market where supply suddenly was vastly outstripping demand,
Mexico continually had found to its cost that the earlier pricing concessions seemed
always to be a case of too little, too late" (Niering 1986, p. 294). In short, in spite of the
risks posed by introducing formulas, Lajous believed that the Foreign Trade Division of
Pemex and his own footing were at greater peril with either price administration or with
netbacks.
Mexico's geopolitical strength had shifted from the Diaz Serrano days, and
commercial policy stopped responding to foreign policy objectives. Maximizing
177 Pedro Haas, personal interview, 14 January 2009.
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government revenues became the only goal, as the fiscal subsistence of the state was on
the line. Mired in debt, the government's bargaining position vis-i-vis creditor nations-
the United States in particular-was much deteriorated. It was pointless to continue with
the defiant rhetoric of the Echeverria and Lopez Portillo administrations. 78 Moreover,
President De la Madrid became disaffected from OPEC after what appeared to be
disloyal behavior regarding the effects of their actions in the oil market (Madrid Hurtado
2004). When Saudi Arabia introduced netbacks, Mexico was, to a large extent, fully
relieved of its commitments to OPEC, and it was free to pursue its own commercial
strategy.
In a special meeting held on February 14, 1986, COCEP voted to allow formula
pricing. Lajous obtained authorization for the use of formula pricing in spite of the
reluctance of some members of the cabinet-in particular Labastida and Jesus Silva-
Herzog, the Finance Minister. The meeting was unusual in that it was attended by the
heads of the different ministries, rather than by under-secretaries as it had become
customary. After all, it was a session of very high importance: the Mexican politicians
were formally surrendering control over oil pricing policy to technical bureaucrats'
ability to successfully model the market value of Mexican oil. After the exports debacle
of the previous June, however, most of the members of COCEP had understood that their
ability to administer prices effectively was dubious and that technical expertise was
needed to ensure the flow of government oil revenues.
178 President De la Madrid would write in his memoirs: "I have no doubt that the drastic fall of our primary
source of income hurts the relationship between Mexico and the United States greatly. It weakens us to the
extreme; it places us in a situation where we have to wait for and tolerate the negotiations that they
propose." (2004, p. 536).
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Pemex presented fonnula pricing to clients at the annual International Petroleum
Week in London in late February, and initial response to formula pricing was negative
(Lajous 2006). Lajous recounts that an oil magnate pulled him aside to chastise him.
"Why are you intent in ruining your country with this crazy plan!" the man said. 19 A
well known oil industry consultant, Philip Verleger, argued soon after that netback
pricing was going to be the dominant pricing mechanism for the foreseeable future
(Petroleum Economist 1986). Furthermore, between January and April of 1986, Mexican
oil exports lagged behind the official target by 400,000 barrels per day, presumably
because customers were still finding netback preferable (Niering 1986). However, soon
after, Mexico began regaining market share, and the skeptics at home and abroad began
to appreciate the merits of the new system.
Changes to the "K" were still subject to COCEP approval each month. They
represented only a small percentage of the price, which-once the "K" was set-was
allowed to fluctuate based on the changes in market prices of the different components of
the formula. An excerpt of the minute of the April 7, 1986 meeting serves to illustrate this
process:
Mr. Lajous indicated that just as the formulas for Isthmus have allowed
Pemex to place the available supply of this crude in the market, and even
to have demand in excess of the supply capacity, the formulas for Maya
require an adjustment in the constant. The adjustment was already
foreseen in the design of the formula. COCEP discussed the issue at
length, highlighting the strong competition from Venezuela to place its
179 Author's interview with Adrian Lajous, Cambridge, MA, 24 November 2009.
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heavy crude, posting prices below the Mexican price. The difficulty to
place Maya given the sales practices that Venezuela uses were noted. It is
expected that lowering the constant in the formula for Maya will facilitate
the sale of the excess volumes of this crude.
The Committee RESOLVES: COCEP approves lowering the constant for
Maya formulas by US$0.75 per barrel, beginning on April 10, and it
authorizes Pemex to lower this constant up to US$1.25 per barrel with the
objective of placing the largest possible volume of heavy crude in the
market. (pp. 2, 3.)
Time series econometric analysis confirms the success of formula pricing and
quantifies its effect. The vector-autoregression-intervention-analysis (VARIA)
methodology (see Appendix A) shows that the introduction of formulas, holding constant
global supply, global demand, and exports of Maya, had a strong and statistically
significant sustained impact on the price of Maya relative to a counterfactual (Alaska
North Slope). The left panel of Figure 4.5 displays the effect of formula pricing on the
price differential of these two crudes. The gray area and the dashed line represent the
67% and 95 % confidence intervals, respectively. The immediate impact of formula
pricing was an increase of two dollars on the differential; the cumulative impact
stabilized around 7 dollars.
The right panel of Figure 4.5 shows the cumulative impact of the introduction of
formula pricing on the exports (represented in the statistical analysis as the monthly
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percentage change in exports of Maya). The 95% confidence intervals are wide, but the
findings strongly suggest that formula pricing had an immediate impact of raising exports
by 10%, and eight months afterwards the cumulative effect had been a sustained and
statistically significant increase of 5 % per month. In short, this results support the thesis
that formula pricing helped Lajous and his staff meet the dual goals of price and export
maximization.
[FIGURE 4.5 HERE]
Figure 4.5. Effect of Formula Pricing on the Price and Export Volume of Maya
(VAR-Intervention Analysis - Cumulative Dynamic Multiplier Results)
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An alternative statistical analysis, also confirming the benefits of formula pricing,
is provided by Juan Carlos Bou6 (2002). Rather than comparing the price of Maya to a
spot market benchmark like Alaska North Slope, Boud's reference point is the price of
Venezuelan crude-which has historically been the main competitor of Maya in the
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market of the United States Gulf of Mexico. Venezuela's state-owned oil company,
Petrdleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), provided a different counterfactual by continuously
refusing to implement formulas and opting instead to maintain discretionality-adhering
to the policy of administered prices. 180
The essence of Boud's approach is threefold. First, he takes a marker crude as
reference (in this case, West Texas Sour). Second, using information on the price of
several heavy and medium crudes with high sulfur content imported to the United States,
he calculates the market premium for each additional degree API and the penalty for each
additional percentage point of sulfur content. Third, he estimates the market price of a
crude of similar characteristics to the average of Mexican and Venezuelan export baskets
and compares that price to the realized prices published by the Department of Energy of
the United States.181
Boud's results are reproduced in Table 4.3. His data only covers yearly averages
from 1992 - 2000, so the immediate impact of formula pricing against the Venezuelan
counterfactual cannot be assessed. Nevertheless, the pattern of Boud's analysis is
consistent with the VAR estimates of Figure 6. Pemex repeatedly sold its crude at or
slightly above the estimated market price, while PDVSA failed to meet the expected price
year after year by more than one dollar per barrel on average (with the exception of the
year 2000).
Formula pricing succeeded for two reasons. First, Pemex adequately recognized
that spot markets had finally become reliable indicators of market conditions. According
180 Juan Szabo, who served as head of the Exploration and Production division of PDVSA in the late 1990s,
commented that, in his view, formulas ultimately proved to be a better commercial strategy (personal
interview, 12 August 2009).
181 This step is necessary because the U.S. Department of Energy, for many months, has not published the
price of individual Venezuelan crudes, only for the average export basket.
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to Bernardo de la Garza, who served as head of crude oil commercialization in PMI in the
2000s, crucial to this was the introduction of oil futures in the New York Mercantile
Exchange, which gave volume and liquidity to the paper trade of marker crudes.182
[TABLE 4.3 HERE]
Table 4.3 Observed and Estimated Prices for Mexican and
Venezuelan Crude Exported to the United States (1992-2000)
Estimated Price - Observed Price
(US$/B)
Year Pemex PDVSA
1992 0.44 1.79
1993 0.09 1.55
1994 0.06 1.78
1995 -0.06 1.58
1996 -0.04 1.38
1997 -0.03 1.30
1998 -0.05 1.14
1999 0.03 0.84
2000 -0.07 -0.4
Average 0.04 1.22
Source: Table T6.1 in Bou4 (2002)
Second, customers greatly appreciated the transparency and simplicity that
formulas brought into the market (Bou6 2002). The savings in transaction costs and in
political risk turned out to be preferred over the uncertainty of netback negotiations.
Rosendo Zambrano, who served as director-general of PMI in the late 2000s, agrees with
that statement and notes that proof of the benefits of formula pricing is the fact that
182 Bernardo de la Garza, personal interview, 30 October 2008.
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refineries running Mexican crude have historically received better financing terms from
banks than those running Venezuelan crude. This, he argues, is due to the perceived
benefits of a transparent commercial relationship between producer and consumer.183
This served as an incentive to lift Mexican oil. When Saudi Arabia adopted formulas in
late 1987, the benefits of formula pricing were vindicated.
Fiscal Jeopardy Exacerbates the Effect of Market Competition
Chapter 2 explains that market competition decreases the government's
willingness to meddle in a state-owned enterprise's operational decisions due to the
potential high cost to the public treasury. This mechanism is exacerbated in a setting of
fiscal jeopardy such as Mexico's throughout the 1980s (see Figure 4.4). Mexico was
mired in a deep financial crisis, and oil revenues were the lifeline of the government. In
this context, the government withdrew further from meddling with technical decisions.
One clear instance of fiscal jeopardy occurred in 1982, when Mexico effectively
suspended servicing its payments and unleashed the Latin American debt crisis (Schmidt
1985). However, this would not be the only critical moment. For example, an imminent
threat of a moratorium occurred in early 1986. As oil prices kept dropping, rumors
surfaced that President De la Madrid would resign (Madrid Hurtado 2004, p. 543). By
February of that year, Mexico was on the verge of declaring a moratorium on its debt
payments (Krauze 1999). De la Madrid wrote then in his memoirs:
I know that if in the current juncture I suspended payments on the foreign
debt, the people would applaud me. But I also know that the excitement
183 Author's interview with Rosendo Zambrano, Mexico City, 12 June 2008.
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would last a mere 15 days, and after that they would turn against me, as
they began to feel the effects of such a drastic measure. The reason why a
unilateral moratorium is not convenient is because we could be subject to
sanctions (2004, p. 538).
And later, in May:
Perhaps it will be inevitable for me to take more aggressive measures
regarding the payment of the debt, that is, allow the crisis to hit. And it
will certainly be a crisis, because if I suspend more payments it is almost
inevitable that the creditor countries will impose sanctions, which would
affect our foreign trade, our import capacity, and would certainly wreak
havoc in the foreign exchange market. The problem is that I do not see
them giving me any other alternative (2004, p. 568).
Problems continued through the end of the De la Madrid administration. Pedro
Aspe, who was undersecretary of Finance in the De la Madrid administration and would
later become Minister of Finance, focused on early 1987 as "perhaps the worst moment
of the Mexican fiscal crises." Aspe had traveled to Washington, DC with Finance
secretary Gustavo Petricioli seeking to renegotiate the terms of Mexico's debt payments.
"We went to the office of [IMF Managing Director] Jacques de la Rosiere. Since they
made us wait, Gustavo turned to me and said: 'Call Lajous and ask him what the price of
a barrel of Mexican oil is right now.' I called him and he said: '5.50.' A shipment had
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just left at that price. I'll never forget that moment. So the Minister of Finance says: 'So
what's the price?' 'Low, but he doesn't have the exact number,' I replied. Afterwards, I
said to Gustavo: 'I told you a white lie. The price of Mexican oil today is 5.50.' 'Oh my
God!,' he replied in disbelief." 84
Similarly, the fiscal crisis of the government in early 1989, once Carlos Salinas
had taken office, cannot be underestimated. Mexico had already reached agreements to
renegotiate its debt with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, but
commercial banks were determined not to yield to the Mexican request to forgive a
fraction of the principal. In his memoirs (2000), Salinas wrote the following:
On May 19th [1989], we had an economic cabinet meeting... The proposal
to suspend payments was lingering. I reiterated that that was not the
adequate measure to put pressure; it was a possible action that should only
be employed as a last resort...
In my personal notes from May 23P, I wrote: "The [commercial] banks
are not in a hurry and they are in a very tough position. I am on the way to
a moratorium, against my will, not because of what it represents, but
because of the fearful who are here." The next day, I wrote: "The
exchange market is restless. People can perceive the threat of the
moratorium. The worst would be unleashing speculation."
184 Pedro Aspe, personal interview, 13 May 2009.
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Removing regulatory constraints and the creation of PMI
The effect of market competition and fiscal jeopardy was manifested in the
government's willingness to establish institutional limits on its ability to interfere in oil
commercialization activities. These efforts began in the mid- 1980s, when the Division of
Foreign Trade was relieved from cumbersome regulations applicable to all state-owned
enterprises in Mexico and that had the objective of maintaining the government's
capacity to oversee the companies' activities. Subsequently, the government's
willingness to establish "veto points" in its relationship with the Division of Foreign
Trade peaked on May 24, 1989, barely six months into the administration of President
Carlos Salinas, when the Division formally became a subsidiary company of Pemex.
The new entity was named "PMI Comercio Internacional." It would be
headquartered in Mexico City, and it had its own subsidiaries abroad to undertake its
commercialization activities. Companies such as "PMI Holdings North America" and
"Pemex Internacional Espafta" had emerged, the first chartered in Delaware, in the
United States, and the second one established in Madrid, Spain. These subsidiaries were
not classified as state-owned enterprises by the Ministry of Finance and thus were not
subject to the regulatory constraints of the Mexican public sector in terms of procurement
and the hiring of personnel. The creation of PMI crystallized a series of objectives that
Lajous had been pushing for in the previous years, and it was facilitated-as it will be
explained below-by the need of the Mexican government to protect petroleum revenues
at a time of extreme fiscal jeopardy.
Functionally, PMI would differ from the Foreign Trade Division in two regards. It
continued to handle crude oil marketing activities, but it also took control of managing
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Pemex assets abroad. Perhaps more importantly, the first director of PMI, Pedro Haas,
introduced a trading division within PMI to make transactions-and reap a profit-on oil
products. Haas explains that
When I arrived to lead Foreign Trade, my job was to follow up on what
Lajous had been doing. Our main disagreement at the time was that he
thought that the area of Foreign Trade had to be limited to international
marketing of crude, that is, the contractual sales to final customers. But I
was coming back from working in London, having observed closely the
trading activities that Shell and BP were doing in the market for Brent. I
was excited about that and wanted to implement it in Pemex. In the end,
we were both right. In crude, Pemex has never done trading: it has always
sold to final customers; but trading was introduced in products, and it was
necessary, and it brought high profits, and it mitigated a lot of problems.185
Second, and more importantly, the requests for greater regulatory flexibility by
the Foreign Trade Division occurred at a time when fiscal jeopardy in the country made it
highly advisable for the federal government to establish a separate subsidiary in charge of
crude oil commercialization. Mexico's foreign debt problems remained high in 1989, and
the creation of a separate corporate entity in charge of foreign trade offered some
185 Pedro Haas, personal interview 14 January 2009. When asked why he was persuaded that Pemex should
not do trading of crude oil, Haas replied: "Because crude oil revenues are so important for the nation. The
idea that you could sell a shipment at 14.10 and the next at 14.15 and the next at 13.95 would entail that
you could get into a lot of trouble. You needed rules."
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"corporate veil" protection in the event that the Mexican government defaulted on its
payments.
Pemex, formally a unit within the Ministry of Energy, could be considered an
extension of the federal government by a foreign court of law if creditor banks sought to
seize Mexican assets after a moratorium was announced. Under international law,
accounts receivables are domiciled in the country of the company making the payment-
rather than in the country of the company receiving the payment. Accordingly, oil
revenues were highly vulnerable unless a structure could be constructed to build degrees
of separation between the federal government and the proceeds from oil sales abroad.
A sensible solution was to create a subsidiary in charge of oil commercialization,
with majority-but not exclusive-ownership by Pemex and with the capacity to open
subsidiaries abroad that would not be, legally, state-owned enterprises. Hence, PMI was
founded with three different shareholders, all state-owned: Pemex (85 % ownership), the
National Foreign Trade Bank (Bancomext) (7.5%), and Nacional Financiera, a
development bank (7.5%). Pemex would first sell its crude oil, at arm's length, to PMI,
which would then commercialize it abroad. The "corporate veil" protection was not
absolute, since all shareholders were state-owned, but the government's legal team
believed that it offered a reasonable degree of security, especially if foreign subsidiaries
were incorporated in jurisdictions-such as the state of Delaware in the United States-
with statutes where "corporate veil" protections were stronger.186
Moreover, this "corporate veil" logic explains the fairly convoluted ownership
scheme of the PMI subsidiaries. In the mid-1980s, Lajous and the Juan Manuel Romero,
186 In the United States, courts deciding on lawsuits to "pierce" the corporate veil must use the laws of the
state of incorporation, even if the corporation conducted business in other states. Laws in Delaware are less
liberal in allowing the corporate veil to be pierced than elsewhere.
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Finance Director of the Foreign Trade Division, designed a system of foreign subsidiaries
for Pemex and created "PMIs" abroad-even before the main PMI was chartered in
Mexico City.187 Before, Pemex activities abroad were conducted in the Mexican
embassies by so called "energy attach6s," a questionable practice that made Mexican oil
revenues liable to tax collection by local authorities. The creation of subsidiaries was
meant to protect the Mexican government against fiscalization, by chartering companies
that only provided "assistance" to Pemex abroad. Thus, PMI Holdings North America,
Inc., incorporated in Delaware, is owned in its entirety by PMI Norteamdrica S.A. de
C.V. The latter is incorporated in Mexico, but has 71.7% ownership by PMI Holdings BV
and 28.3% ownership by PMI Holdings Petr6leos Espanta. However, PMI Holdings BV is
incorporated in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and has 100% ownership by Pemex, while
PMI Holdings Petr6leos Espafna is incorporated in Curagao, Netherlands Antilles, also
with 100% Pemex ownership. 188 In 1989, when PMI was founded in Mexico, the network
of PMIs abroad was already in place.189
As it turned out, Mexico met its international obligations and there was never a
need to test the structure in international tribunals. The fiscal crisis peaked in July of
1989, when Salinas actually instructed his press secretary to arrange the recording of a
speech announcing that his government had declared a moratorium (Salinas de Gortari
2000). Nevertheless, in the end the negotiation with the commercial banks succeeded and
an agreement was reached before payments were suspended. From that moment forward,
187 Author's interview with Juan Manuel Romero, Mexico City, 3 February 2010.
188 Source: http://www.pmi.com.mx/Contenido/docsPortal/Transparencia/Que_es_PMI_3.pdf, 
accessed on
28 January 2010.
189 Author's interview with Juan Manuel Romero, Mexico City, 3 February 2010.
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Mexico's fiscal jeopardy came to an end-but the effects in terms of state's relationship
with its oil commercial activities had been already completed.
The question that remains is why subsequent administrations did not repeal the
"extra-legal" regulatory arrangement of PMI, especially given that debt payments were
not suspended and that the government did not face the risk of a moratorium again.
Lajous recalls that "every time there was a new Comptroller-General, he would object to
the structure of PMI, and we would have to go explain the reasons of the regulatory
flexibility."' Officials in the Bank of Mexico and the Finance Ministry, which always
supported the independence of PMI, argued that the organizational arrangement provided
an important safeguard for the oil revenues of the government, just in case another fiscal
crisis took place. Moreover, changing back and forth the corporate governance of PMI
could weaken the corporate veil argument before a court of law.
In fact, challenges to the legality of PMI lingered well into the 2000s, but its
regulatory flexibility persisted. In April of 2006, the Superior Auditor of the Federation-
the supreme oversight entity of the legislative branch-conducted an audit on Pemex and
demanded that it provide documentation justifying its investments in all the subsidiaries
of PMI. This issue was brought to a meeting of the Board of Directors of Pemex, which
voted to ratify retroactively the purchase of the shares of PMI and the subsequent
establishment of PMI's subsidiary companies.' 91
In 2008, one of the leading opposition senators, Graco Ramirez of the PRD,
denounced the PMI structure of subsidiaries in a congressional hearing on Mexican oil
sector. His participation demonstrated general lack of awareness of the history of PMI
190 Author's interview with Adrian Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2008.
191 Minutes of the Pemex Board of Directors Meeting of 1 June 2006.
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and the intricacies of international law. Nevertheless, it illustrates the concerns of a new
generation of Mexican politicians, not tempered by the fiscal crises of the 1980s,
regarding the regulatory exemptions of PMI:
You want a black hole? Pemex International... Pemex Financial [a
subsidiary of PMI] does not have any employees and is administered by a
bank located directly in the Cayman Islands. Think about what we do for
tax evasion. And they have several companies, just so you know: one in
Dublin, one in Houston, one in Amsterdam, in Aruba, and in several other
places... This is beyond the transparency laws... Commercial decisions go
through the Foreign Oil Trade Committee, which does not exist legally...
If we want to reform Pemex, we must subpoena the director-general of
PMI and eliminate this agency of international corruption.192
Developing staff cohesion in PMI
Over the years, PMI managers developed a high level of cohesion. A relatively
small group of managers worked together and collectively developed specialization in the
analysis of the crude oil and refining markets. As the technical nature of the work
increased, the managers of PMI began to see themselves as different from Pemex-
especially not marred by its reputation of inefficiency.
As mentioned above, Lajous's replacement in charge of PMI was Pedro Haas,
who had been a close collaborator for years. Similarly, Haas would be followed in 1994
192 Participation of Senator Graco Ramirez in the forum on Transparency, Accountability, and the Fight
Against Corruption in Petroleos Mexicanos, 17 July 2008.
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by Eduardo Martinez del Rio, who also had a long trajectory in the Division of Foreign
Trade and PMI, having served as deputy director for market analysis and deputy director
for crude oil marketing. When Martinez del Rio retired in 2005, he was replaced by
Rosendo Zambrano, who had forged his entire professional career in PMI and had risen
from the lower echelons of the company.
The specialization of the staff at PMI had begun in 1983 when the subdivision for
market analysis was created. The introduction of the pricing formulas, which demanded
close analysis of both the global crude market and the local refining markets that bought
Mexican oil, raised the need for further training. Attention focused on determining the
adjustment factor present in the formula-the constant labeled as the "K"-in order to
maximize revenues. It was an important task, yet manageable for the small and still
relatively inexperienced commercial staff.
Guillermo Ruiz, then an analyst in the Foreign Trade Division, described the
aftermath of the introduction of the formulas as follows:
The formulas were very beneficial in that they gave us the ability to follow
the market, making sure we did two things at all times: not leave any
money on the table and reduce volumetric risk. In the Foreign Trade
Division there was a focus on how to follow the market and how to have
ever more sophisticated tools to measure our competitiveness, how to
simulate the value obtained at a refinery that used any of our crudes, Maya
or Isthmus. The formula for Olmeca, which came into production later,
was developed with those tools. We looked into what tools refiners used to
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optimize their profit margins, like linear programming models, and we
tried to develop simulation models for all our clients-I mean, they didn't
have to be incredibly detailed, but the idea was to be able to derive the
demand curve for our crudes.193
Training and learning-by-doing were emphasized, with rapid progress. In 1987, a
group of three analysts of the Foreign Trade Division, led by Guillermo Ruiz, went to
Houston to receive training by McKinsey & Company on refining economics-in
particular regarding the linear programming techniques used by refiners to optimize their
operations. Upon their return, the staffers organized workshops to transmit their
knowledge to their peers.
Upon taking charge, Pedro Haas continued to build a competent staff. He visited
top universities to recruit young college graduates. He valued raw intelligence over
experience or knowledge of the oil industry, under the belief that new employees could
be trained rapidly. An oil market observer familiar with PMI recalls that: "All the state
companies wanted to be like PMI. [Brazil's] Petrobras, [Colombia's] Ecopetrol,
everybody wanted to emulate the success of PMI, and whenever they would meet them
they would say 'Here come Pedro Haas and his kinder,' since everyone was so young." 194
Specialization in trading developed under Haas. As a former gasoline trader of
PMI explained, trading required considerable learning-by-doing, and over time the staff
grew more comfortable with their new activity and began to reap considerable profits:
193 Author's interview with Guillermo Ruiz, Mexico City, 25 July 2008.
194 Confidential interview with oil trader, Houston, TX, February 2009.
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Knowing the market is not a quality but an activity. There are several
sources of learning to know the market. First, there are publications
related to gasoline markets (including news about refinery maintenance,
political affairs that could affect the market, trends in regulation in
important market). Second, you need to know about the activities that are
carried out by the other traders. You do this in several ways, talking on the
phone with the brokers, studying the futures market, the derivatives
market-mainly swaps. And you also need to be talking with your
counterparties, be they clients or suppliers. You do that in order to
understand what they are doing and so that they understand what you are
doing. Another activity is monitoring your own trades. Just like a stock
market trader, a commodities trader has positions in the market-I am
short here and long there. For gasoline in PMI, it is not just about buying
or selling futures, but also about buying gasoline, lifting in a tanker, did
the tanker arrive on time, does it have the correct quality. 195
Interestingly, many "old guard" members of the Foreign Trade Division-who
had worked for many years in Pemex and who were less in tune with the transformation
orchestrated by Lajous and Haas-left voluntarily when PMI became an independent
subsidiary. Since PMI was, legally, a separate company from Pemex, it was not
immediately clear whether those employees in PMI would keep their Pemex labor
benefits, in particular their seniority. In consequence, they sought to transfer to other
branches of Pemex rather than continue with PMI. At first, says Haas, PMI had a small
195 Interview with former gasoline trader, Mexico City, 17 April 2008.
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crisis given the shortage of personnel; however, it opened the door for hiring younger
cadres who would be trained in the methods of market analysis that had been developed
in the late 1980s.196
Additionally, PMI would have no unionized employees. Since the early 1980s,
union members were reluctant to seek positions within the Foreign Trade Division given
the nature of the work involved, which required language skills and which involved high
legal and financial risks. 97 There remained, however, a few unionized support staff, and
these workers left when PMI was created. 198
Effect of specialization: lower government intervention
As the work in PMI became more technical in nature, politicians became more
distant from their internal operations. Government officials lacked the capacity to
understand the decisions made at PMI, and they yielded to the subsidiary to make
promotions from within. Bernardo de la Garza, director of crude oil commercialization in
2008, remarked that:
The work of PMI is so technical and specialized that it is hard for
outsiders to know what is going on... Now, the government does not want
to appoint someone external to lead PMI because what if someone new
cannot do the job-the revenue that PMI provides for the government is so
important that they do not want to touch it so they don't break it.199
196 Author's interview with Pedro Haas, telephone communication, 14 January 2009.
197 Author's interview with Adriin Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2008.
198 Author's interview with Pedro Haas, telephone communication, 14 January 2009.
199 Author's interview with Bernardo de la Garza, Mexico City, 7 April 2008.
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Effect of specialization: Development of successful commercial strategies
The development of technical know-how allowed PMI to understand in-depth the
special characteristics of the market for Maya. PMI's knowledge of the economics of
Maya--developed as a result of the introduction of formula pricing-allowed it to adjust
commercial policy accordingly. This section discusses the process and results of the two
most significant marketing policies implemented in the 1990s in order to increase the
price and export volume of Maya. These were the acquisition of 50% ownership in a
refinery in the United States in 1993 and the signing of several long-term supply
agreements with refineries in the United States beginning in late 1997.
Since the 1980s, PMI had developed expertise to analyze the oil market and had
realized that the demand side is primarily determined by the refining markets. The
essence of crude oil demand thus lies on two main elements. First, refineries seek to
maximize the yield of some products over others. Second, lighter crudes can be
transformed into higher value products much more easily and with considerably less
expensive capital investments. PMI had the data and the modeling tools to realize that
refineries customized to run heavy, sour crudes were price inelastic with regards to heavy
oil, although they could substitute Mexican crude for other types of heavy crudes
(primarily from Venezuela). However, refineries without deep conversion capacity were
highly price elastic-a small increase in the price of heavy crudes or a decrease in light
crudes would shift their demand for Maya considerably. The challenge, evidently, is that
if the price of Maya decreases drastically at the margin, the price is lowered for the entire
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supply and not just for the percentage of exports that is shipped to general purpose
refineries.20
An effective response to counter this vulnerability of heavy crudes is to promote
the expansion of capacity of refineries that are specifically customized to run heavy oil.
Refineries that expand their "deep conversion capacity," which primarily entails the very
costly cracking and coking facilities, stand to reap sizable profits due to the lower price of
heavy oil but also become captive to processing those types of crudes. While general
purpose refineries cannot easily switch to processing heavy crudes because they cannot
extract the same yield of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel, deep conversion refineries cannot
easily switch to lighter crudes because they rely on the lower price of heavy oil to
compensate for their higher capital investment.
There have been two primary strategies to promote the expansion of deep
conversion capacity and thus improve the structure of the demand curve for heavy oil.
One of these, pioneered by Petr6leos de Venezuela in the early 1980s, consists of
purchasing refineries in foreign markets and building the coking facilities. This vertical
integration downstream achieves in-house control over investments in physical capital,
but it is costly to make the acquisition and it brings risk-and-return exposure in the
downstream markets to the parent company. The second strategy was pioneered by PMI
in the late 1990s and consists in enticing refineries to make the investments on their own
in exchange for price guarantees. This approach does not require front-end capital
disbursements by the seller of oil and does not bring risk-and-return exposure to
downstream markets. The successful completion of either strategy, however, demands
200 The shift may not occur immediately, given that a large percentage of oil is sold via long-term contracts.
However, these contracts typically must be renewed every three months.
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highly specialized knowledge of trends and opportunities in the upstream and
downstream oil markets.
In the early 1990s, PMI followed the first approach, which led to a 50-50% joint
venture with Shell in a refinery in Deer Park, Texas. 20 1 In August of 1992, the two
companies signed a memorandum of understanding whereby Pemex would purchase a
50% interest in the refinery and contribute to the construction of its coking and
desulfurization facilities. In early 1993, the venture was made official in a new
company-Deer Park Limited Partnership.202 Upgrading began in the summer of 1993,
and the coker was completed in April of 1995 after one billion dollars in expenditures.203
As part of the 30-year agreement, Deer Park would process over 100,000 barrels of Maya
per day and ship a sizable share of its gasoline production back to Mexico.204
The Deer Park agreement met several objectives for PMI. Perhaps the most
important was diminishing the vulnerability of Maya crude in the market. Second, it gave
Pemex copious profits in the 2000s from the profits in the refining market of the United
States.205 Third, it further developed PMI's expertise in contract negotiation and asset
management, as it enabled PMI's staff to be present in Houston and exchange
information with their counterparts from Shell regarding the state of the U.S. refining
market.
201 At the same time, PMI was also in talks with Conoco to start a joint venture in the latter's Lake Charles,
Louisiana refinery, but the project never materialized. See "Pemex in talks with Conoco," Petroleum
Economist, 19 March 1993.
202 "Shell, Pemex Team Up in Refining Venture," The Oil and Gas Journal, 8 March 1993, p. 25.
203 Knott, David, "Looking for Ventures Down Mexico Way," The Oil and Gas Journal, 23 October 1995,
. 48. See also, Editorial, "The Shape of Shell to Come," Petroleum Economist, 30 November 1995, p. 2 .
4 "Pemex to Acquire Interest in Shell Texas Refinery," The Oil and Gas Journal, 31 August 1992, p. 28.
205 In 2006, for example, PMI received total profits from the joint venture in Deer Park of US$520 million.
Source: PMI, Freedom of Information Law response UE-1860000002108, 16 April 2008.
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The evidence on the direct impact on prices and exports, however, is mixed.
Figure 4.6 presents the results of the VARIA analysis, testing the cumulative impact of
the completion of the coker facility in Deer Park in the spring of 1995 on the price
differential of Maya and Alaska North Slope and on the percentage change of exports.
The effect on prices is small in the early months; subsequently, the effect grows but so do
the confidence intervals. The rate of exports increased by nearly 4% in the first month
and eventually stabilized at around 1 % higher than the pre-intervention level (although
without consistent statistical significance).
[FIGURE 4.6 HERE]
Figure 4.6 Effect of Deer Park on the Price and Export Volume of Maya
(VAR-Intervention Analysis - Cumulative Dynamic Multiplier Results)
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A few years later, PMI decided to try a different strategy which had an
unambiguously positive impact on the price of Maya. Rather than acquiring an ownership
stake in the refineries in the United States, PMI increased the overall refining capacity for
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heavy crude by enticing several companies to construct coking facilities in exchange for
long-term supply contracts of Maya that guaranteed a certain differential between Maya
and a reference crude-such as WTI-or product-such as gasoline or fuel oil. Captive
demand for heavy crude in the U.S. increased by approximately 700,000 barrels per day
without Pemex having to disburse money up front and much faster than an equity
purchase would have allowed.206
The first of these agreements was signed in late 1997 between PMI and Clark
USA for the latter's Port Arthur refinery. Pemex would supply, for a minimum period of
eight years starting on July 1, 2001, close to 175,000 barrels per day to be processed in
deep conversion facilities that Clark would build on its own account and risk.207 In
exchange for making the massive capital investment, Clark was assured that the
difference of the sum of half the price of regular unleaded gasoline and the price of diesel
minus one and a half times the price of high sulfur fuel oil would not be less than 15
dollars per barrel.208 If the average differential over the life of the contract was below 15
dollars, then PMI would pay Clark for the difference. Otherwise, no payments would be
made in either direction.
Ernesto Estrada, a Chicago-trained Ph.D. in economics, was the director of PMI's
Houston office at the time and the person in charge of developing these long-term supply
agreements. He arrived in Houston in the summer of 1996 with confidential knowledge
that Pemex would undertake a massive enhanced oil recovery project to nearly double the
production of Maya in Cantarell in five years and with the mission of devising a
206 Author's interview with Ernesto Estrada, telephone communication, 12 January 2010.
207 This agreement was approved in an extraordinary session of Pemex's Board of Directors, held on 2
March 1998.
208 See Extraordinary Session of the Board of Directors of Pemex, 2 March 1998.
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commercial strategy to place that additional crude in the market without putting a severe
downward pressure on its price. Estrada explained his challenge as follows:
We already knew that the price differential [between light crude and
Maya] would widen, but the market didn't know... The first thing we did
was estimate the impact on the market of the additional production. We
knew what was the capacity to process Maya and we saw that the
opportunity cost of refineries fell dramatically. With only 100 or 200
thousand additional barrels, the extra refining capacity would already be
exhausted and then the price would have to be cut considerably so that the
refineries customized to process light crude started to lift heavy oil. Say
that the differential was 10 dollars. We estimated that with the additional
production the differential would go to something like 20 dollars. If PMI
managed to close that differential by even 4 or 5 dollars, that was
additional profit multiplied by hundreds of thousands of barrels per day
over many years.209
The Deer Park agreement had been very expensive and time consuming, and a
similar downstream investment would not resolve the underlying problem. The
negotiation of a single joint venture would have exhausted much of PMI's time and
energy, and it would have only increased captive demand for heavy crude by a fraction of
what was needed. Instead, the strategy of the long-term contracts ensured that as many as
209 Ernesto Estrada, personal interview, 12 January 2010.
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seven refineries committed to coking investments in a relatively short period of time, thus
210
fully absorbing the additional 700,000 barrels per day that were forthcoming.
Estrada and his team had to move quickly and discreetly. There was complete
confidentiality in every step of the process. If the refineries found out the magnitude of
the Cantarell project, they would realize that PMI's willingness to pay was high and
demand a wider price differential as guarantee to build the cokers. That did not happen,
and for each new agreement PMI would negotiate a differential close to their initial
objective.21' By the year 2000, before Maya exports increased drastically, a total of seven
contracts had been signed.
The success of these contracts can be gauged through participant accounts. An oil
industry executive who worked for one of the refining companies argued that the
agreements were immensely beneficial for both Pemex and its customers.m Estrada
agreed with that assessment, although he believes that PMI had a more favorable
outcome given that it successfully exploited its confidential information:
Some of these refineries got upset afterwards. I mean, it was obviously
beneficial to them, since the differential did widen, but they would argue
that they had given the deep conversion to Pemex for free. I mean, these
complaints were never made via official channels. At the corporate level,
they never complained. But individual people would later make casual
2 10 Ernesto Estrada, personal interview, 12 January 2010.
211 Estrada explained as follows: "The negotiation with Coastal for their Aruba refinery was very tough.
They were very tough. But by then I had already signed three contracts, so I was in a stronger position. 'We
already know that you're about to increase production by X,' they would say. They would throw numbers
at you. But you could tell that they didn't know, that they were bluffing, because their numbers were far
from the real figures, and in the end they agreed to a differential where Pemex never had to pay anything"
(personal interview, 12 January 2010).
212 Confidential interview, Houston, Texas, 8 February 2009.
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comments that Pemex had gotten a great deal. And they couldn't complain
too much because they knew that PMI had pushed them into making a
deal that was also very advantageous for them. But they would say: "Yes,
advantageous, but it could have been even more advantageous for us had
we known the information that you had!"2 13
The econometric analysis confirms these assessments and quantifies the size of
the gains for PMI. Figure 4.8 presents the VAR results of this particular policy
intervention. The impulse that is measured is the date when the coker in Clark's Port
Arthur refinery began operating. Other cokers would become operational in the coming
years, but their effect is not directly measured by this analysis. The left panel shows a
statistically significant cumulative gain of approximately two dollars per barrel-against
the benchmark-by the eighth month. The cumulative impact on the rate of exports,
however, was negligible.
[FIGURE 4.8 HERE]
Exogenous shock: The price collapse of 1998
In 1998, nominal prices of crude dropped below their 1986 levels.2 14 A drop in
global aggregate demand, arguably triggered by the Asian financial crisis, took prices to
levels not seen in over a decade. In late 1996, Maya had averaged as much as US$20.81
per barrel. In 1997, the price stabilized around US$15, but then dropped to US$11.49 in
213 Ernesto Estrada, personal interview, 12 January 2010.
214 "Markets-The Crash of '86 Eclipsed," Petroleum Economist, 23 December 1998, p. 47.
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December and to US$9.70 in January of 1998. In December of 1998, the monthly
average was down to an all-time low of US$6.37.m
Figure 4.8 Effect of the Port Arthur Agreement on the Price and
Export Volume of Maya
(VAR-Intervention Analysis - Cumulative Dynamic Multiplier Results)
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The price of Maya would slowly rise in 1999. In April of that year, it fmnally broke
the US$10 barrier for the first time since December of 1997, and in December of 1999 it
was back above US$20. All in all, the price crisis had lasted at least 18 months. What was
PMI's response? Would there be similarities between 1998 and the previous sudden price
drops of 1981 or 1986?
21 A consensus had emerged in the industry regarding the "fair" price of oil the intemnational market,
whereby producer countries could find it profitable to continue to make investments and consumer
countries would not see their economies negatively affected. In 1998, this price was US$18, using Brent
crude as the reference (Mabro 1998).
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Effect of specialization: PMI's response to the price collapse of 1998
On January 9th, 1998, Lourdes Melgar, the director-general for international
affairs at the Mexican Ministry of Energy, got an unexpected phone call from Luis
T61lez, the secretary of energy.216 "You said that there will be an energy conference in
Caracas on January 15th, right?" "Yes," she replied, surprised by the sudden interest of
her boss in an international meeting of relatively low importance. "We are going to go,"
said T6llez. "Adridn Lajous is coming with us. Schedule meetings with the Venezuelan
Minister of Energy, the President of the Central Bank, and, if possible, the President of
the Republic of Venezuela. The international oil market is about to collapse, and we must
do something."
For the analytical purposes of this chapter, the response of the marketing branch
of Pemex to the price collapse is illustrative because it was handled professionally and
never threatened the job security of the people in charge nor the price-setting framework
in the country. In fact, commercial policy in Pemex had been institutionalized in such a
way that the result was the mirror opposite of the disarray of 1981 that led to the fall of
Diaz Serrano. Lajous-then chief executive of Pemex-remained stable in his position,
and formula pricing-the backbone of Mexican oil commercialization strategy-was not
put into question.
T6llez became promptly aware of the impending crisis thanks in large part to
PMI's ability to follow closely the international market. "The Ministry of Energy is small
and did not have a strong research department," said Tellez. "However, Pemex had a very
solid institution in PMI, which has very good traders and people who do very good
analysis, and they realized that the price was about to decline and that a very serious
216 Lourdes Melgar, personal interview, 13 May 2009.
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public finance crisis was imminent." Lourdes Melgar concurred: "Without a doubt,
PMI played an important role... [And] the participation of Lajous was critical. He knew
the oil market extremely well, and that enabled to craft a strategy very quickly."218
A whirlwind of high level oil diplomacy ensued, as Mexico helped to bring
together the Venezuelans and the Saudis-bitter rivals within OPEC-as well as the
Norwegians in an effort to curtail global supply in light of the drastic reduction of global
demand. A conflictive OPEC meeting in Jakarta in late 1997 had left the cartel in disarray
and unlikely to meet the challenge of a sudden drop in demand. T6llez explained his
reasoning as follows:
There was a need for someone to serve as a catalyst of OPEC's ability to
coordinate, and this idea arose within the Mexican government. We sought
the assistance of another major producer that wasn't in OPEC, which was
Norway. The Norwegians agreed with us. I went to Oslo to meet with the
oil minister and she agreed with us, so then it wouldn't just be us
alongside OPEC. And we made an effort for Venezuela and Saudi Arabia
219
to resume cooperation.
Events unfolded rapidly, leading to a wide OPEC and non-OPEC agreement to
curtail supply. Mexicans and Venezuelans reached a preliminary agreement in the
January meeting in Caracas. T6llez and Lajous then flew to Norway to explain the
proposal. Norway, like Mexico, was a member of the OECD and its participation was
217 Luis T6llez, personal interview, 26 June 2009.
218 Lourdes Melgar, personal interview, 13 May 2009.
219 Luis T6llez, personal interview, 26 June 2009.
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critical to avoid the semblance that Mexico was OPEC's "puppet. From Oslo, the
Mexican delegation travelled to Madrid to convene with the Venezuelans, notify them of
the Norwegian position, and travel to Riyadh and explain the secret plan to the Saudi oil
authorities. Participants understood that Saudi cooperation was crucial in any effort to cut
global supply significantly (Grayson 1998).
The initial impact of the accord was positive, although short-lived. News of the
Riyadh meeting broke out on March 22, 1998 and led to an immediate rise in the price of
oil (Mabro 1998). In hindsight, however, the production cut was too small compared to
the magnitude of the drop in demand, and prices continued to crawl downwards (Mabro
1998).
Diplomatic efforts continued throughout 1998 and 1999. Keeping oversupply at
bay was a full time activity that extended over several months and was not always
successful. Lourdes Melgar pointed out the difficulties in overseeing market players in a
context of high uncertainty and deeply rooted suspicion among producers:
[I]t wasn't something where the initial agreement took place and then we
just sat back and saw the fruits of our labor. No, we had to be working
continuously to try to keep the agreement in place... I had to monitor
CNN around the clock. The issue was that the debates between ministers
did not take place in official meetings; they took place through the press.
A conflict broke out between Venezuela and Iran and led to a point where
the whole effort to keep production low was in jeopardy. Then, in
February of 99, the oil market reached its lowest point. Mexico started to
220 Lourdes Melgar, personal interview, 13 May 2009.
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attend OPEC meetings... Algeria was the chair of OPEC that year, and
they called a meeting in The Hague, in the house of the Algerian
ambassador, and it was attended by Venezuela, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Algeria, and Mexico... The debate was bitter, but the final resolution was
that some form of agreement had to be reached regarding the compliance
of Iran and Venezuela, and another production cut was agreed. After that
meeting, things began to improve once and for all, albeit gradually... The
other concern was that Chivez won the elections in the middle of the
process and there was a huge concern about the future of Venezuelan oil
policy. President Zedillo asked Luis T6llez to travel to Caracas to meet
with the president-elect. We were very interested in this, because it was
evident that Chaivez already was in conflict with Luis Giusti, the president
of PDVSA, but Venezuela did comply.221
Exogenous shock: The rise in prices of the 2000s
The 2000s witnessed a dramatic rise in the price of crude oil. Price levels peaked
in the summer of 2008, but they had been rising continuously since 2002. By and large,
the upward pressure on prices was driven by an increase in aggregate global activity,
especially in China and other rapidly industrializing Asian economies. Maya production
from the Cantarell field would peak in 2004, but PMI had little difficulty placing the
additional barrels of oil. From a price of US$13.15 in January of 2002, Maya rose to
US$27.65 in January of 2004-a level unimaginable a decade earlier. Prices would not
stop there: in June of 2005, the nominal F.O.B. price of Maya broke the US$40 barrier
221 Lourdes Melgar, personal interview, 13 May 2009.
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for the first time in history. In April of 2006, it surpassed US$50; in July of 2007, US$60.
The all-time high was reached in July of 2008 at a staggering US$121.36 per barrel.
The decrease of market competition in the 2000s had two effects on PMI. First,
concerns arose that the productive efficiency of PMI had begun to deteriorate. Second,
the government's willingness to intervene in the operations of the company increased.
This response was not generalized throughout the government, but it rose to levels not
seen since the early 1980s. Luckily for PMI, the high level of technical specialization
among its staff thwarted political attempts to challenge its decisions. At the same time,
some concerns arose regarding the insularity of the managerial personnel.
The Congressional Investigation of 2005
In November of 2004, COCEP-now labeled GICEH-announced that the
adjustment factor in the formula for Maya-the "K"-would be cut by 3 dollars. This
represented almost 8% of the average price in the previous month. The decision and the
events that followed illustrate the high level of institutionalization of pricing policy
compared to 1981, but also the fact that in a context of lower market competition and no
fiscal jeopardy, the government's willingness to intervene in the company increased.
On November 6, 2004, the Mexican newspaper La Jornada published a story that
would trigger the most significant attempt of government intervention in oil
commercialization in two decades. "Historic Cut to the Oil Price Sold to the United
States," read the headline.m The article then quoted an international oil market analyst
who argued that the price adjustment was "excessive." The article concluded by
m Israel Rodriguez, "Hist6rica rebaja al precio del crudo para EU: Pemex Internacional," La Jornada, 6
November 2004.
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insinuating that PMI's Director of Crude Oil Commercialization, Bernardo de la Garza,
had sought to send a gesture of goodwill to the recently re-elected President George W.
Bush.
A congressional investigation was launched on March 16, 2005 to determine
whether any wrongdoing by PMI had led to the price decrease.22 3 Bernardo de la Garza
explained the events leading to the price cut as follows:
Many things came up at once. It was one year before Katrina and Rita hit,
and in that year we had about 4 hurricanes hit. One of those hit a refinery
that buys a lot of crude from us, which is the Chevron refinery in
Pascagoula [Mississippi], leading to its close for several months. Then,
starting in August or September, the Arabs starting lowering their prices,
and we did not bring down ours at that point. It was an honest mistake on
our part, and when we reached the point where we had to make the
adjustment, it had to be a big one. It led to the resignation of the director-
general of PMI. He had a delicate health condition, and he decided to
224
resign given all the pressure that he was facing.
The congressional committee lacked the technical capacity to assess pricing
policy correctly-both to appreciate the virtues of the institutional system and any
potential errors in policy implementation. Knowledge of commercialization activities in
223 See Comisi6n de Investigaci6n en Relaci6n a las Politicas Implementadas para la Determinacion de los
Precios del Petr6leo, "Informe de la Comisi6n," Cimara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Uni6n, LIX
Legislatura, 22 February 2006.
224 Bernardo de la Garza, personal interview, Mexico City, 7 April 2008.
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Mexico, by that point, was far removed from anyone who had not worked in PMI for
years. Bernardo de la Garza, for example, had already worked in oil commercialization in
PMI for 14 years, was a former head of PMI's Houston office, and was very well
respected among industry experts, both domestic and international."2
The final report of the congressional investigation illustrates these points.
Members of congress met with PMI managers and travelled to Mexican oil producing
facilities, but did not summon independent experts that could provide an impartial
opinion on the state of affairs. In fact, the general report prompted the deputies from the
opposition PRD to include the following dissent:
We believe that the general tone of the document is excessively flattering
for several reasons. First, it does not answer fully the question that
motivated the creation of the commission: to investigate the unilateral
decision to discount by 3 dollars the "K" factor of the formula that
determines the price of crude... 226
PMI emerged unscathed from the congressional report, but eventually a regulation
was instituted in 2007 that curtailed PMI's price setting flexibility. In 2007, at the request
of the PMI's comptroller, a new rule dictated that changes to the "K" in excess of 10% of
the price of oil would have to be first approved by the company's Board of Directors.m
225 Confidential interview with international oil industry expert, February 2009.
226 Dissent by Deputies Francisco J. Carrillo Sober6n and Rosa Maria Avilds Nijera of the Party of the
Democratic Revolution. See Comision de Investigaci6n en Relaci6n a las Politicas Implementadas para la
Determinaci6n de los Precios del Petr6leo, "Informe de la Comisi6n," Camara de Diputados del H.
Congreso de la Uni6n, LIX Legislatura, 22 February 2006, p. 37.
m Bernardo de la Garza, personal interview, 7 April 2008.
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In practice, month-to-month fluctuations were expected to be much smaller than that and
thus the new rule would have little impact.
Is the Formula for Maya Keeping Up with Market Changes?
Observers worried that a degree of complacency had prevented PMI from
updating its formula to price Maya in international markets in spite of changing market
conditions. Between 1986 and 1996, the formula was revised three times. However, since
1996 until 2010 no changes had been made. If formulas do not successfully estimate the
market price of Maya, PMI risks failing to meet its objectives of price and export
maximization.
Two major reasons suggest that formulas could be outdated. Most significantly,
some industry experts argue that benchmark crude prices no longer represent the clearing
price at the margin (Fattouh 2006). The production of benchmark crudes has been in
decline, leading to fewer open transactions and a more difficult process of "price
discovery." 228 Second, the percentages in the formula may no longer represent accurately
the distribution of price components. The importance of fuel oil in the energy matrix of
the United States, for example, has declined, prompting some experts to question the
validity of continuing to anchor Maya prices to fuel oil in the North American market to
such high degree. However, in an environment with lower market competition, incentives
to meddle with the formulas decrease. Risk aversion rises and the search for innovative
commercial strategies suffers.
228 Fattouh explains this problem for the case of the Dubai benchmark, which is used to price oil in Asia.
Oil production of Dubai dropped from 400,000 barrels per day in the early 1990s to slightly over 100,000
by the year 2004. This meant that every month there were only a handful of cargoes of Dubai crude. In fact,
this prompted the use of Omani crude in combination with Dubai as the relevant benchmark. Brent and
WTI, according to Fattouh (2006) have similar problems.
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PMI in 2008: Becoming a Technical Enclave?
Concerns arose in the middle of the price spike of 2008 regarding whether the
decrease of competition was transforming PMI into a "technical enclave," successful due
to its highly specialized staff but increasingly parochial. By then, all directors-general of
PMI had been promoted from within, after building their entire professional life inside
229the company. Pedro Haas had been followed by Eduardo Martinez del Rio, who was
replaced in 2005 by Rosendo Zambrano. Zambrano was a veteran of PMI, with over 15
years of experience in the company, and he had served as deputy director for refined
products trading from 1995 to 2005. Zambrano's replacement, Rocio Zambrano, also
came from within the company. In fact, she had taken over Zambrano's position of
deputy director in 2005.
The sense among some observers was that if market competition did not expose
inefficiencies in PMI, no one from outside would notice. In other words, managerial
cohesion with decreased market competition was leading to a sluggish insularity not seen
before. In the end, even if PMI did not have identifiable landmark successes in the
2000s-comparable to formula pricing in the 1980s and the contracts in exchange for
cokers in the 1990s-performance remained high in the 2000s. "PMI traders are just as
good as BP or Shell traders," said an international oil industry expert based in Houston. 3 0
Other experts interviewed for this study concurred.
Moreover, in the long run, rising levels of competition are likely to keep PMI
honest. After the price peak of the summer of 2008, competition increased rapidly as the
world struggled with a global recession. In a more difficult market environment,
229 InterView with Mexican oil industry expert, April 2008.
230 Interview with international oil industry expert, February 2009.
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incentives for top performance in PMI should return. Combined with the high degree of
managerial specialization, high competition can help keep non-aligned government
interference at bay and promote entrepreneurial behavior within the organization.
6. Conclusion
This chapter accomplishes three major objectives. First, it presents a detailed
account of the history of PMI's crude oil marketing activities-whereby a state-owned
enterprise evolved from a disorganized and inefficient unit into a highly productive and
innovative firm. Analytically, it illustrates the role of the different explanatory variables
in shaping the outcomes of business efficiency and policy utilization of the firm.
Methodologically, the chapter blends meticulous process tracing-based on archival
material and dozens of in-depth interviews-with time series econometric analysis in
order to provide robust evidence.
In essence, the branch once associated with the downfall of Jorge Diaz Serrano
and a haphazard price determination process changed into a modern company capable of
responding to a dynamic international environment. In fact, PMI's innovations
transformed that environment. Formula pricing became one of the major mechanisms for
oil price discovery in the global market, and the projects to expand the deep conversion
refining capacity in the United States changed the landscape of supply and demand
conditions in the Gulf of Mexico. This process coincided with a retrenchment in the
state's involvement in the company.
Chapter 2 conceptualizes the role of market competition as two-fold. First, it
provides the company with "pressures" to change. The case of PMI illustrates this
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process. In September of 1985, when several Pemex managers realized that Saudi Arabia
was abandoning its policy of moderation in crude production and adopting netback
pricing, they moved fast to protect their position in the market and avoid being undersold.
Their analysis determined that the new Saudi commercial policy greatly threatened
Mexican marketing activities, and they rushed to develop a counter-measure. Similarly,
in 1996, PMI understood that the increase in production of Maya threatened to bring the
price of Mexican crude down. As a result, the company developed a plan to increase
captive demand for heavy oil in the Gulf of Mexico and executed it stealthily prior to the
completion of the Cantarell Project.
By the same token, the decrease in the level of market competition removes these
pressures to change. Without the need to undersell rivals, managers lose incentives to
revise the status quo and improve the company's operations. As the chapter points out,
PMI faced this challenge in the 2000s when demand for oil rose and the difficulty to sell
additional barrels dropped. Several experts raised concerns regarding PMI's apparent
lack of interest to update the pricing formulas and adjust to changing market
circumstances. Moreover, questions arose regarding the implementation of the
adjustment factor (known as the "K") in those formulas, in particular in late 2004.
Second, market competition plays an important role because it affords the
company the necessary "means to change," decreasing the willingness of the government
to participate in its internal operations. In this particular case, the company needed
autonomy to make pricing decisions based on technical considerations as well as
regulatory flexibility to participate in a fast-paced environment. Market competition was
decisive because it raised the cost for the government to intervene in decision-making.
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The severe loss of oil revenue in 1981 had already warned politicians of the pitfalls of
meddling in pricing decisions and had prompted the creation of COCEP-an inter-
ministerial committee that institutionalized decision-making. In that context, Adrian
Lajous had also persuaded the government to relax the public bidding regulations for oil
marketing activities. Otherwise, he told prominent cabinet members, Pemex would be too
slow to respond to rivals' efforts to undersell.
The state retrenched further in the middle of 1985. After COCEP chose to ignore
the recommendation of the technical staff to lower prices in May of that year, Mexican
exports collapsed by 50% over the next month. To overcome the losses, politicians
yielded further control of pricing to PMI bureaucrats, who gained influence over the
coming months and eventually obtained approval for the use of formulas in February of
1986.
The "means to change" would be curtailed slightly in the 2000s, when market
competition decreased. In response to the congressional investigation of 2004,
government officials established limits on COCEP's ability to change the "K" in the
formula from one month to the next. This policy had the advantage of institutionalizing
decision-making for larger swings in the "K." At the same time, it also decreased PMI's
flexibility to respond to short-term market volatility.
The case of PMI also helps to illustrate the formation and effects of managerial
cohesion. In the theoretical discussion of Chapter 2, there are two elements that lead to
cohesion of the managers: specialization and socialization. The process of specialization
in oil industry economics in PMI began with the creation of the subdivision of market
analysis in the early 1980s and continued in earnest once formula pricing was introduced
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and a group of staffers travelled to Houston to attend courses in refining economics. The
advanced knowledge of oil marketing and trading was then shared among the members in
Mexico, and each new generation of employees would undergo extensive training.
Socialization derived from the subsidiary's tradition to retain its staff over the years and
from the fact that PMI was a small place where all employees knew each other well. In
the 2000s, most of the top executives had worked together since they began their
professional careers decades.
Cohesion provided generations of PMI managers with the capacity for
coordinated activity. Additionally, the specialization that had been developed over time
helped constrain the government's ability to intervene in the company. By the 2000s,
several respondents remarked that the analytical and operational work of PMI seemed
quite arcane for outsiders, and that government officials were increasingly unwilling to
appoint politicians to top managerial positions out of fear of losing oil revenues.
This chapter also serves to highlight how fiscal jeopardy can interact with market
competition and affect the government's willingness to intervene in the company. Fiscal
jeopardy encouraged the government to remove regulatory constraints and grant
autonomy to the technical bureaucrats because it raised the cost of politically-induced
managerial errors. The formal creation of PMI as an independent subsidiary in 1989, with
its network of companies around the world, was a direct consequence of the
government's fear of declaring a moratorium on its debt and having foreign courts
confiscate the proceeds of petroleum sales abroad.
Petroleum marketing also allows for the examination of a change in the political
ideology of the government on the policy utilization of the subsidiary. In the 1970s, when
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a leftist ruling coalition controlled the Mexican government, the foreign trade of oil was
linked to the promotion of domestic industrial activity. In exchange for supply
agreements, foreign governments would be asked to engage in technological exchange
programs with Mexico or to commit to make investments in the country. These policies
fit within the general economic policy paradigm of the ruling coalition-import-
substitution industrialization-which championed the notion that economic development
primarily resulted from the promotion of domestic industrial activity. After the mid-
1980s, when the political right consolidated its control over economic policy, PMI
stopped seeking the industrial policy agreements. While in the 1980s and 1990s
competitive pressures prevented the government from willing to intervene in the first
place, it is noteworthy that in the 2000s, once competition decreased, the rightist Mexican
governments still abstained from linking domestic industrial projects to oil
commercialization.
The two following chapters in the dissertation are meant to complement the
analysis of the case of PMI. Chapter 5 describes the history of PEP in order to underscore
the effect of a high degree of managerial cohesion for a subsidiary company that does not
face market competition. Chapter 6 compares two companies with lower levels of
managerial cohesion but with changing levels of market competition.
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CHAPTER 5
PEP: MANAGERIAL COHESION IN A MONOPOLY ENVIRONMENT
1. The Argument in Brief
The history of Pemex Exploracidn y Produccidn (PEP, for short) illustrates the
trajectory of a state-owned enterprise with a high level of managerial cohesion and
specialization but operating in a monopolistic market. As explained in chapter 2, this
organization displayed a middling level of performance with a downward trend.
Compared to the dynamism of the international exploration and production industry, PEP
parochialism paralyzed its technological evolution and innovative capacity.
This chapter makes the following main arguments. First, the PEP's historical
level of business efficiency, by world standards, has been average; yet, it has deteriorated
recently. Second, high managerial cohesion has curtailed the ability of the government to
intervene and make political appointments to top executive positions. However, the lack
of market competition has had two deleterious effects. It has removed incentives among
the managers to improve their performance over time, and it has not compelled the
government to soften the cumbersome regulatory and fiscal framework of the company.
Within this context, two auxiliary variables have stood out to explain changes in
the relationship between PEP and the Mexican state. The willingness of the government
to introduce non-aligned intervention has diminished during times of a threat of oil
scarcity. When oil scarcity appears to be imminent, the government allows the company
to operate more freely; otherwise, constraints on managerial autonomy are maintained.
Additionally, the ability of the government to interfere with the operations of the firm has
been diminished by the emergence of veto points in the political system with the advent
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of democratization. This has been manifested primarily in the reduction of the fiscal
burden.
Appendix B describes in greater detail the statistical analysis included in the
chapter. An ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression is used to test the importance of the
threat of oil scarcity on the degree of non-aligned government intervention. The statistical
results confirm and quantify the findings of the qualitative analysis, showing that the
level of NAGI responds negatively to decreases in the relative oil abundance in the
country.
The analysis of PEP complements PMI's in two ways. At one level, PEP
illustrates in depth the consequences of low market competition and high managerial
cohesion over an extended period of time. Subsequently, by holding these variables
constant, the case of PEP allows identifying more clearly the impact the government's
political ideology, fiscal jeopardy, veto players. Chapter 6, which compares Pemex-Gas
and Pemex-Refining, will emphasize the effect of an increase in market competition
while holding managerial cohesion at a lower level.
2. An Overview of the Business of PEP
Pemex-Exploration & Production was created in 1992 as a subsidiary company of
Pemex out of the old Division of Primary Production. For the purposes of this chapter,
PEP and the Division of Primary Production are analyzed together given that the new
subsidiary comprised the same staff and offices as its predecessor. The main difference
was organizational. Starting in 1992, PEP has operated at arm's length from the rest of
the subsidiaries of the company and constitutes a separate legal entity.
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PEP is in charge of all upstream oil and gas activities in Mexico. This entails the
exploration, development, and management of reservoirs. Its responsibilities end when
the hydrocarbons are put in pipelines for domestic processing (which are under the
management of Pemex-Refining and Pemex-Gas) or when they arrive at the export
terminals (at which point they are controlled by PMI).
Organizationally, PEP is divided into four regions and a subsidiary headquarters
in Mexico City. The structure of each region is semi-autonomous in the sense that the
regional chief has oversight over all the staff, and it is this managers who responds to the
corporate executives. In practice, PEP has a highly decentralized administration where
many operational decisions are made in the regions.
The four regions are North, South, Offshore Southwest, and Offshore Northeast.
The northern region includes areas that were highly productive in the early 20* century
but that have been in decline for many years. The southern region comprises the oil fields
of the Chiapas-Tabasco area. These fields were discovered in the late 1960s and rendered
large amounts of light crude in the 1970s and 1980s. However, they peaked soon
thereafter. The two most important areas in the 2000s were the offshore regions, both of
which are located in the Gulf of Mexico. The Offshore Northeast region has provided the
bulk of Mexico's heavy oil since the 1980s. The Offshore Southwest region has
historically produced less oil but has risen in notoriety because it includes the prospective
deepwater areas in the Mexican side of the Gulf of Mexico.
The history of PEP is largely determined by the evolution of the Cantarell oil
field. It is located in the Bay of Campeche in the Gulf of Mexico, in the Offshore
Northeast region, and it has provided most of the Maya crude that Mexico has exported
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over time. Its commercial production began in 1979, and, in 2004, only the Ghawar field
in Saudi Arabia-the largest in the world-produced more oil than Cantarell (Adriin
Lajous 2009). In that year, however, production peaked and by 2010 Cantarell was in a
process of accelerated decline. While other fields-mainly Ku-Maloob-Zaap, also in the
Offshore Northeast region-had been developed in the previous two decades, they did
not fully compensate for the loss of production in Cantarell. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 in
Chapter 3, respectively, present the evolution of total domestic production and
consumption of oil from 1950 to 2008 and the average monthly production in Cantarell
from 1980 to 2008.
PEP, like any exploration and production (E&P) company around the world, faces
the challenge of increasing reserves of petroleum, minimizing development time (that is,
the lag between discovery of a reservoir and commercial production), and maximizing
the recovery rate from the reservoirs. Reserves may be the most salient measure of the
long-term value of an E&P company (David Johnston and Daniel Johnston 2006; Arnott
2004). Richard Sears, former vicepresident for deepwater E&P at Royal Dutch Shell,
sustains that "the upstream oil industry is exceptional in that inventories are valuable in
and of themselves." 231 Field development and reservoir management are important as
well, as they are essential to "monetize" reserves on the ground. A reflection of the
importance of these three activities is the fact that oil companies subcontract most other
functions, but they invest heavily in attracting top human capital in these areas.
The accumulation of reserves is the product of successful exploration, which
relies on the skill of the company's geologists and geophysicists. Oil companies usually
hire a service company to collect seismic data in prospective oil areas. In this process,
231 Author's interview with Richard Sears, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 14 May 2009.
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brigades of workers measure the time lag of sound waves bouncing off layers of rock
beneath the soil-or, in the case of offshore activity, under water (Conaway 1999).
Subsequently, geologists and geophysicists must interpret the mappings, identifying the
types of rocks that are present and the probability that oil has been trapped inside of
them.
Exploration is an inexact science that depends on the intuition and experience of
the scientists analyzing the data. Back in the 1960s, relying exclusively on two-
dimensional charts, exploration experts faced much more difficult odds. In the 2000s,
with the advent of seismic data in three dimensions and advanced computing power,
interpretation took place in formidable labs where researchers analyzed the subsoil from
all possible angles. Yet, an expert geologist could still find a large reservoir where others
had not. In fact, one of the most important discoveries of the late 20th century, BP's
Thunder Horse field in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico, largely resulted from the ability of
the company's geologists to use an innovative interpretation analysis in areas that others
had abandoned as "dry" (Yeilding et al. 2005). In consequence, international oil
companies invest heavily in recruiting and retaining top geologists.
Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of proven reserves in Mexico. This series is not
fully comparable across time for two reasons. First, in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
reserves are likely to be inflated. Mexico, as other countries have done over time,
overestimated the reserves for political reasons. Second, the methodology to calculate
reserves changed twice in recent years. In 1997, transparency was increased and the
232 Three general classifications of reserves are found in the oil industry, known as the 3P's: proven,
probable, and possible. Proven reserves refer to those which can be produced for economic gain under
existing technological conditions. As the definition entails, their volume depends on both geological and
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more stringent methodology of the Society of Petroleum Engineers was adopted,
resulting in a considerably decline in reserves. Subsequently, in 2002, PEP introduced the
methodology used by the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) of the United
States. Reserves declined further with this accounting change. The top line after 1997
shows what reserves would have been if no methodological changes had been made. The
dotted line shows the reserves measured with the S.E.C. guidelines.
[FIGURE 5.1 HERE]
Figure 5.1 Evolution of Oil Reserves in Mexico (1950 - 2008)
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Even if oil is found, the well will be closed if the hydrocarbons are not highly
concentrated or if production is more costly than the expected sales price. If the field is
deemed to be commercially viable, a development project will be designed and executed.
economic considerations. Probable and possible reserves are reservoirs that cannot be produced
economically given current price levels or existing technologies. Total reserves add all three "P's."
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Otherwise, the oil company will move on to a different prospective area. On occasions,
companies will abstain from developing fields with large concentrations of oil because
production is more expensive than the estimated future price of oil.
Development of a field generally takes several years, and timely completion of
these projects is critical for the company's success. Drilling rigs and other machinery
necessary to develop a field are very expensive. Delays in development cost an E&P
company dearly simply in terms of rental fees and in terms of the opportunity cost of
each day that a field is not in full production.
Project management expertise is crucial to minimize the time of development. In
fact, project management is a core competency of oil companies, while specialized
technical work is often subcontracted to service companies. The expertise lies in the
knowledge of the available technology, the ability to bring different contractors together,
and the logistical acumen to ensure safe and timely completion of deadlines. As Miller
and Lessard (2000) explain, large engineering projects "are unforgiving and often
unrewarding investments" (p. 12). "If a delay in the development of a field is long
enough," explains Richard Sears, "it can easily bankrupt a company."2 33
The third main challenge of an upstream oil company entails optimizing the
amount of oil that is recovered from a reservoir. Oil fields are not large pools of liquid
hydrocarbons that can be drained until exhaustion. Instead, petroleum molecules are
trapped within microscopic pores that exist in the rocks of the subsurface. The
commercial exploitation of a reservoir depends on whether there is enough porosity in the
rocks for the oil to flow through, whether the oil itself is fluid enough, and whether there
is enough pressure in the reservoir to force the oil outwards through the well (Speight
233 Author's interview with Richard Sears, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 14 May 2009.
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2001). As more petroleum flows to the surface, the pressure of the field decreases,
making a high percentage of the remaining oil unrecoverable. Furthermore, if oil is
produced too quickly, the drop in pressure may be disproportionate to the amount of oil
extracted, thus wasting much of the asset's productive capacity.
The successful planning and execution of "secondary oil recovery" endeavors is
similarly crucial for reservoir optimization. In essence, these projects seek to increase the
pressure of the reservoir so that additional oil can continue to flow through the wells.
Baviere (1991) describes the techniques of oil recovery as follows:
Oil is accumulated, together with water and gas, in reservoirs consisting of
porous and permeable rocks. When an oil reservoir is brought into
communication with the surface through a drilling operation, part of the
oil is spontaneously produced because of the natural pressure that exists in
the reservoir. The amount of oil produced by the energy of the reservoir
itself, as well as by pumping of individual wells to assist the natural drive,
is known as primary oil recovery. At the end of this depletion period, the
recovery factor is low, usually lower than 15 % of the original oil in place
(OOIP). For improving oil recovery, water or gas can be injected in order
to maintain or to restore the pressure and to flood the reservoir. These are
secondary oil recovery processes.
However, these now conventional techniques still leave in the
ground about two-thirds of OOIP. This is a result of both unfavorable
234 Porosity is a measure of the amount of open space in a rock, while permeability determines the ease with
which a fluid can flow through those open spaces. Both are important for highly productive reservoirs.
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reservoir characteristics, such as high oil viscosity or rock heterogeneity,
which are responsible for areas of the reservoir that have not been flooded
by the injected fluid, and the poor microscopic displacement efficiency of
water and gas due to capillary forces which are highly active in such
porous media. Therefore, methodologies have been developed to increase
both the oil production rate and the recovery factor... They are called
enhanced oil recovery (EOR) processes. (p. v)
The differential between gas and petroleum prices makes the project economical, even
accounting for the cost of the gas-injection infrastructure. Typically, secondary oil
recovery projects use carbon dioxide or natural gas-although in Cantarell PEP decided
to use nitrogen injection.
Just like exploration, the management of reservoirs is one of the most important
elements of know-how for oil companies and depends on intuition and expertise. Success
is often measured by how well the company can maximize the amount of recoverable oil.
While geologists and geophysicists work in exploration, reservoir development and
management is generally the realm of petroleum engineers.
3. Measurement of Variables
3.1 Business Efficiency
Economic efficiency is measured in several ways, seeking to address the three
major tasks of an exploration and production company described above. Exploration
efficiency is measured in terms of the success rate in exploratory wells drilled. The
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success rate in development wells is not included since these are usually drilled in areas
adjacent to others that are known to be productive. For that reason, exploratory wells are
sometimes referred to as "true exploration" by oil companies.
Figure 5.2 presents the number of exploration wells drilled and how many of them
were successful. The 1990s stand out for the historically low levels of exploration. In the
2000s, the exploratory success of PEP is comparable to that of similar state-owned
enterprises, although lower than the most successful international private companies. For
instance, in 2005, PEP drilled 74 exploratory wells and had a success rate of 53%.
Brazil's state-owned Petrobras drilled 73 wells and its success rate was 57%. PEP's rate
was higher than Colombia's state-owned Ecopetrol's at 38% (21 wells) and Malaysia's
Petronas' at 29% (35 wells). By contrast, BP drilled 45 wells with a 69% success rate and
Shell drilled 54 wells, also with a 69% success rate (Energy Intelligence 2007) .235
[FIGURE 5.2 HERE]
Project management expertise is more difficult to measure. Qualitative
assessments of PEP's major projects are used to gauge the logistical capacity of the
company. Each oil field poses different challenges, but an assessment of performance can
be made by comparing actual development time to (i) estimated time, (ii) the time other
companies took to develop fields with similar geological challenges, and (iii) the time
PEP took to develop fields in the past. Cost overruns are a measure of inefficiency unless
they can be reasonably justified.
235 These figures are not directly comparable. Exploration in offshore areas generally has a different success
rate than onshore, and disaggregated data is not available. Nevertheless, these indicators provide an
indication of the standing of these companies that confinms qualitative assessments by industry experts.
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Figure 5.2 Number of Exploration Wells Drilled and Success Rate (1950 - 2008)
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Reservoir optimization is measured as the percentage of oil recovered from the
field out of the total amount estimated one year before. While companies do not
necessarily meet their targets in terms of production, this comparison allows assessing
how well the petroleum engineers understand the reservoir (in order to make forecasts
and meet their production objectives). The same caveats of the measurement of project
management expertise apply here, since different reservoirs pose different problems.
Nevertheless, these quantitative assessments provide a baseline from which to evaluate
the qualitative evidence.
Figure 5.3 compares actual production from Cantarell with PEP's estimates from
its Annual Operative Program for the period 2000-20 10. Until the fourth quarter of 2004,
PEP's ability to forecast the behavior of the reservoir is exceptional. After the third
quarter of 2005, however, it overestimates production in every single period (except for
the second quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2010). The errors in planning become
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severe in 2008, with actual production at least 20% below estimate for three consecutive
quarters.
[FIGURE 5.3 HERE]
Figure 5.3 Estimated and Actual Quarterly Production in Cantarell (2000-2010)
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3.2 Policy Orientation
In the case of an exploration and production branch, industrial policy can be
identified by the presence of regulations obliging the company to purchase from domestic
companies or to require contractors to have a given percentage of domestic employees in
their workforce. Similarly, it is manifested in the policy of support for domestic industry
in the form of price subsidies.
The strength of the policy orientation is measured in several ways. First, changes
in the tax regime of the company indicate an attenuation or intensification of the use of
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the company for fiscal purposes. Similarly, changes in the rules to hire workers or for
procurement are indicative of changes across time.
3.3 Market Competition
In an exploration and production company, market competition is different from a
commercialization or a refining company. Often, the E&P firm will sell the crude to a
subsidiary of the same parent company, which is then in charge of placing the oil in the
market. In the case of PEP, oil production is sold to PMI for export or to Pemex Refining
for domestic processing. These transactions are usually made at arm's length, but there is
little in terms of competitive pressures.
Instead, competition in the E&P business takes place primarily in the exploration
market. In countries with open exploration markets-such as the United States--oil
companies must determine which areas have the highest potential and how much they are
willing to bid in order to obtain the lease to develop commercial production.23 6 The Shell
Oil Company, for example, outpaced its competitors in the 1970s and 1980s by acquiring
a sizable portion of the deepwater Gulf of Mexico when other companies remained
skeptical of the region's productive potential (Priest 2007). Soon after, Shell's geologists
were proven correct and gave the company an edge over the rest of the industry. In short,
deciding which areas are desirable and acquiring them before other companies is the
locus of competition in the industry.
Hence, PEP faced no market competition. In Mexico, only Pemex is allowed to
conduct any exploratory activities. There is little urgency to assess the productive
236 The market for exploration combines both large companies and independent "wildcatters" searching for
the best opportunities. This competitive rivalry keeps firms constantly seeking for the best human capital
and technology to find oil reservoirs (McKie 1960).
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potential of different regions effectively or to get to them rapidly. In consequence,
effectiveness has deteriorated over time.
3.4 Managerial Cohesion
The same discussion provided in the chapter on PMI applies for the case of PEP.
However, cohesion does not change over time. In order to provide a quantitative measure
of the degree of specialization, archival evidence is presented (see Chapter 6) showing
the percentage of top executives who are petroleum engineers. For the most part,
however, the assessment is qualitative.
3.5 Fiscal Jeopardy
From the government's side, fiscal jeopardy is a critical variable decreasing the
willingness to meddle in the productive activities of the firm. As far as PEP is concerned,
fiscal jeopardy arises when oil scarcity is imminent. This is due to the fact that, for fiscal
purposes, oil and tax revenues are relatively fungible, and the threat of running out of the
former entails a severe shortage in the latter. However, unlike what happens in
commercialization, the process of oil scarcity comes slowly and governments may have
different thresholds regarding what constitutes as a threat of scarcity.
Quantitatively, the threat of oil scarcity (i.e., fiscal jeopardy) is measured as a
continuous variable: the reserves-to-production ratio (R/P). As the name implies, this
indicator is obtained by dividing the total proven reserves of a company (or country) by
the production in a given year, and it is a critical variable to measure the long-term health
of an oil company. When the ratio is low, the threat of oil scarcity increases. Figure 5.4
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shows the evolution of Pemex's reserves-to-production ratio. The solid line shows the
ratio using total reserves, while the dashed line shows the adjustment for proven reserves.
[FIGURE 5.4 HERE]
Figure 5.4 Reserves-to-Production Ratio (1950-2008)
Year
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Two points merit further explanation. First, as explained above, Pemex changed
the methodology to calculate reserves twice since the mid-1990s and thus the reserves
series is not directly comparable across time. Yet, this is not as serious a problem from
the perspective of measuring fiscal jeopardy. In this sense, what matters is the
information that the government has when making decisions. Unless the government
knows the "true" reserves and decides to publish exaggerated ones, then it will make
decisions on the available data. In the case of Mexico, while several government officials
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in the early 1990s suspected that reserves were overly optimistic, the general notion was
that they were very high.
Second, in this regard, R/P indicators for state-owned and private companies are
not directly comparable. Private oil companies generally carry lower ratios than national
companies. A large ratio for a private firm may indicate that reserves are not being
monetized adequately and shareholder value is not maximized. State-owned oil
companies, on the other hand, are believed to prefer higher ratios to enhance their
geopolitical standing and to ensure intergenerational distributive justice (saving oil
reserves for future generations).
How to identify whether changes in the R/P measure are associated with the
decrease of non-aligned government intervention? Regression analysis is used to show
the effect of the R/P ratio on the number of exploratory wells drilled by the company,
extending the methodology of Moroney and Dieck-Assad (2008). For results, see
Appendix B.
3.6 Veto Players
The most relevant veto player that has emerged in the Mexican political system
for the case of PEP is an independent Congress. An independent lower chamber has
influence over the budget of Pemex, while the upper chamber and the lower chamber
both oversee the fiscal legislation of the company. For the present context, the relevant
dates are 1997-the year when the ruling PRI lost its absolute majority in the lower
chamber-and 2000-the year of turnover in the presidency and also when the ruling
party lost an absolute majority in the Senate.
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The case of Mexico allows for good identification of the role of veto players
because, despite turnover in the presidency, the government's economic policy before
and after the year 2000 remained the same. In fact, the staff at the Ministry of Finance
was largely unchanged-except for the replacement of the top-level officials for others
with a similar background.237 Thus, while the Ministry of Finance stayed constant, the
ability of Congress to challenge the former's fiscal and budgetary policies changed.
4. The Evolution of PEP Across Time
Unlike PMI, the evolution of PEP has not entailed qualitative changes in the
degree of market competition and managerial specialization. Given that these two
variables are held constant across time, the case of PEP permits a more nuanced
understanding of the effects of the two auxiliary variables: fiscal jeopardy and veto
players, both of which affect the perspective of the government. The former reduces the
willingness of the government to steer the company towards non-productive activities;
the latter constrains the government's ability to do so.
Table 5.1, however, shows the evolution of PEP according to these variables. In
this context, oil scarcity has an impact analogous to fiscal jeopardy in the case of PMI,
except that the urgency is less immediate. Veto points play a role in the implementation
of policy, but they do not affect the ability of the government to make political
appointments (since these do not require congressional approval).
[TABLE 5.1 HERE]
237 The Minister of Finance appointed by Vicente Fox in 2000, Francisco Gil Diaz, was a University of
Chicago-trained Ph.D. in economics who was closely associated with the generation of economists that
implemented the neoliberal economic policies of the late 1980s and 1990s .
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Table 5.1 Changes in the Level of
Veto Players and Fiscal Jeopardy
Veto Points
Low
O.i
0
U V) High
U-
Holding market competition and managerial specialization constant, the
combination of the threat of oil scarcity and the presence of veto points leads to an even
lower level of intervention. A low threat of oil scarcity combined with a high level of
veto points, and viceversa, leads to an intermediate level of intervention. Finally, the
outcome of low oil scarcity and low veto points is a higher degree of non-aligned
interventionism.
5. A Political and Economic History of PEP
Mexico runs out of "easy oil"
In his annual state of the nation address, Mexico's president warned about the
imminent threat of oil scarcity and urged for a major initiative to safeguard the energy
outlook of the country. "Today," he said, "Mexico must face an era of difficult oil, which
requires drilling at lower depths and strengthening offshore drilling." Speaking in 1966,
President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz continued: "Petrdleos Mexicanos continues to seek a
balanced development that will allow it to anticipate the rising demand, improve the
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quality of its products, increase hydrocarbon reserves, and improve its means of oil
production, storage, transportation, and distribution." 238
Up until the mid-1960s, Mexico had met domestic demand thanks to production
from fields discovered by the international oil companies prior to the expropriation of
1938. In the 1940s and 1950s, the low international price of oil eliminated incentives to
produce beyond self-sufficiency, and Pemex did not pursue an active exploration
program. Instead, wells were drilled in areas adjacent to existing fields (Morales,
Escalante, and Vargas 1988), with low risk but also low probabilities of making a major
discovery.
Mexico's rapidly industrializing economy would soon require an amount of oil
that Pemex was unable to provide. A Pemex study published in the company's 1965
annual report predicted a continued high growth in demand and an inability to increase
production from existing fields at the same rates of the previous twelve years:
The forecasts for hydrocarbons demand for the remainder of this decade
and for the period 1971-1980... show the need to develop all phases of the
petroleum industry to levels far superior to the current ones, and it is
necessary, as the fundamental point, to increase Mexico's petroleum
reserves.239
238 Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, Second State of the Union Address, 1 September 1966. Diaz Ordaz was president
from 1964 to 1970.
239 Pemex, Memoria de Labores, 1965, p. 10.
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The predictions of the 1965 annual report were accurate. 240 Between 1965 and
1970, the average annual growth in gasoline consumption was a steep 7.83%, while
production grew at an average of 5.42%. Starting in 1966, Pemex stopped exporting
crude oil for the first time in its history, as the entirety of its production went to meet
domestic needs. Between 1971 and 1973, in the first three full years of the Luis
Echeverria administration (1970-1976), consumption of gasoline grew by 9.2% annually,
while crude production rose by a mere 1.71%. In fact, between 1972 and 1974, right at
the time of the first oil shock, Mexico became a net importer for the first time in the
twentieth century.24'
The large exploration initiative of the late 1960s
The Diaz Ordaz government and Jesu's Reyes Heroles, the chief executive of
Pemex, undertook an ambitious exploratory program. As a result, the number of field
brigades collecting seismic data, the number of exploratory wells drilled, and the average
depth of the wells increased considerably. In 1965, for example, 139 exploratory wells
were drilled, up from 70 in 1963 and 83 in 1964. The yearly average from 1965 through
1970 was 140, compared to 95 for the previous sexenio. The activity of field brigades,
measured as group-months worked, rose to 637 in 1965 from 547 the year before, and the
six-year average for the Diaz Ordaz administration was 742, compared to 516 for the
240 By then, several other prominent actors had warned about the imminent threat of oil scarcity. Antonio
Bermidez, for example, who was chief executive of Pemex between 1946 and 1958, wrote to then
president-elect Diaz Ordaz in 1964 about the dire production outlook. See "Memorandum urgente de
Antonio J. Bermudez para el Sr. Lic. Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, Presidente Electo de Mexico," 27 October 1964
(Hermida Ruiz 1974).
241 In fact, Pemex should have become a net importer earlier, but Reyes Heroles allegedly preferred to keep
refineries operating below capacity rather than admit the inability of Pemex to produce as much as the
country needed (Meyer and Morales 1988).
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previous government. Figure 5.2 (above) shows the rise in exploratory activity during the
Diaz Ordaz administration.24 2
The efforts paid off. In 1967, Pemex geologists identified three prospective fields
along the border of the southern states of Tabasco and Chiapas. Exploratory drilling
began in early 1971, and two of them-Sitio Grande and Cactus-turned out to be highly
productive (Meneses de Gyves 1983). These reservoirs came onstream in late 1973, and
in 1975 production averaged over 300,000 barrels per day. This amount constituted
45.6% of national crude production that year and allowed Mexico to export oil once
again (Sordo and Carlos Roberto L6pez 1988). The development of Cantarell would
follow shortly, crowning the high level of exploratory activity.
The discovery that turned Mexico into a major petroleum power
One February morning in 1971, a fisherman named Rudesindo Cantarell appeared
at the Pemex offices in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz. He asked to meet with the regional
chief of exploration and reported that for several years he had noticed an oily spot in the
sea, in the Bay of Campeche, which looked like petroleum to him (Meneses de Gyves
1983). He had first seen the oil during a fishing trip in 1961, but had not paid much
attention to it. Eventually, he had become aware of the country's need for petroleum
resources and felt compelled to speak with Pemex field executives about his finding
(Morita 1997).
242 Starting in 1989, Pemex stopped reporting the activity of exploratory field brigades, so a full time series
is not available. Up until 1988, the pattern is analogous to that of exploratory wells drilled. Additionally,
development wells drilled are not reported given that they refer to wells from proven fields, which entail
little risk (success rates usually surpass 90 %).
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Normally, Javier Meneses de Gyves, the regional chief of exploration, would not
have paid too much attention to a stranger telling a story of oil seeping somewhere in the
country. As it turns out, Pemex workers constantly received false alarms from laypeople
claiming to have made an oil discovery. Mr. Cantarell's account, however, struck a
chord: the shallow waters of the Bay of Campeche could potentially hold large petroleum
resources-there were old records describing leaks oozing all the way to the surface-
and the area was yet to be systematically explored.243 Thus, he instructed one of his
staffers, Narciso Paz, to gather a team and visit Campeche to determine the accuracy of
the claim.244
The Pemex engineers were pleased with what they saw. Narciso Paz would report
back to Meneses de Gyves that the large extension of the oil "spot"-covering
approximately 50 square kilometers-and the shallow depth of the waters-35 meters-
made him very optimistic about the potential for a large field lying underneath. "The
hydrocarbons manifested in the aforementioned area have great economic importance,"
Paz wrote on March 2, 1971. "Given its geological conditions... the area is favorable and
I advise to initiate seismic exploration immediately" (qtd. in Meneses de Gyves 1983, p.
62).
Preliminary studies were conducted between 1971 and 1974, when the first
exploratory well was drilled (Meneses de Gyves 1983). In 1976, the well Chac- 1
243 Meneses de Gyves (1983) wrote: "Suddenly I remembered an old map that I found looking through
some archives. It was an old geological map of Guatemala and Mexico, made by Tercier in 1932, that
showed two unverified oil seepage areas in the waters north of Xicalango" (p. 60).
244 Historical sources differ slightly on the point of the first contact between Mr. Cantarell and Pemex
personnel. In an interview given soon before his death in 1997, Cantarell recalled having visited the Pemex
office in Coatzacoalcos in 1968 and not hearing back until March 1, 1971. Javier Meneses de Gyves, on the
other hand, reported in his memoirs meeting Cantarell in Coatzacoalcos in February of 1971 and
dispatching an exploration brigade on February 28th. It is possible that Mr. Cantarell misremembered the
dates, since the interview took place nearly thirty years later. Similarly, Mr. Meneses de Gyves may have
wanted to downplay the amount of time that passed before a brigade was sent out.
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confirmed the presence of large volumes of crude in the reservoir. Starting in early 1977,
Pemex contracted the services company Brown & Root-now a subsidiary of
Halliburton-to develop the field and begin commercial production as soon as possible
(Pratt et al. 1997). Finally, in June of 1979, after a relatively fast development process,
crude began flowing from the offshore production platforms in Cantarell to the main
export terminal of Dos Bocas, in the neighboring state of Tabasco.
The Cantarell field, thus named after the person who first saw it, turned Mexico
into a major oil producing power. At the time, it was the second largest field ever
discovered, second only to Saudi Arabia's Ghawar field (Adrian Lajous 2009). Between
1979-the year it came onstream-and 2007, production averaged 1.26 million barrels
per day. 245For comparison, this rate is more than double the total produced by BP and its
partners from the massive Prudhoe Bay field in Alaska during a similar time period.246
From a different angle, total global oil production for ExxonMobil, the largest private oil
company in the world, for 2004 was 2.57 million barrels per day (Energy Intelligence
2006), barely twice Cantarell's average.
Moreover, the geological characteristics of the area made Cantarell an
exceptionally cheap area of production (Shields 2003). In 2008, for example, the cost per
barrel in Cantarell was estimated at US$4 per barrel, comparable to the Persian Gulf and
several times below the cost per barrel of deepwater production in the Gulf of Mexico.247
245 Source: Pemex report on the history of Cantarell, accessed on 24 June 2009,
http://www.pemex.com/index.cfm?action=content&sectionID =137&catID =2222.246 Source: Prudhoe Bay Fact Sheet, BP, August 2006.
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp-internet/us/bp_us-english/STAGING/localassets/downloads/a/AO3_pru
dhoe bay fact sheet.pdf, accessed on 24 June 2009.
247 Pemex E&P manager, author's interview, 9 June 2008.
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This meant that petroleum would be abundant for years to come and that rents would be
high.
The Impact of Oil Abundance on Government Intervention
The end of the threat of oil scarcity eliminated the incentives for the government
to align its objectives with the commercial success of the company. The government's
willingness to intervene rose, especially given the lack of competitive market forces that
could punish attempts to meddle in the operations of the firm. However, the ability to
intervene would be constrained-first by the high degree of managerial cohesion and,
eventually, by the rise of an effective opposition in the Congress that acted as a veto
player in policy implementation.
In the case of PEP, in the years after the discovery of Cantarell, non-aligned
government intervention was manifested in fiscal and regulatory policy. In the absence of
relevant veto players in the political system, the government could implement policy
unfettered. However, the ability to make political appointments was hindered
considerably the high degree of managerial specialization in this branch of Pemex.
The Sociology of PEP: High Managerial Cohesion
As explained in Chapter 2, scholars of organizational sociology have long
emphasized the importance of recruitment, socialization, and promotion practices in
shaping the behavior of large bureaucracies (Kaufman 1960; Kunda 1992; Wilson 1968).
Incentives within the organization are often the product of norms of loyalty and
reciprocity that are transmitted in the performance of day-to-day activities. Sometimes,
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particular types of people self-select into the group, increasing the chances that the
resulting organizational outcome will take a certain form. In the case of PEP,
organizational behavior cannot be understood without an analysis of the characteristics of
the dominant executive- and operative-level professional in the company: the Mexican
petroleum engineer.
Petroleum engineering is the university major par excellence for the crude oil
production activities worldwide (exploration is generally the realm of geologists and
geophysicists, while refining is reserved for chemical engineers). Petroleum engineering
is mostly concerned with drilling wells and optimizing the life-cycle of the reservoirs. In
E&P subsidiaries worldwide, petroleum engineers share leadership opportunities with
geologists, and the orientation of a company is often the result of the training of the
person at the helm. In the Shell Oil Company of the 1970s, for example, the strong
emphasis on exploration was to a large extent the product of the CEO's worldview as a
geologist (Priest 2007).
In Mexico, however, petroleum engineers reign at PEP. Geologists are few and, to
a large extent, have joined the social circles of petroleum engineers. At the time when
this study was conducted, the highest ranking geologist in PEP was the deputy director
for planning, who had befriended petroleum engineers since his college years. In the
National University, as it turns out, during the first two years petroleum engineers and
geologists often enroll in the same courses.
Mexican petroleum engineers have the following characteristics. First, they are
relatively few in number, so that little anonymity exists. Historically, only two
universities have offered the major of petroleum engineering-the National University
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(UNAM) and the National Polytechnical Institute (IPN), both in Mexico City-and
generally no more than a handful of students graduate each year. In a subsidiary of almost
50,000 employees, the managerial group is drawn from a remarkably small circle.
Second, Mexican petroleum engineers, by and large, must join PEP. Virtually
none of them is recruited to work abroad, and, given their specialized training, scarce
employment opportunities exist outside the company.248 In the language of Albert 0.
Hirschman (1970), they lack an "exit" option.
Third, operative work as a petroleum engineer is dangerous, taking place is
remote areas where the smallest oversight can lead to a deadly accident. This experience
is shared by most petroleum engineers, who thus develop strong bonds both directly with
their reservoir teammates and indirectly with other members of the profession due to this
common "rite of passage." Jose Angel G6mez Cabrera, a professor of petroleum
engineering at the National University, explains that the vast majority of graduates go
through the same career socialization process: "After graduating, the petroleum engineer
has to go to the field. You have to be in the wells, in the platforms, you have to be there
for a while, from 3-5 years, to really get to know what is going on."249
Fourth, promotion is slow and depends on years of proven service and loyalty. It
is only after years in the field that a petroleum engineer can take on executive jobs within
PEP, and then competition for promotion is fierce, since few positions are available. Not
alienating the superiors is critical to stand the chance of moving upwards. "The discipline
of the subordinates is essentially like in the military" remarked a veteran petroleum
248 A few petroleum engineers choose a research career at the Mexican Petroleum Institute and others find
employment at the Federal Electricity Commission working in geothermal facilities.
249 Author's interview with Jos6 Angel G6mez Cabrera, Mexico City, 16 April 2008.
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engineer who asked for anonymity. "Disagreements are not allowed," or else future
promotion opportunities are severely compromised. 0
How the organizational structure of PEP strengthens the culture ofpetroleum engineers
The reform of 1992 modernized Pemex by improving its governance structure,
enhancing the transparency of its transactions and, for the first time, creating a reliable
system of statistical records. At the same time, it allowed for a "feudalization" of the
industrial branches. With newfound independence, subsidiary and regional directors
amassed power, garnering the ability to steer their organizations into paths different from
those envisioned by their superiors. A manager in PEP who requested anonymity
remarked:
In the regions, there is a director of planning, but he doesn't report to the
subsidiary's director of planning. Instead, he reports to the director of the
region. And the subsidiary's director of planning does not report to the
corporate director of planning, he reports to the subsidiary's director-
general. The same thing happens with finance, human resources, etcetera.
How can accountability be enforced along the chain of command? It's
impossible. That's why no one takes the corporate headquarters seriously
and why the power lies in the subsidiaries and in the regions.2 5 1
250 Petroleum engineer, personal interview, 11 April 2008.
251 Author's interview, June 2008.
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Consequences of the sociology ofpetroleum engineers
The strong bonds created amongst petroleum engineers and the lack of "exit"
options creates a military-style sense of discipline which generally helps the performance
of the subsidiary but which, in the absence of market competition to keep the managers
honest, has led to some parochialism and a concomitant downward trend in performance.
On the positive side, high discipline allows a highly decentralized organization-
operating in many unsupervised areas-to carry out tasks with a sense of mission. This is
especially remarkable given that in PEP, as in many state-owned enterprises worldwide,
the firing of a bad employee is virtually unheard of. Close observers of the Mexican
industry believe that the middle managers of PEP are compelled to work harder than their
counterparts in Refining given that the failure of PEP entails the end of their means of
subsistence and that they do not want to be shunned from their primary social circle for
irresponsible behavior.
Additionally, politicians are seldom appointed to top managerial positions in PEP.
The technical nature of the activities means that most jobs are closed for non-petroleum
engineers. Moreover, given the scarcity of well-paid executive positions, the rank-and-
file feel strongly offended when outsiders join the company at a managerial level. Jose
Angel Gomez Cabrera describes the reaction of petroleum engineers to political
appointments:
[T]hey see [political appointments] with a lot of resentment. We feel that
people coming in know very little about the company. I was telling you
that, in order to be a manager in PEP, many years have to go by, years of
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hard work in stressful, dangerous conditions. And then you see that in
other subsidiaries things are different, where recent college graduates
make it to high positions right away. These are people who don't know
anything about the petroleum industry and come to Pemex to learn, but
they come to learn as managers and as deputy directors. This has a big
impact on morale in the operating segment of the company. 2
In general, the government does not test the resolve of the petroleum engineers to
challenge a political appointment. On occasion, however, someone external is appointed
to a mid-level position and the PEP managers close ranks against him. A person closely
familiar with PEP activities described the case of an outsider manager appointed by the
director-general of Pemex who was isolated and ignored by those around him, both
superiors and subordinates. Those above him would not include him in the decision-
making process and those below him would openly disregard his instructions-with the
complicity and support of the superiors. Frustrated, the outsider resigned.
On the negative side, however, PEP has been largely closed from the outside
world and has also blocked beneficial external interference. More specifically, PEP has
been capable of preventing outsiders from modernizing the organization, in spite of the
fact that the technological lag between PEP and its international counterparts has become
more severe over the years. Former Pemex director-general Adrian Lajous explains this
eloquently: "[PEP] has developed a much stronger esprit-de-corps than the rest of the
2 Author's interview with Jos6 Angel G6mez Cabrera, Mexico City, 16 April 2008.
253 Author's confidential interview with a top energy ministry executive, Mexico City, April 2008.
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company... They have defended themselves so that no one can infiltrate them. Thus, it is
a more isolated group. That's their strength and that's their weakness."254
Effect of Low Market Competition I. Lack of Incentives to Improve Efficiency
The lack of market competition helps to explain the downward trend in the
efficiency of PEP's staff as well as two instances of distortionary government
intervention: regulatory and budgetary suffocation. In a context of abundant oil, the lack
of signals of performance given by competitive forces meant that the optimization of
company operations was not a top concern for a government already occupied in a
plethora of other public policy domains.
Mufioz Leos argues that the main negative consequence of no market competition
was in the loss of human capital in exploration. "For about twenty-five years, the
exploration budget was restricted by the Ministry of Finance, and the little money they
got was spent exploring right next to the known areas. There was no incentive to do
better, to explore in areas that entailed risk, and in those conditions we were not attracting
the best geologists in the world."255
Luis T6llez, chief of staff for President Ernesto Zedillo and later Secretary of
Energy, explains the predicament on the government's side. "What happens," he argues,
"is that the discount rate for the government is extremely high, and we needed oil
revenues immediately in order to grow. The choice was to prioritize production in order
to obtain revenues, and only subsequently seek to explore. So yes, there was an explicit
254 Author's interview with Adrian Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2008.
255 Author's interview with Ra6l Mufloz Leos, Mexico City, 30 July 2008.
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policy, which is manifested in the data, to prioritize production."25 In short, in light of
the tradeoffs that any government must make, exploration could wait given that no other
companies could compete for exploration opportunities against Pemex in Mexico.
Effect of Low Market Competition I: The Government is Unwilling to Withdraw
PEP has never faced a competitive market that punishes the presence of
suboptimal regulatory practices. This issue is perhaps best understood in comparison to
the history of PMI. In the mid-1980s, the management of PMI persuaded the Ministry of
the Comptroller to exempt international crude oil sales from the regulatory framework
that was applied to the rest of the state enterprise system, including PEP and Pemex
Refining. Then PMI director-general Adriin Lajous describes the urgency of obtaining a
regulatory exemption: "Imagine what would have happened if they had forced us to sell
Mexican crude by public tender. No company in the world did that. We would have been
destroyed in the market. I had to speak with the Comptroller and with Carlos Salinas and
Pedro Aspe when they were in the Ministry of Planning and Budget, and they understood
this.""'
Luis T61lez explains the problems faced by a state-owned enterprise such as PEP:
The issue is that there is an oversight system that is excessively rigid and
inefficient. It's built for a bureaucracy and not for a business, and Pemex
must be a business enterprise. It's been difficult, and the government
256 Author's interview with Luis Tellez, telephone communication, 26 June 2009.
257 Author's interview with Adriin Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2008.
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hasn't known how to resolve this question... In the area of crude oil
production, rents are so high that many of the inefficiencies are hidden.258
Non-Aligned Government Intervention I. Regulatory suffocation of PEP
The main constraint lied in the area of procurement. The bulk of purchases had to
undergo a public bidding process, regardless of quality or technical compatibility
considerations. The consequence was a delay in almost all unanticipated project
decisions-which could not be made without a lengthy bureaucratic approval process-
without a substantial decrease in corruption. As a high ranking Pemex official said,
lamenting the high level of corruption, "it is incredibly easy to collude with a company so
that it wins a public bid."259
The regulatory framework was problematic because it severely restricted the
possibility that a manager of a state-owned enterprise-Pemex included-could make
operational decisions based on the so called "business judgment rule" (Bou6 2002). The
business judgment rule is an important element of the corporate governance tradition
worldwide. In simple terms, it means that managers are not legally liable for decisions
made in good faith for the improvement of the company, regardless of whether those
decisions lead to positive or negative outcomes. Unless it is demonstrated that a manager
had ill intent-something very difficult to prove in a court of law-he or she cannot be
sued by shareholders claiming that a decision affected the earnings of the company
(Block, Barton, and Radin 1987).
258 Author's interview with Luis Tellez, telephone communication, 26 June 2009.
259 Confidential author's interview, 4 July 2008.
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The absence of the business judgment rule in a commercial enterprise introduces
extreme risk-aversion incentives, as managers are generally unwilling to deviate from
business-as-usual practices for fear of legal sanctions, including incarceration. For
example, Pemex managers became extremely reluctant to pilot-test innovative
technologies in refineries or wells, afraid that the temporary suspension of service would
result in administrative penalties. Similarly, as Bou6 (2002) points out, a broad
interpretation of the Federal Penal Code could, in the worst cases, allow for politically-
motivated prosecution and, most often, promote "bureaucratic paralysis." Former Pemex
director-general Ran'l Munioz Leos explains the problems faced by the company as
follows:
The legal framework with the comptroller complicates things greatly for a
state-owned company. Let's say that your project design called for a
certain type of pipe. Then the contractor comes to you and says: "Look,
you proposed this pipe, but this other pipe is better for this project because
of this reason. Can you authorize that I use this pipe instead?" Within the
current legal framework, the bureaucrat who dares to authorize such type
of change places himself at great legal risk, since the assumption is that
he's being bribed in order to agree to using different pipes. Therefore, in
order to authorize a change, they have to go through a long process, but
it's not like the contractor can stop the work. What can the contractor do?
If he uses the bad pipe, he knows that it's not going to work as well and
there may be adverse consequences later. If he uses the good pipe, he is
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taking the risk that the change isn't approved and doesn't get reimbursed
for the expense. So things just get more and more complicated, to the
point that it becomes impossible to disentangle the paperwork. The result:
long delays in the project, costs are double of what was anticipated, and
you have all kinds of rumors and gossip about the bad management. And
bureaucrats do what's safer for them, since they don't want to end up in
jail.26o
The origin of the regulatory framework preventing PEP from adopting a more
flexible business orientation is found in a series of reforms implemented by the
government of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) to diminish corruption in government
agencies (Barriga Fernindez 1988). Ironically, in spite of the good intentions, the reforms
severely hindered the flexibility and operational autonomy of state-owned enterprises.
The changes were part of De la Madrid's broader Moral Renovation program,
26
which amended several legal codes soon after taking office.261 In late December of 1982,
he introduced a new Federal Law of Responsibilities of Public Servants-for
administrative offenses-and added a section to the Federal Penal Code on "Crimes
Committed by Public Servants"-for criminal offenses. Both of them proscribed specific
types of behavior by public servants, and at least two of their clauses were overly
restrictive.262
2 Author's interview with Rail Mufloz Leos, Mexico City, 30 July 2008.
261 For a discussion of the effects of the Moral Renovation program on the relationship with the union, see
Grayson (1988).262 Article 47, section 1 of the Federal Law of Responsibilities stated that all public servants ought to
"fulfill with maximum diligence the service that is assigned and abstain from any act or omission that
causes the suspension or deficiency of such service or implies abuse or undue exercise of a job, duty, or
commission." Similarly, article 214, section III of the Federal Penal Code now read: "A public servant will
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Many of the regulatory restrictions existed since before the reforms of the De la
Madrid administration, but they were not always enforced. Prosecution of public servants
was constrained because article 111 of the federal constitution stipulated that they had to
be tried by public jury. This condition had been preserved from the original constitutional
text of 1917 despite the fact that, in 1929, public juries were eliminated from the Mexican
judicial system for "common" crimes (Ovalle Favela 1980b). In theory, a public jury
could be summoned specifically to discuss a case against a public servant, but in practice
the legal system had little institutional ability to do so (Ovalle Favela 1980a). In
December of 1982, De la Madrid removed the anachronistic reference to the public jury
in article 111, thus opening the way for the Federal Law of Responsibilities and the
Federal Penal Code to be enforced freely, with perverse consequences for the
management of a productive enterprise.
Why the Regulatory Constraints Hurt PEP's Efficiency
The 1980s witnessed a transformation of the upstream oil industry around the
world, whereby oil companies pursued new reserves in more difficult terrains and
became leaner from the divestiture of non-core assets. By 1982, after oil prices had begun
their gradual march downwards, industry executives had come to terms with the new
bargaining power of oil-producing countries. The nationalizations of the 1960s and early
1970s had shocked the majors, accustomed to dictate the terms of trade to host countries,
commit the crime of undue exercise of public service when, having knowledge by reason of employment,
duty, or commission that, for any act or omission, the patrimony or interests of any entity of the centralized
federal public administration system, of the Federal District, of the descentralized organisms, enterprise
with majority state ownership, association and society belonging to these, and public trusts, of the Congress
of the Union or of the federal judicial branch or of the Federal District can be gravely affected and does not
inform the hierarchical superior in writing or prevents it if it is within scope."
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but by the early 1980s there was a broad-based acknowledgement that expropriations had
come to stay (Grant and Cibin 1996).
Moving from a state of "denial" to a state of "accommodation" (Grant and Cibin
1996), the loss of access to areas with abundant oil resources compelled company
executives to change their old business models in two fundamental ways. First,
international oil companies further developed the capacity to produce in frontier
environments, such as Alaska, the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea, and West Africa,
which they had pioneered in the 1970s. Not only did IOCs invest heavily in technological
innovation programs, but they also acquired advanced managerial skills from supervising
the construction of large engineering projects that they could then transplant to other
parts of the world.
Both private and state-owned firms moved forward in this respect. In 1983, for
example, Shell drilled an exploratory well in the Gulf of Mexico "in a world record water
depth of 6,448 feet" (Priest 2007, p. 222). In 1988, a fixed platform was installed in the
deepwater Bullwinkle field, and in 1993 production began at its Auger field in 2,800 feet.
The company's emphasis on deepwater exploration and production, to a large extent,
responded to its need to open up new productive areas (Priest 2007). Likewise, in 1985
Petrobras drilled at 1,256 feet in the Marimba field off the coast of Brazil, and by 1992
the Brazilian state-owned company was operating in 2,562 feet (Bertani 2008). By
contrast, the Ixtoc-1 well in Cantarell was drilled in 1978 in only 157 feet of water in the
continental shelf (Boehm and Fiest 1982). Pemex E&P had different technological needs
than its peers, but the gap in project management was widening.
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Second, the lack of easy oil elicited the need to optimize operations, thus allowing
for making profits at the margin. Optimization upstream revolved around the divestiture
of non-core activities and assets, making companies leaner and more flexible. Coal and
minerals subsidiaries were sold. Even activities that erstwhile had been done in-house,
such as drilling and the collection of seismic data, were increasingly subcontracted out to
services companies. This practice not only reduced overhead costs, but also led to the
development of unparalleled expertise by services companies through specialization
(Grant and Cibin 1996). Moreover, several majors further specialized in particular
segments of the industry in order to exploit their comparative advantage. Mobil, for
example, focused on enhancing its leadership in lubricants and other refined products
(Grant and Cibin 1996).
Similarly, the divestiture of low-yield upstream assets became generalized, as the
accumulation of oil fields no longer served a purpose in and of itself. Oil fields that had
low rates of return for some companies-and where production would have been
postponed-were desirable for others willing to invest at higher levels. Optimal
exploitation of the entire portfolio of assets became the goal, and reservoirs that did not
meet the companies' desired returns were traded.
The technological and project management results were evident by the 1990s. The
management of the Cantarell Project, the largest investment of Pemex in over a decade,
was outsourced to the external engineering firms, allegedly due to a lack of internal
capability. 263 Additionally, PEP engineers were forced to rely excessively on external
consultants to analyze the desirability of different projects-a sign of faltering in-house
263 Former Pemex director-general Ranl Mun'oz Leos, author's interview, 30 July 2008. In the international
oil industry, project management is a core competency of oil companies, which generally leave the
specialized technical work to contractors in the services companies.
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skills to make strategic and procurement decisions. 264By 2008, several top-ranking
Pemex executives complained about the inability of the company to manage large
engineering projects and the financial losses caused by long delays in project completion.
The nature of industrial relations in PEP can be explained in a similar way. The
main constraint of the rigid labor practices for operations regards the fact that surplus
labor cannot be laid off or even transferred to different geographic areas.26' The high
rents obtained from upstream activities, however, have generally been sufficient to keep
the government from challenging the power of the oil workers' union. The result has
been a suboptimal use of labor throughout the company.
Non-Aligned Government Intervention H: Fiscal Suffocation of PEP
Over the past twenty years, Pemex has been noted as one of the state-owned oil
companies with the heaviest fiscal burden in the world, and no subsidiary has faced more
stringent fiscal obligations than PEP. In industrial enterprises, the percentage of profits
that is reinvested in the finn-the plowback ratio-is considered critical to take
advantage of future growth opportunities. In the Mexican oil sector, this ratio is
determined by the fiscal legislation. Prior to democratization, this legislation was
"rubber-stamped" by the Congress; after democratization, a negotiation takes place
between the executive branch and the different parties in the legislature to set the taxes
and duties of the company, as well as any expenditure restrictions.
264 Confidential author's interview with international oil industry expert, 23 June 2009.
265 Power in the oil workers' union follows from the number of union members in each union district.
Accordingly, union leaders have established a system where workers cannot be transferred by the
management to districts different from the one of their incorporation. This mechanism perpetuates the
regional distribution of power in the national union, and it prevents Pemex from sending workers from low
demand to high demand areas.
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The fiscal burden of Pemex grew rapidly starting in the 1980s and especially in
the late the 1990s and the early 2000s. Between 1960 and 1982, the company operated
under a simple fiscal scheme, paying only 12% of net income. This amount was increased
in 1975 with an additional export tax. Starting in 1983, a duty on hydrocarbons was put in
place for the production of crude, and an additional one was added for the export of
petroleum, raising the total contribution to 56.7% of net income by 1985 (Diaz Escalante
1997). Reforms in the 1980s established "ordinary," "extraordinary," and "additional"
duties on the extraction of oil reaching 78.9% of PEP's net income. These charges were
mostly comprised of a "duty on hydrocarbons" equal to 60.8% of total income plus a
"surplus profit tax" equal to 39.2% of the difference between the annual average of
Mexican crude and the amount forecast by the government at the end of the previous year
(Martinez Ramirez 1997; Suirez Coppel and Yepez 2007). After the payment of duties,
PEP would be subject to the payment of a corporate income tax.
Figure 3.4 (see Chapter 3) shows the actual amount of taxes paid by Pemex as a
percentage of total sales from 1950 to 2008. In the 1970s, as Mexico becomes a net
exporter, taxes rise significantly. Interestingly, the highest percentages of taxes paid
occur after the time when Mexico settles its main foreign debt crisis in 1989.
In the international oil industry, high taxes and royalties are common as states
seek to capture their share of the rest associated with the production of a scarce resource.
Yet, Mexico's fiscal scheme stands out as one of the most onerous. The high fiscal
burden meant that, between 1998 and 2005, total duties and taxes surpassed total profits
of the company before taxes (Sudrez Coppel and Yepez 2007).
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In addition to the low plowback ratio, the fiscal scheme prevented PEP from
responding to changes in the international price of crude oil when making investment
decisions. Suairez Coppel and Yepez (2007) document the relationship between the price
of oil and Pemex's cash flow per barrel before and after taxes and duties. Before taxes,
cash flow increases considerably as the price rises; after taxes, however, cash flow per
barrel remains constant.
Peak and Decline of Production
The early years of the 2 1't century witnessed a dramatic rise in production in
Pemex E&P-peaking in 2004-followed by a precipitous decline. The era of rising oil
prices coincided at first with record-high export volumes, but by 2007 the outlook was
grim: unless major exploratory activity took place, Mexico could become a net importer
again within a decade. Moreover, the rapid decline in reserves threatened the short-term
revenue base of the state, accustomed to financing much of its budget from the export of
crude. Why did production decline so rapidly? What were the political consequences of
that decline?
Downward Trend in Efficiency: Problems Managing the Reservoirs
An analysis of the decline in production of Cantarell can help to understand the
middling performance of PEP. The management of the reservoir has been the subject of
much controversy in the Mexican petroleum industry, with some analysts arguing that its
decline was the product of an excessively high level of production in the early 2000s that
prematurely decreased its pressure. The truth is that Cantarell was expected to decline
247
considerably in the second half of the 2000s and PEP engineers cannot be blamed for the
inevitable geological fact of the exhaustion of a reservoir.
On the other hand, PEP engineers in the late 2000s consistently failed to forecast
correctly the one-year-ahead production level of Cantarell. In 2005, the first full year of
decline, actual production was 99% of the amount originally estimated. In 2007,
production dropped to 94.4% of the forecast; in 2008, it was only 80.1 % (Adriin Lajous
2009). (See Figure 5.3.)
While any forecasting exercise is bound to miss the mark occasionally, the fact
that actual output systematically fell short of expected production was evidence that
Pemex engineers were not in control of the reservoir. An international oil industry expert
remarked: "In the industry, much of the work is focused in 'beating the earth,' constantly
trying to extract more oil than what you initially thought was possible. In Cantarell,
however, it is clear that the earth beat Pemex engineers." 266
It was not surprising that the decline of Cantarell overwhelmed the technical
capacity of PEP. For nearly three decades, the shallow waters of the Bay of Campeche
had provided abundant and easily accessible oil. Furthermore, in the previous five years,
the injection of nitrogen had made the reservoir more productive than ever before. As
long as two million barrels of oil continued to flow daily from Cantarell, political
oversight would not be concern with the question of whether PEP was failing to extract a
few thousand barrels of oil here and there. Vast rents concealed inefficiencies. However,
once the reservoir peaked, PEP could not develop the needed expertise quickly enough.
266 Author's confidential interview, 14 May 2009.
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As one observer of the Mexican oil industry remarked, "For many years, PEP engineers
were hypnotized by the productivity of Cantarell."267
In that environment, signals of performance to measure the effectiveness at
analyzing and managing the reservoir were blurry for two reasons. First, the Pemex
director-general and the political superiors lacked the technical knowledge to question
whether PEP was optimizing the assets. Second, the absence of competing companies
managing other fields in Mexico meant that no reasonable counterfactual existed to gauge
the technical capacity of Pemex.
How Veto Players Diminished NA GI. The Role of Democratization
Veto players in the political system constrain the ability of the government to
intervene in the operations of the state-owned enterprise. In the case of Pemex, the
relevant veto player is the legislature, and it can influence two areas: regulation and fiscal
policy. As explained earlier, prior to the year 1997, Mexico's Congress was not a reliable
veto player; instead, deputies and senators were subordinated to the executive branch.
After the midterm elections of 1997, the ruling PRI lost its absolute majority in the lower
chamber although not in the Senate. In 2000, Vicente Fox of the opposition PAN won the
presidential election, but his party had minority status in both chambers of Congress. The
independent Congress was then able to intervene in the relationship between the Ministry
of Finance-representing the executive branch on fiscal issues-and Pemex.
The Ministry of Finance and Pemex have historically engaged in a process where,
as one former Finance official put it, "each side has a different objective function,
information asymmetries are widespread, and therefore the final result is suboptimal." In
267 Author's interview with Mexican oil industry expert (Mex.Exp.#10), Mexico City, 11 April 2008.
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terms of fiscal policy, this official explained that the mission of the Ministry in its
relationship with Pemex has been to obtain the largest possible revenues subject to the
constraint that Pemex "does not die."268 Another government official remarked: "Judging
by the fiscal and budgetary control of Pemex, there is no doubt that the owner of Pemex
is the Ministry of Finance." 269
As expected, Pemex managers have complained forcefully against the power
wielded by the Finance officials. For instance, Francisco Rojas, Pemex director-general
between 1987 and 1994, stated:
Hacienda was put in charge of major government initiatives, and we
reached the extreme where Hacienda would tell a productive enterprise
like Pemex that it had to spend 35% of its budget in the first quarter of a
year and 40% in the last quarter. It is truly insane for Hacienda to set rules
on how a productive enterprise should allocate its budget throughout the
year.270
By the early 2000s-a time of macroeconomic stability-the control was
extreme. Economists at the Ministry of Finance, not necessarily versed in petroleum
matters, authorized the budget line-by-line to determine which projects Pemex could and
could not undertake. Former Pemex director-general Ra61 Mufioz Leos, however,
complains that the Finance Ministry does not understand that the inefficiencies of Pemex
derive from the lack of experience managing large engineering projects, and that greater
268 Author's interview with former Ministry of Finance official, telephone communication, 26 June 2009.
269 Author's interview with former Ministry of Finance official, Mexico City, 29 July 2008.
270 Author's interview with Francisco Rojas, Mexico City, 30 July 2008.
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expertise can only be obtained gradually by undertaking the types of projects that Finance
officials are reluctant to authorize.
Additionally, the view of the Ministry of Finance is that Pemex is an inefficient
company and thus extreme mechanisms of fiscal and budgetary control are necessary to
force the company to keep costs down given a business environment lacking market
competition. Finance officials argue that, in the negotiation of the budget, no one can
truly determine whether the company's forecasts are made correctly, and the Ministry's
task is to push the budget as far down as possible and thus force Pemex to cut wasteful
spending.
Thus, the year 2000 marks the emergence of a relevant veto player that could
influence the relationship between the Ministry of Finance, on one side, and Pemex, on
the other. The legislature between 1997 and 2000 was not fully a potential veto player
because the lower chamber, by itself, cannot reform fiscal or regulatory laws without the
consent of the Senate. While the Chamber of Deputies does have sole control over
appropriations, the effect on the Pemex budget was limited for at least two reasons. First,
after the budget for 1998 was passed, the PAN negotiated an agreement with the PRI that
effectively eliminated the veto power during the budget debates for 1999 and 2000.
Second, many opposition leaders were in charge of congressional committees for the first
time and faced a multiplicity of challenges. In the list of their priorities, PEP, forecast to
increase production drastically in the upcoming years, was not towards the top.
Ricardo Garcia Sainz, the chair of the Budget Commission in the Chamber of
Deputies between 1997 and 2000, explains the lack of emphasis on Pemex expenditures
at the time:
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Our priorities were others. We were focusing on transparency in the
allocation of the budget. In that regard, we had the support of [Santiago]
Levy-the undersecretary of Finance expenditures-with regards to
everything that dealt with good governance in the federal budget, so we
made progress in that direction. However, our budgets did not have too
many improvements in terms of the allocation of resources... The main
substantive issue regarding the allocation of appropriations was on the
Fobaproa bank bailouts. We debated that issue for a long time, and in the
end the PAN voted with the PRI.271
After democratization, the process whereby the new veto player constrained the
ability of the government to intervene was protracted. Yet, in the end, the outcome was a
less onerous fiscal burden on the company. The process, however, is illustrative of the
manner in which policy can be moderated by a legislature with policy preferences
different from those of the executive.
In 2003, President Fox introduced a fiscal reform package to Congress that
essentially left the fiscal regime of Pemex intact. This bill was rejected, and several
months later, in 2004, the Chamber of Deputies developed its own proposal to reform
Pemex's fiscal code. This new bill was approved easily in the lower chamber in October
of 2004 with 391 votes in favor and zero against. In April of 2005, the Senate passed its
own version of the bill, which was returned to the lower chamber for reconciliation in
2005. Francisco Salazar, a moderate member of the PAN who played a central role in the
271 Author's interview with Ricardo Garcia Sainz, Mexico City, 17 July 2008.
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fiscal reform as chair of the Energy Commission in the Chamber of Deputies, described
the events as follows:
In the Chamber of Deputies we weren't too pleased with the Senate
version, but we understood that it was an improvement and we approved it
in those circumstances, even though it wasn't unanimous anymore. But
then there was a presidential veto. The objections of the president would
be sorted out during the legislative recess, and the reform finally passed in
the November of 2005.m
The new fiscal framework, which applied starting in January of 2006, lowered
Pemex's contributions to the government. Taxes and duties would amount to 79% of net
income, Pemex would be allowed to make larger deducations than before, and, in order to
promote investment in high value projects, the ranking of projects according to net
present value would be the same before and after taxes (Suirez Coppel and Yepez 2007).
Moreover, two years later, the Congress approved an additional reduction of taxes and
duties from 79% to 70%.
How Fiscal Jeopardy Diminished NA GI Threat of Oil Scarcity in 2008
On March 18, 2007, only a few months after taking office, conservative President
Felipe Calder6n expressed great concern regarding the exhaustion of Mexican oil
reservoirs and the imminent danger of becoming, for the first time since 1974, a net
importer of crude:
272 Author's interview with Francisco Salazar, Mexico City, 2 July 2008.
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I am worried by the fact, for example, that the ratio of proven reserves
with respect to production of crude oil provides us with a productive
horizon of only 9.3 years... This is due, we know, to the fact that for
several decades we have every day extracted more oil than we have
discovered. And it is clear to all of us that we must act now if we want to
safeguard the future... If we do not act soon to replenish our reserves, we
will not be able to overturn the decrease in production in the last few years
and in very little time our country will face grave problems, not only to
fmance its development, but also instead of being exporters we will
become importers of crude and its refmed products.273
In early 2008, Calder6n introduced an initiative to reform Pemex. The goal was to
address issues of procurement, corporate governance, and regulatory oversight.
Additionally, funding for exploration activities was substantially increased. In a
nationally-televised speech promoting his proposal, Calder6n argued that Pemex's
problem was "fundamentally technological and operational" and urged "to act now,
because time and oil are running out."27 4
Arguably, the situation of energy jeopardy led Calder6n to undertake an
extremely risky reform initiative. Interest groups around the country vowed to derail any
attempt to allow private participation in the oil sector, and the proposal gave opposition
leader Andr6s Manuel L6pez Obrador a cause to rally against the government. The extent
273 Felipe Calder6n, 18 March 2007, ceremony to commemorate the 69* anniversary of the oil
expropriation, Ixhuatlin del Sureste, Veracruz.
274 Felipe Calder6n, 8 April 2008, message regarding the initiative submitted to the Senate of the Republic.
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of potential social outcry was uncertain, and Calder6n endangered consensus-building for
other important items of his domestic policy agenda-most prominently the pressing
need to combat organized crime. Yet, the threat of becoming a net oil importer within a
few years tilted the political calculus towards reforming Pemex.
In order to verify the government's level of interest in the question of PEP's
exploratory activity, a content analysis of all State-of-the-Union addresses by Mexican
presidents between 1952 and 2006 was conducted. Table 5.2 presents the number of
times that each president used a variant of the word "exploration" in explicit reference to
petroleum during all six speeches of his term. While the exact number of times may
respond to idiosyncratic factors, a clear finding emerges. As expected, Gustavo Diaz
Ordaz shows the greatest rhetorical interest in oil exploration, while conservative Emesto
Zedillo exhibits the least.
Table 5.2. References to petroleum exploration in
State of the Union addresses (1953-2006)
Number of Explicit
President References
Adolfo L6pez Mateos (1958-1964) 6
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-1970) 43
Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) 3
Jos6 L6pez Portillo (1976-1982) 3
Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) 3
Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) 4
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) 0
Vicente Fox (2000-2006) 2
Note: Content analysis consisted of counting the number of times the president mentioned
any variant of the word "exploration" in direct reference to the petroleum industry. President
Felipe Calder6n changed the format of the State of the Union address and delivers instead
televised thematic speeches to the country.
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Felipe Calderon, facing the threat of oil scarcity, had the strongest rhetorical
interest in exploration since Diaz Ordaz. It is not possible to make direct comparisons
with his predecessors, given that he changed the format of the State of the Union address,
but the available evidence suggests a very high level of attention. For example, in 2008,
Calderon delivered a series of short, thematic speeches to the country. In the speech
dedicated to energy, he mentioned variants of the word "exploration" five times, more
than for any entire presidential administration since Diaz Ordaz.
An econometric analysis confirms that the government is more inclined to
authorize exploratory activity-which is what E&P companies generally seek to do-
when the threat of oil scarcity increases-measured by changes in the reserves-to-
production ratio. The results presented in Appendix B show that, holding the price of oil
constant, a one-year decrease in the R/P ratio leads to 0.34 additional exploratory wells
drilled during the following year.275 In other words, the Finance Ministry's authorization
of exploration investment responds to its perceived threat of oil-related fiscal jeopardy
rather than to the fluctuations in the price level.
6. Conclusion
In 2008, Pemex Exploration & Production (PEP) was, by international standards,
an average performer in the upstream oil industry. Its human capital consisted of Mexican
geologists and petroleum engineers well versed in the fundamentals of oil exploration and
production, and, for nearly three decades, Pemex had extracted millions of barrels of oil
per day to meet the energy needs of the country and beyond. Yet, PEP appeared unable to
275 This result refers to Model 2 in Appendix B, for changes in total reserves. Changes in proven reserves
lead to a slightly lower, but still stastistically significant, increase.
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tame the decline of Cantarell and had not discovered sizable reserves since the 1970s.276
Moreover, its ability to manage large engineering projects-precisely a core competency
of international oil companies-was questionable.
This chapter explains the reasons why PEP became an average performer in the
upstream oil industry-highly cohesive group with low government interference but also
with deteriorating performance. Additionally, this chapter explains that variation in the
history of PEP, holding competition and managerial cohesion constant, has been driven
by the government's perceived threat of oil scarcity and by the rise of Congress as a real
veto player in the macropolitical system.
The lack of market competition obscured signals that could allow outsiders to
gauge performance. For decades, no rival oil company has operated alongside Pemex to
provide counterfactuals on the limits of the possible. If another company were allowed to
explore for oil in Mexico-and succeeded at rates higher than Pemex-then political
superiors would have a point of reference. Without such baseline, it has been difficult to
detect whether exploration failure is due to lack of funding, lack of technical capacity, or
poor geological conditions. Similarly, if competitors operated assets in fields adjacent to
those owned by Pemex, then oversight could also compare the recovery rates between
firms. Low productivity and operational inefficiency have been the natural outcomes.
This problem was compounded by the nature of upstream activities, which take several
years to come to fruition and thus provide slow feedback on the causes of mediocre or
poor performance.
276 The most important source of potential reserves in Mexico today is in the Chicontepec region, an area
discovered during the late 1970s. Chicontepec's geology poses difficult challenges for commercial
production, which partly explains why Pemex did not develop it while Cantarell was producing healthily.
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PEP's internal cohesion guaranteed that orders could be transmitted swiftly
throughout a decentralized organization operating in remote locations. Additionally, it
helped to overcome collective action problems in repelling political interference. The
chief of PEP has never been a professional politician, as the government has feared
explicit and implicit sabotage from staffers worried that their organization is under
attack.27 This stands in contrast to the history of Pemex Refining and Pemex-Gas. 27 8
In the case of PEP, an overly rigid system of regulation prevented the
organization from optimizing its operations, but exact causes of its inefficiencies were
difficult to pin down across time and, in any case, the lack of a competitive environment
ensured that inefficiencies did not become a major political problem for the government.
Unlike what happened in the commercialization of crude oil, where errors would be
punished rapidly and severely by the market and create crises in the political
environment, in the upstream industry there were few incentives to change the status quo.
Additionally, PEP was subject to an onerous fiscal system and received scarce funding
for long-term investment projects.
When the threat of running out of oil has been high, the government, regardless of
its ideological orientation, has invested heavily in upstream activities and taken steps so
that the regulatory and corporate governance of the company improve. When the threat of
running out of oil has been low, then the willingness of the government to intervene in
the operations of the company has risen.
277 Confidential interview, April 2008.
278 Yet, the same cohesion that protects petroleum engineers from outside managerial interference has
promoted a degree of parochialism that, over time, has decreased the absorptive capacity of Pemex E&P.
This has been become a problem more recently in blocking external reform attempts.
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CHAPTER 6
THE DOWNSTREAM COMPARED: A CHANGE IN COMPETITION WITH
LOW MANAGERIAL COHESION
1. The Argument in Brief
Pemex-Refming and Pemex-Gas are the two industrial subsidiaries included in
this study that operate in the "downstream" segment of the oil and gas industry-that is,
in the processing, transportation, and distribution of the hydrocarbons. While the former
is charged with petroleum and the latter with gas, the essence of their activities is similar.
They both purchase the unprocessed ("crude") oil and gas from PEP, then they refine
their feedstock in refineries and gas processing plants, and they transport and distribute it
to the marketing centers-Pemex gasoline station franchises and local natural gas
distribution companies. Yet, Pemex-Gas is widely regarded as a relatively efficient
subsidiary while Pemex-Refming is considered to be an archetype of an inefficient state-
owned enterprise. What accounts for this difference?
The puzzle of the divergent outcomes of these two subsidiaries is exacerbated by
the fact that the industrial activities of both subsidiaries are conducive to similar levels of
managerial specialization. Chemical engineers are the dominant profession in both
refineries and natural gas processing plants and, as it was explained in the previous
chapter, their cohesion is lower than that of petroleum engineers. Moreover, both
Refining and Gas have extensive transport and distribution operations where chemical
engineers have no comparative advantage in training-thus diluting their presence in the
organizational chart and their capacity for collective action.
This chapter argues that the primary cause of the divergence in business
efficiency is the fact that, since 1995, Pemex-Gas has faced competition in the natural gas
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industry. This competition is limited in scope for two reasons. First, it is only allowed in
transportation, storage, and distribution and not in gas processing. Second, few
companies have had the interest and capability to enter markets where Pemex is the
dominant player. Yet, the introduction of this small degree of competition has been
sufficient to align some of the government intervention with the business interests of
Pemex-Gas and has provided the top management enough incentives and leverage to
modernize the company. By contrast, Pemex-Refining has remained stagnant throughout
those years, in spite of a generalized sense of awareness throughout the Mexican oil
industry that its business efficiency is low and that change is needed.
The policy orientation of both subsidiaries has been similar throughout. On the
fiscal realm, both companies are taxed at the same corporate rate that any industrial firm
in the country has to pay. On the industrialist realm, government policy is implemented
with pricing subsidies that result in support for the upper and middle classes of the
country and for the large industrial consumers. In terms of political patronage, Pemex-
Refining is home to a wide clientelistic network based on the delivery of products by
truck-an inefficient process compared to pipelines. Pemex-Gas, while not immune to
this practice, has managed to increase the percentage of the fuel supply transported via
pipeline.
2. An Overview of the Business of Pemex-Gas and Pemex-Refining
Until 1990, both refiing and gas processing activities, along with their
transportation, storage, and distribution services, were managed by the Division of
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Industrial Transformation of Pemex.279 In that year, refining tasks remained under the
Division of Industrial Transformation while gas processing-along with petrochemicals
production-was transferred to the newly created Division of Petrochemicals. One year
later, this latter unit's name changed to the Division of Petrochemicals and Gas. Soon
after, with the restructuring of Pemex that gave birth to the subsidiary companies in 1992,
the Division of Industrial Transformation became Pemex-Refining, while the Division of
Petrochemicals and Gas was split and Pemex-Gas was founded.
In the 2000s, both subsidiaries owned a large network of productive assets
throughout the country. Pemex-Refining owned six refineries in Mexico, in the cities of
Ciudad Madero and Minatitlin on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, Salamanca and Tula
in the center, Cadereyta in the north, and Salina Cruz on the Pacific. Pemex-Gas operated
twelve gas processing plants, mostly clustered along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico.
With regards to their organizational structure, Pemex-Refining and Pemex-Gas
were similar. All productive assets-refineries and gas processing plants respectively-
were administered by a single deputy director for production. This differed from PEP,
where regional deputy directors managed decentralized assets and where deputy directors
for exploration and production also participated in the administration of the fields.
Additionally, unlike PEP, both Refining and Gas administered their respective
distribution and marketing operations throughout the country. Finally, the organizational
reform of 1992 that created the subsidiaries had put the network of petroleum, natural
gas, and refined products pipelines under the control of the downstream-rather than the
upstream-subsidiary. Thus, deputy director for pipelines managed these assets in each
subsidiary.
279 See Memoria de Labores, 1990. The Petrochemicals Division was created on February 15, 1990.
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In the decades that followed the oil expropriation, the downstream units of Pemex
evolved more rapidly than the exploration and production. The company had to meet the
rising domestic demand for fuel, and scarce investment resources were steered towards
ramping up the refining capacity rather than pursuing exploration projects. According to
Snoeck (1989), by 1970, the Mexican refining industry was relatively modem. This stood
in contrast to the difficult conditions in the upstream, with Mexico facing the prospect of
becoming a net importer of oil. In conjunction with the Mexican Petroleum Institute
(IMP), Mexico's oil research and development center, Pemex began to invest in
upgrading technologies that could assist in the processing of Mexican oil (Aboites,
Dominguez, and Beltrin 2004).280
Starting in the 1980s, investment priorities shifted and the downstream received
less attention (Snoeck 1989). Between 1979 and 1981, the first stage of the refineries of
Cadereyta and Salina Cruz was completed. These centers were modem and capable of
processing the heavy oil that Mexico had begun to produce. However, no significant
investment in refining would take place until the late 1990s, in spite of the fact that the
rest of the refineries could only process lighter crudes.
The largest gas processing plants in Mexico were also laid out in the 1970s. The
plant in Cactus, the largest in the country (located on the border between the states of
Chiapas and Tabasco), began operating in 1979. Another large plant, in Nuevo Pemex,
Tabasco, opened in 1984. Afterwards, investment became scarce, not only to upgrade the
facilities but also to provide maintenance.
Business efficiency in the international refining and gas processing industries
entails the optimization of production in the industrial centers and the prompt, reliable,
280 Author's interview with Enrique Aguilar, researcher at the IMP, Mexico City, 14 April 2008.
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and cost-effective transportation and distribution of the products to the customers. Both
refining and gas processing are mature industries, with long established production
processes and where innovation has rendered only marginal improvements for decades
(Peterson and Mahnovski 2004). In this regard, the downstream business contrasts with
exploration and production, which has continuously witnessed great technological
advances in the search for oil in areas of more difficult access (Grant and Cibin 1996).
In the case of gas processing, optimization consists in maximizing the amount of
liquids that can be extracted from the stream of natural gas. Most of the natural gas
coming from the wellhead is methane, which is gaseous at surface temperatures. Natural
gas liquids are compounds that, as the name suggests, are liquid at surface temperatures,
and they generally carry a higher value in the market than methane itself.281 Thus, natural
gas coming from the wellhead is known as "wet," and it may also contain a high amount
of sulfur or metals that make it unfit to be fed into the distribution pipelines. The process
of removing the liquids also makes the gas "dry" or "pipeline ready."
In the case of refining, optimization is a more complex process that takes into
account the relative prices of the inputs and the outputs, subject to the configuration of
the refinery. Refineries are customized to process certain types of crude oil in order to
maximize the yield of "light" products that can be extracted-primarily gasoline, diesel,
and jet fuel. Those refineries with the most capital intensive facilities can process cheaper
"heavy" crudes, which are more viscous and relatively more difficult to refine (Bou6
2002; Ocic 2005). Given that constraint, the refinery manager must optimize the slate of
products to send to the market and the crude streams that will render those products in the
281 These liquids include propane, butane, pentane, hexane, and heptanes. Liquified petroleum gas (or LPG)
is one of the most important commercial products produced with these liquids.
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most cost-effective manner. The relative prices of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel vary
depending on supply and demand conditions, and refining profit margins partly rely on
exploiting these differences.
Optimization in a petroleum refinery is more complex, but it is likewise a well
developed process that is known by all participants in the industry. Some refinery
managers are better than others are optimizing based on changing market conditions, but
differences in profit margins due to this comparative advantage are small. Efficiencies in
distribution and successful marketing provide additional profits (Francisco Flores-Macias
2009).
In Mexico, however, there are at least two structural constraints that make the
efficiency challenges of Pemex-Refining and Pemex-Gas different from other countries.
First, there is a mandate to keep the domestic market well supplied. In the case of natural
gas, after the legal reform of 1995, customers may independently purchase gas abroad
and import into Mexico. However, this is not the case with gasoline, which must all be
purchased from Pemex.
Second, prices do not follow market conditions freely but instead are determined
by separate price boards. Gasoline prices are set by a Committee on Prices for Petroleum
Products, which is controlled by the Ministry of Finance. Natural gas prices and liquefied
petroleum gas prices, on the other hand, are dictated by the Ministry of Energy. Pemex-
Refining and Pemex-Gas managers often complained about the inability to receive
market signals rapidly via an open price setting mechanism.
In general, the administration of the pipelines demands a cost-effective control
system to increase the flow in the company's network and deliver the products on time to
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the different customers. In this regard, Pemex-Gas faces greater challenges than Refining.
The latter is the only entity allowed to use gasoline pipelines and thus requires fewer
instruments of control. Pemex-Gas, on the other hand, is obligated by law to allow
private distribution companies to use its pipelines to distribute gas purchased and sold to
third parties. Controllling this "unbundled" market of gas processing, transportation, and
distribution is more challenging, since the number of players and transactions is much
larger.282
Finally, both Pemex-Refining and Pemex-Gas face the challenge of a rapid rise in
demand that has taken place in the last two decades. Especially in the early 2000s, Pemex
production was outpaced by domestic consumption, leading to higher imports. This trend
let industry critics in Mexico to blame the government for not investing in additional
refining capacity and for exporting cheaper crude oil while importing more expensive
refined products (Shields 2003). In the case of gas, this debate has not emerged, mostly
because Mexico is not a major exporter of gas.
3. Measurement of Variables
The level of productivity of the two subsidiaries is primarily measured
qualitatively. Each of these companies conducts several activities for which data
collection is difficult, yet expert opinion on the degree of modernization is readily
available. For example, with regards to the pipeline infrastructure, Adriin Lajous
282 Author's interview with Ernesto Estrada (deputy director for pipelines, Pemex-Gas, 1995-1996),
telephone communication, 14 July 2010.
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commented that "there is a monstrous difference between the Pemex-Gas and the Pemex-
Refining pipelines. The control center in Refining is among the worst in the world."283
The policy utilization is analyzed in a similar way to that of the previous chapters.
Qualitative assessments of the change in the orientation of the government over time are
made. Much of the non-aligned government intervention in the downstream is similar to
the case of PEP, and therefore it is emphasized less in this chapter. The procurement
regulation, for instance, is the same.
The change in the level of market competition is done by examining the legal
reform of 1995 that liberalized certain segments of the natural gas market. This change is
not measured quantitatively given that, according to several industry experts, the actual
entry of rival companies into the gas industry would be negligible. Thus, what is analyzed
is the change in the possibility of entry. Furthermore, as in previous chapters, the
qualitative discussion of the level of managerial cohesion is complemented with a
discussion of the professional background of the top managers.
4. The Evolution of Pemex-Gas and Pemex-Refining over Time
In terms of business efficiency, Pemex-Gas and Pemex-Refining began diverging
around 1995. Prior to that point, both subsidiaries were regarded as equally inefficient.
Afterwards, Pemex-Gas modernized while Pemex-Refining remained stagnant. However,
neither subsidiary is structurally endowed with the type of managerial cohesion and
specialization that would thwart the governments' ability to intervene in the firm-
especially through the appointment of politicians as top executives. Still, the government
283 Author's interview with Adriin Lajous, telephone communication, 2 July 2010.
266
has shown less willingness to intervene in gas operations than in refining, and when it has
done so, it has done so at a smaller scale.
The policy orientation of both subsidiaries has been similar. Industrial policy was
once high, focused on promoting regional development and subsidizing industrial growth
(Bermiidez 1976; Morales et al. 1988). In the 1980s, active promotion of industrial
interests decreased-although it did not disappear. The main instrument for industrial
policy was the price of the products, which remained controlled by the government. The
main difference, however, was a switch from a policy of actively keeping prices below
market level to the pursuit of price stability. Thus, the real price of gasoline was kept
constant throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and large industrial consumers of natural gas
were protected against price spikes in the international markets.
5. A Contemporary History of the Downstream Sector in Mexico
The Explosions that Shocked Mexico
On the evening of July 26, 1996, a massive explosion devastated the gas
processing plant of Cactus, located 33 kilometers southeast of Villahermosa, Tabasco.284
The incident underscored the dismal state of some of the production facilities of Pemex-
Gas. The destruction of several parts of the Cactus plant represented the temporary loss
of nearly one-third of Mexico's supply of pipeline-ready natural gas. More importantly,
six workers died and many others were injured.285
Unfortunately, high profile industrial accidents were not novel in the downstream
sector in Mexico. Only four years earlier, in April of 1992, several explosions destroyed
284 See L6pez, Rend Alberto, "3 explosiones en el complejo de Cactus," La Jornada, 27 July 1996.
285 See Dillon, Sam, "Blast Mars Pemex's 22% Earnings Gain," The New York Times, 2 August 1996.
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parts of the city of Guadalajara after gasoline from the underground pipeline network
leaked into the water distribution system. According to official reports, over 200 people
died and hundreds more were injured.286
Accidents are unfortunately not uncommon in the oil and gas sector, but in the
case of Pemex-Gas and Pemex-Refining, they reflected broader problems of
performance. Infrastructure had been poorly managed for years and a culture of
excellence was lacking throughout the companies. Pedro Haas, director-general of
Pemex-Gas between 1994 and 1996, lamented the dire state of the company's facilities in
the early 1990s. The pipeline control system was obsolete, and a lack of attention to
industrial safety was widespread. 287 "Pemex-Refining," he explains, "was just as chaotic
as Pemex-Gas."
What was the state of the downstream industry in Mexico in the early 1990s?
How did it reach that point? The following section describes the context of the
downstream sector in Mexico leading to these accidents.
The level of NA GI in the Downstream Sector in Mexico
Several factors contributed to the "chaotic" state of the refining and gas activities
in Mexico. Many of these problems resulted from the way in which the government
utilized them as instruments of policy. In fact, the degree of non-aligned government
intervention has historically been greater and more extensive in refining and gas than in
other subsidiaries. In the words of a long-time Pemex top executive, "in the downstream
286 See Zapata, Belen, "Guadalajara conmemora 18 anhos de las explosiones que dejaron 210 muertos,"
CNN Mexico, available online at http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2010/04/22/guadalajara-conmemora-18-
anos-de-la-tragedia-del-22-de-abril (accessed on July 5, 2010).
287 Author's interview with Pedro Haas, 24 June 2010 (telephone communication).
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sector in Mexico, the problems of state ownership have been exacerbated." 288 An expert
on the Mexican refining sector remarked: "It is schizophrenic to expect Pemex to perform
like a private enterprise when the rules of the game do not allow it to behave as such.
Pemex-Refining is not an enterprise. It is an instrument of public policy." 289
Throughout their history, these branches have had at least two policy mandates:
keeping the domestic market fully supplied and controlling the price of energy. As a
company of "public benefit" (beneficio piblico), Pemex must provide fuel even in areas
of the country where it would be uneconomical for a private company to do so-for
example, opening gasoline service stations in rural areas with low demand. A top Pemex-
Refining executive explains: "Pemex cannot stop supplying an area of the country,
whether it is profitable to do so or not."290
Second, the downstream branches have been the primary means to implement
industrial policy in the private sector. The government has consistently subsidized the
prices of fuels for both industrial and residential consumers, and Pemex has been required
to absorb the losses (Snoeck 1989). A former Ministry of Finance official argued that
"from the perspective of public finances, it makes no difference whether Pemex absorbs
the subsidies or not."291 However, Pemex managers complained about the distortions
caused by the excess demand for cheap energy and argued that the Ministry of Finance
seldom acknowledged the foregone investments due to its policy of subsidies.
Refining and gas activities were also vulnerable to political pressures not present
in PEP due to their presence in the entire country. High levels of patronage and
288 Author's interview with Bernardo de la Garza, Mexico City, 7 April 2008.
289 Author's interview with Mexican oil industry expert, Mex.Exp.#3, Mexico City, April 2008.
290 Author's interview with Jos6 Antonio G6mez Urquiza, deputy director for Finance and Administration
in Pemex Refining, Mexico City, 12 June 2008.
291 Author's interview with former Ministry of Finance official (MF.#3), Mexico City, July 2008.
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inefficiency permeated the distribution networks of both subsidiaries. This was
observable in the fact that, unlike what happens in most countries, a sizable percentage of
the transportation of gasoline and gas was done by trucks rather than by pipelines.292 Fuel
transportation by trucks is more costly and more dangerous, yet it also provided high
rents to a handful of well connected business groups.
The Effect of the Lack of Market Competition
The lack of market competition increased the willingness of the government to
implement these policy mandates and thus contributed to the loss of economic efficiency.
Without the need to undersell competitors, for example, the government felt no need to
remove inefficiencies by tackling the entrenched trucking interests. Additionally, over the
years, not having market competition consolidated a corporate culture that emphasized
production at the expense of cost. In other words, signals of performance were not
available for the management to set goals properly.
The effects of monopoly protection are described by Guillermo Ruiz, who arrived
as deputy director for planning in Pemex-Refining in 1994 and noticed an absence of
cost-efficiency considerations in the company:
The incentives where all about maximizing volume. It's not entirely an
incorrect view. If you ask any refiner in the world, he'll say that the
primary thing is to maximize the utilization of the capacity. True, but you
have to maximize it with respect to economic value. That did not happen
292 Author's interview with Rosendo Zambrano, former CEO of PMI, Mexico City, 12 June 2008.
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in Pemex-Refining. Instead, since we're a monopoly here, you're missing
those market signals. It was "maximize volume," period.293
Others Pemex managers agreed that the lack of signals of performance made it
more difficult to moderate the engineering culture of the company that focused
exclusively on volume maximization. One interviewee went as far as to say: "What
Pemex engineers cared about is how much you could produce, not how much things cost
and they certainly did not care about good record-keeping." 294 Moreover, the lack of
competitive pressures is compounded when the mandate for the company consists in fully
supplying a large domestic market such as Mexico's.
Liberalization in the Natural Gas Industry
On May 11, 1995, the government of President Ernesto Zedillo enacted a reform
to the Enabling Law of Article 27 of the Constitution with regards to Petroleum. The new
Article 4 of the Enabling Law liberalized several segments of the industry in Mexico,
namely the transportation, storage, and distribution of natural gas. Production and gas
processing remained under exclusive control of PEP and Pemex-Gas, respectively. The
production, transportation, storage, and distribution of gasoline and other refined oil
products also remained under strict state control.
For the first time in decades, the private sector would be allowed to compete with
Pemex in specific segments of the market. Luis T6llez, one of the top advisors to
President Zedillo at the time and one of the masterminds of the reform, referred to the
293 Author's interview with Guillermo Ruiz, deputy director for Planning at Pemex-Refining from 1994 to
2001, Mexico City, 25 July 2008.
294 Interview with a Pemex manager who requested confidentiality (Pem.Ref.#1), Mexico City, June 2008.
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reform as a "small but significant step forward" towards increasing the competitiveness
of the energy markets in Mexico.295
The practical impact of the reform would be as follows. Industrial consumers
would now be able to import natural gas from third parties rather than have to purchase it
from Pemex, and they would not even have to contract with Pemex for the transportation
of the gas in the pipelines. Moreover, private parties would be allowed to build pipelines
and to utilize Pemex's pipeline network-now "open access"-for their own commercial
projects. 296
There is reason to believe that the Zedillo administration would have also sought
to liberalize the refining market if its political symbolism had not been as high. In other
words, the decision to reform the gas market and not the refining one resulted from
causes relatively external to these subsidiaries, namely political reasons outside of their
control. Luis T6llez explained his thinking as follows:
The activity of Pemex Refining is industrial in nature, where raw materials
are transformed in derived products. Even if you keep the state's control
over oil production, there is no reason, in my opinion, why the state should
continue to run refining activities. Refining is not a strategic activity and
has no rents. The solution would be to open refining to the private sector,
but this could not be done.297
295 Author's interview with Luis T6llez, telephone communication, 26 June 2009.296 "Open access" pipelines in the natural gas industry are those that do not favor transportation of the gas
owned by the operator of the pipeline. Transportation of the gas by other parties is done by the operator on
a fee-for-service basis (Busby 1999).
297 Author's interview with Luis Tellez, telephone communication, 26 June 2009.
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In hindsight, the reform would not drastically change the competitive landscape of
the gas industry. Pedro Haas, who was leading Pemex-Gas at the time of the reform,
believes that private companies were reluctant to enter the market, among other things,
because prices were never entirely liberalized.298 This constraint to a free market was
exacerbated due to the subsidies that were authorized by the Ministry of Energy to
improve the competitiveness of large industrial consumers when the international price of
natural gas spiked in the year 2000 (Adrian Lajous 2003). An effect of this policy was
that consumers along the U.S. border preferred to purchase subsidized gas from Pemex
rather than to import it, which under free market conditions would have been preferable
due to the lower cost of transportation. '
Furthermore, entry into the local distribution of natural gas was also hindered by
the fact that the residential demand for natural gas in Mexico has historically been low
compared to liquid petroleum gas (LPG). The distribution of LPG was not included in the
reform and the incentives to transition into natural gas use in the households were low.
Finally, competition at the wholesale level was also limited in many parts of the country
by the fact that natural gas production in Mexico is concentrated in the south. Away from
the U.S. border, Pemex enjoyed a large advantage due to the lower transportation costs.
If competition did not arrive in the way intended by the reform, how can the
natural gas transportation and distribution sector be characterized? A manager in Pemex-
Gas, who acknowledged that competition in the industry is very limited, referred to the
state of the sector as one of "latent competition."299 In fact, the regulatory framework
established by the Mexican Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) is known as a
298Author's interview with Pedro Haas, telephone communication, 24 June 2010.
299Author's interview with Pemex manager (Pem.Gas.#2), telephone communication, June 2010.
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"transitory regime." The different market participants know that a permanent regime
ought to be finalized at some point, but as of 2010 that moment had yet to arrive. In other
words, while there has never been a true competitive natural market, since 1995 there has
been a strong threat of competition.
The Response of Pemex-Gas to the Liberalization
The reform of 1995, however, ignited a process that allowed the managers of
Pemex-Gas to greatly reduce the inefficiencies of the subsidiary. Pemex-Refining
remained stagnant, falling further behind its international counterparts, while Pemex-Gas
implemented a large-scale modernization effort. The results were visible to observers of
the Mexican petroleum industry, most of whom unambiguously believed that Pemex-Gas
had become much more efficient than Pemex-Refining. From gas processing
infrastructure to pipeline controls to customer service, Pemex-Gas greatly improved its
operations.
The change in the legislation that allowed market competition had both direct and
indirect effects on the ability of the management to improve the efficiency of the
company and on the government's ability to intervene in the internal operations of the
subsidiary. Direct effects were those that were triggered in order to abide by the new
regulation, and they took place soon after the reform was passed. Indirect effects, on the
other hand, occurred when reform-oriented managers of Pemex-Gas strategically used the
threat of competition to push for changes within the subsidiary, with the government, and
with the clients.
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One of these direct effects has been described by one Pemex-Gas manager as the
development of "a market-oriented mentality."300 Among other things, the subsidiary's
business plan now included a strategy on how to achieve competitiveness with regards to
the private sector, even if these companies had not yet entered the Mexican industry. One
component of this strategy consisted in developing a more precise knowledge of the
clients' needs. A high-level manager at Pemex-Gas in the 1990s explains that, in natural
gas marketing, companies do not compete with the commodity that they sell, but rather
with the quality of their service, and that Pemex-Gas needed to be up to the task.301
Hence, Pemex-Gas managers embarked on a project to understand how Pemex-
Gas could better serve its customers. In a company that had had a captive demand for
decades, this simple process constituted a momentous change. As CEO of Pemex-Gas,
Pedro Haas spearheaded this effort, motivated by his awareness of the behavior of
international oil companies as former CEO of PMI. Looking back at the change in the
corporate culture of the subsidiary, Haas remarked: "That shows you, to some extent, that
changing the culture within a state-owned enterprise like Pemex is completely
feasible." 302
A second direct effect was the modernization of the pipeline infrastructure for
natural gas. In 1995, the pipeline control system in Pemex-Gas was obsolete. Pedro Haas
describes the state of affairs in that year as follows:
The network of natural gas and LPG pipelines in Pemex was terrible. The
first time I went to Venta de Carpio [an area located north of Mexico
3o Author's interview with Pemex manager (Pem.Gas.#2), telephone communication, June 2010.
301 Author's interview with Pemex manager (Pem.Gas.#3), telephone communication, June 2010.
302 Author's interview with Pedro Haas, telephone communication, 24 June 2010.
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City], which has one of the pipeline control centers, I found out that there
was no actual control center. It was an old room built in the 1950s with
pneumatic controls-valves controlled manually, for example. There was
no system to measure how much gas was being dispatched from the
pipeline. You couldn't tell if the client had gotten more or less gas than
you had agreed.303
The new law, however, required an advanced control system so that different
companies could transport their gas in an organized way. Otherwise, the "open access"
system would be unfeasible. Accordingly, the government authorized investment
expenditures on the pipelines. Ernesto Estrada, deputy director for pipelines at the time of
the reform, explains the program that was implemented:
There were two sets of projects: removing bottlenecks to be able to
transport more and the introduction of the remote electronic control
system. The entire network today is operated remotely thanks to this
system, and it is something that Pemex-Refining never did.3 4
A third direct effect consisted in the strengthening of the company's gas trading
operations. Pemex-Gas has a group, based in Mexico City, that conducts trading activities
in the United States via a subsidiary in Houston, Texas. When the law was passed, the
303 Author's interview with Pedro Haas, telephone communication, 24 June 2010.304 Author's interview with Ernesto Estrada, former deputy director of Pemex-Gas, telephone
communication, 14 July 2010. The new control system is known in the industry as SCADA (Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition system). It is the industry standard in the operation of pipelines around the
world. As of 2010, Pemex-Refining still had not been able to introduce it into its network.
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trading branches of companies such as Enron and El Paso had become very active in the
U.S. market, and Pemex-Gas managers feared that competition would be too strong. In
hindsight, U.S. trading companies would choose not to participate heavily in the Mexican
market, but the development of human capital in Pemex-Gas would stay afterwards.
A fourth direct effect consisted in the development of commercial know-how to
create long-term supply contracts with large industrial customers. Prior to 1995, delivery
of the gas was done based to very simple demand models and clients could not choose
from different delivery schemes to optimize their own operations. The "open access"
pipelines, however, provided customers with choice, as they could contract their gas with
a company that would offer different configurations of base and swing load volumes and
costs. Accordingly, Pemex-Gas had to acquire expertise rapidly to estimate demand
throughout the system with more realistic models and offer clients a menu of
configurations.
This commercial know-how was put to the test in 1999 with the bidding for the
Monterrey III power plant. The gas liberalization had occurred soon after an opening in
the Mexican electricity sector that allowed independent power producers (IPPs) to build
plants and sell electricity to the state-owned Comisidn Federal de Electricidad (CFE).
Monterrey III was the first IPP plant built after the reform of 1995, and in the public
bidding, CFE allowed companies to propose to either purchase their gas supply from
Pemex or from abroad. In this instance, imported gas provided realistic competition given
the proximity of Monterrey to the northern border. Pemex-Gas had to provide to each
bidding consortium the cost estimates for all the different combinations of base and
swing loads and then be able to demonstrate to the Mexican Energy Regulatory
277
Commission that the estimates were fair for all companies and correctly modeled. In the
end, the company that won the bid had proposed a supply contract with Pemex-Gas.305
The most significant indirect effect provided by the liberalization law was the
leverage that it provided to the managers of Pemex-Gas to implement change. This
leverage helped Pemex-Gas both in terms of improving the culture of the company, in
terms of obtaining more investment resources, and in negotiating with clients and the
union. Pedro Haas explains how the liberalization law assisted him in the modernization
of the subsidiary as follows:
I used the liberalization law in order to persuade people internally, tell
them that "competition is coming" even though I knew that in reality we
were to face only limited competition. It was a means to mobilize the staff
and even to mobilize the clients. I used it in order to persuade the clients to
sign contracts with Pemex-Gas, which they hadn't done before.306 In the
case of LPG, I would tell them that what was happening with natural gas
could easily occur in the LPG market, and that it was in their best interest
to have the protection given by clear contracts. 307
Ernesto Estrada echoed Haas's viewpoint:
305 Author's interview with Felipe Luna, former deputy director of Pemex-Gas, telephone communication,
29 June 2010.
306 Haas explains that until the early 1990s, LPG transactions between Pemex and its clients-local
distribution companies-were made without contracts. Clients would often not honor their accounts
payable with Pemex, which had little ability to seek legal remedy without contracts and knowing that the
clients had monopoly distribution rights over different cities. Thus, the introduction of contracts before
making transactions was seen as a fundamental step in order to improve the internal control system of the
company as well as its financial health.
307 Author's interview with Pedro Haas, 24 June 2010.
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The excuse to accomplish much of this-the way in which we convinced a
lot of people, both within Pemex-Gas and elsewhere in the government,
that we needed to modernize-was that there was discussion on a bill to
open the natural gas market. So the liberalization was an incentive to
change, and it also provided an excuse to do many things.308
The leverage provided by the liberalization also reached the gas processing plants.
Investment in modem control systems was authorized in part due to the need to service
multiple pipeline administrators. In fact, a manager of Pemex-Gas mentioned: "The
liberalization helped to justify investments across all areas, including the processing
plants." 309 The explosion in Cactus increased the interest of the government in making
investments in the plants. By then, however, the pipeline modernization process was
already underway.
The Sociology of the Managers in the Downstream
The sociology of the managers of Pemex-Refining and Pemex-Gas differs in
important respects from that of PEP, which was discussed in Chapter 5. First, the
dominant professional in both refining and gas processing activities is the chemical
engineer. This stands in contrast to the situation in PEP, where petroleum engineers
control most of the managerial positions.
308 Author's interview with Ernesto Estrada, former deputy director of Pemex-Gas, telephone
communication, 14 July 2010.
309 Author's interview with Pemex manager (Pem.Gas.#2), telephone communication, June 2010.
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Chemical engineers undergo a much less intensive socialization process. Each
year, there are hundreds of chemical engineering graduates around the country. The
program is offered in many universities and technical institutes, so that friendships are
not molded at a young age. Additionally, chemical engineers can work in a variety of
industries and companies, so the sense of commitment to the Mexican petroleum industry
is weaker. Finally, work in the downstream sector generally provides fewer opportunities
to build lifetime bonds. Even those working in refineries have the ability to leave the
workplace every night and return to their homes scattered in the cities nearby. Thus, the
social circle of the chemical engineers is wider.
Adriin Lajous explains the differences between chemical and petroleum
engineers as follows:
Chemical engineers are scattered, and they can work in many places
besides Pemex. Petroleum engineers, for the most part, can only work in
Pemex. Hence, chemical engineers have many outside options, and there
has always been a greater flow of professionals in and out of Pemex-
Refining. In short, the world of chemical engineering is less closed than
petroleum engineering.
The second major distinction results from the fact that Pemex-Refining and
Pemex-Gas carry out a more diverse set of activities than PEP and thus can more easily
accommodate managers with backgrounds different from chemical engineering. Most of
the managerial positions in PEP are directly associated with exploration and production
310 Author's interview with Adriin Lajous, Mexico City, 7 July 2008.
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tasks, where petroleum engineers enjoy a comparative advantage in terms of
technological knowledge. Thus, in Pemex-Gas and Pemex-Refming the deputy director
for production and the managers of the refineries have customarily been chemical
engineers, but many of the deputy directors have had other backgrounds.
Table 6.1 summarizes the professional background of the directors and deputy
directors of Pemex-Gas, Pemex-Refining, and PEP since their founding as subsidiaries.
In each case, the first column presents the profession of the director, the second column
shows the number of deputy directors in the organizational chart, and the third gives the
percentage of those deputies who are members of the dominant profession (chemical
engineering in the cases of Gas and Refining and petroleum engineering in the case of
PEP). The number of deputy directors is important because it shows the ease with which
one "outsider" can swing the balance within each company's top executive team. Among
five deputies, adding a third non-chemical engineer can affect decision-making more
drastically than among ten or more.
[TABLE 6.1 HERE]
The difference between PEP and the other two subsidiaries is striking. PEP has
always been led by a petroleum engineer, while Gas and Refining have seen, in addition
to chemical engineers, CEOs with degrees in economics, business administration, and
even petroleum engineering. This does not entail that cohesion in a downstream branch
necessitates a chemical engineer-it certainly does not. However, coordination channels
and collective action would be structurally easier if this were the case.
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Table 6.1 Professional Background of Top Executives in Gas, Refining, and PEP (1993-2010)
Pemex-Gas
Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Director
Econ
Econ
Econ
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Econ
Number
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
Pct.
N/A
60%
60%
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
50%
50%
Pemex-Refining
Director
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Econ
Econ
Econ
Econ
Econ
Econ
Chem. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Bus. Adm.
Bus. Adm.
Bus. Adm.
Chem. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Number
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
Pct.
25%
25%
25%
25%
38%
38%
50%
50%
63%
44%
33%
33%
33%
33%
44%
44%
33%
22%
Director
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
Petro. Eng.
PEP
Number
13
13
13
14
15
17
17
17
17
17
17
18
19
19
19
19
18
18
Pct.
85%
85%
85%
86%
80%
82%
76%
76%
76%
71%
59%
61%
63%
58%
63%
63%
61%
61%
Source: Archival information provided by Pemex by request under the Freedom of Information
Law. In those instances where more than one deputy director served in one year, the one who
spent the most time is included in the count.
Petroleum engineers have also managed to keep the number of deputies in PEP
high. Having 17 deputy directors in 1998, adding additional executives with other
backgrounds hardly changed the balance-which never declined below 50%. In Refining
and in Gas the reserve was true.
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How the Sociology of the Managers Affects Performance and the Level of NAGI
The lower level of specialization of the managers in the downstream has had two
discernible consequences on the behavior of Pemex-Refining and Pemex-Gas. From the
perspective of governmental intervention, managers in these subsidiaries have less
instinctive collective action potential to thwart the appointment of politicians to top
executive positions. While this has not been a generalized practice, two cases have drawn
the attention of observers of the Mexican oil industry: the arrival of Juan Bueno as CEO
of Pemex-Refining in 2003 and of Jordy Herrera as CEO of Pemex-Gas in 2010.
Both Juan Bueno and Jordy Herrera were politicians closely associated with the
ruling National Action Party who had low managerial experience and limited exposure to
the oil and gas refining industry. Bueno was appointed by Vicente Fox over the objection
of Pemex CEO Radl Muiioz Leos, who advised the president about the delicate state of
the refining branch and the desirability to appoint a CEO seasoned in the industry.31
Herrera arrived in Pemex-Gas regarded as a close collaborator of President Felipe
Calder6n.312 In fact, he had been the latter's assistant at different points in his career.
While Herrera had served as under-secretary for planning in the Ministry of Energy
between 2006 and 2009, he lacked a managerial background.
The tenure of Bueno was strongly criticized by industry experts. A former advisor
to the CEO at the time commented: "We could not believe the horror stories coming from
Refining. There was no technical knowledge in decision-making."313 Radil Mufoz Leos,
311 Author's interview with Ranl Mufioz Leos, Mexico City, 30 July 2008.
312 See Cervantes, Jesusa, "Nombran a Jordy Herrera director de Gas y Petroquimica de Pemex," Proceso,
4 January 2010.
313 Author's interview with a former advisor to the Pemex CEO, Mexico City, July 2008.
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CEO at the time, lamented by saying that "Bueno's arrival cut short our optimization
efforts." 314
The arrival of politicians or otherwise underqualified people to managerial
positions is not limited to the CEO position. Most of these appointments are made in the
middle management ranks, away from the media spotlight, and their turnover is high.
Thus, human capital in these subsidiaries is lower than in PEP, where managers at least
have acquired industry experience over the years.
Alternative Explanations for the Divergence in Outcomes I: Better Managers
The following sections discuss possible alternative explanations for the
divergence in outcomes between Pemex-Gas and Pemex-Refining. In some interviews,
respondents explained the inefficiency of Pemex-Refining based on several structural
constraints. Interestingly, however, most of the same issues are found in Pemex-Gas, thus
strengthening the claim that market competition-albeit limited in practice-played a
crucial structural role to enable the management of Pemex-Gas to improve the efficiency
of the subsidiary.
One logical explanation is that Pemex-Gas simply had better managers than
Pemex-Refining. This is certainly feasible between 2003 and 2005, when the
inexperienced Juan Bueno was head of Refining while Marcos Ramirez led Pemex-Gas.
Ramirez had been deputy director of PMI in the early 1990s, gaining managerial
experience in a competitive environment. Moreover, he had been director of Pemex-Gas
since May of 1996 and had helped to modernize the subsidiary in the years following the
reform of 1995.
314 Author's interview with Ranl Mufioz Leos, Mexico City, 30 July 2008.
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Nevertheless, between 1994 and 2001, both Pemex-Gas and Pemex-Refining had
management teams with very similar characteristics. When Adrian Lajous was appointed
director-general of Pemex, he named two of his top collaborators from his years in the
Division of Foreign Trade to lead these two branches-Pedro Haas in Gas and Jaime
Mario Willars in Refining. Both of them were trained as economists and each of them
assembled teams of deputy directors coming from the ranks of PMI.315 Lajous was well
aware of the problems of Pemex-Refining and supported the modernization efforts
proposed by the management.3 16 Still, by 2001, Pemex-Gas had already improved its
efficiency considerably while Refining had not.
A plausible conclusion, however, is that the continuity of Marcos Ramirez as head
of Pemex-Gas enabled a faster consolidation of the modem market-oriented practices that
began to be implemented in 1995. Changes in large bureaucracies such as Pemex-Gas
and Pemex-Refining take time to become permanent. Had a politician been appointed
chief of Gas, some of the improvements could have been lost. Similarly, had incompetent
managers been appointed to lead Gas from the beginning, the outcome would have been
different. Rather than a difference in managerial ability, the explanation likely lies in the
one structural change-market competition-that facilitated reform in one place but not
in the other.
315 For example, Guillermo Ruiz and Pedro Carlos G6mez were appointed deputies for planning and
distribution, respectively, in Pemex-Refining. Both were former PMI staffers, just like Marcos Ramirez and
Felipe Luna, who became deputies for planning and marketing in Pemex-Gas. Source: archival information
obtained from Pemex-Refining, Pemex-Gas, and PMI.
316 Author's interview with Adrian Lajous, telephone communication, 2 July 2008.
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Alternative Explanations II The Union, The Budget, and The Regulatory Burden
Other arguments help to explain the low efficiency of Pemex-Refining in absolute
terms, but not in comparative terms with Pemex-Gas. This is the case of all those
structural constraints that affect the two subsidiaries fairly equally. For example, a
refining manager said: "Pemex-Refining cannot perform better for three simple reasons:
the union, the Ministry of Finance, and the environmental regulation. They all strangle
the company." 317 His reasoning was as follows. First, since the union controls the hiring,
firing, and reallocation of personnel, industrial facilities are overstaffed. "The objective
of the union is not to increase productivity, but only to increase the number ofjobs," he
said. Second, since the Ministry of Finance is concerned with keeping public finances
balanced throughout the year, appropriations are transferred irregularly throughout the
year. "The operating budget approved by Congress the year before is not received until
March," he explained. "For the first two months of the year, Pemex-Refining has no
money to pay its bills. Then they release investment money in December, and if you
don't spend it, you lose it for the following year." Third, the manager complained about
the environmental regulation imposed by the Ministry of the Environment, which
required Pemex-Refining to comply with norms beyond the capacity of the existing
facilities.
Yet, Pemex-Gas faces similar challenges. It is true that the union looks to increase
the number of employees in refineries,318 but gas processing plants face the same problem
317 Author's interview with Pemex manager (Pem.Ref.#3), Mexico City, July 2008.
318 This point was confirmed, among others, by Jos6 Antonio G6mez Urquiza, deputy director for finance
and administration in Pemex-Refining, who believes that refineries have excess personnel in the area of
maintenance. Most refineries around the world subcontract maintenance operations only during the time of
the year when that type of work is required. In Pemex, however, a full-time maintenance staff is employed
throughout the year, whether the service is needed or not. Author's interview with Jose Antonio G6mez
Urquiza, Mexico City, 12 June 2008.
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of excess personnel. Furthermore, the characteristics of union members are not different
in each of the two branches. A Pemex manager with experience interacting with the
union explained: "The differences in the culture of the subsidiaries manifest themselves
among the de confianza personnel, not in the union. Unionized workers do not see
themselves as members of PEP or of Refining or what not. They see themselves as
members of Pemex, period."3 19 An expert on the Mexican refining sector would agree
with that assessment and stated that the union leadership in Pemex-Refming was not any
more rigid than in other subsidiaries. 320 Furthermore, all subsidiaries face similar
budgetary restrictions. A former Pemex-Gas manager complained about the lack of
investment money authorized by the Ministry of Finance just as strongly as the Pemex-
Refining managers did.321
Likewise, the challenge posed by environmental regulations is illustrative of
additional differences in the efficiency between the two subsidiaries. Observers do
believe that some environmental standards have been unreasonable given the state of the
infrastructure of Pemex-Refining and its scarcity of investment funds. The most cited
example is the case of the Official Mexican Standard SEMARNAT-NOM-086
(commonly known simply as the NOM-086), which in 2005 revised the guidelines for
sulfur content in gasoline sold in the largest cities in Mexico. As it turned out, Mexican
refineries lacked the technology to meet the standard by the deadline, so Pemex-Refining
was forced to import gasoline at a high cost to meet domestic demand.
319 Author's interview with a Pemex manager who requested confidentiality (Pem.Ref.#1), Mexico City,
June 2008.
320 Author's interview with Mexican oil industry expert (Mex.Exp.#3), Mexico City, April 2008.
321 Author's interview with a former Pemex-Gas manager (Pem.Gas.#1), Mexico City, August 2008.
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A careful investigation, however, reveals that Pemex-Gas has been subject to
similar challenges in terms of environmental constraints but has known how to navigate
through the Mexican bureaucracy to utilize the regulations in its favor.m In the case of
the NOM-086, officials in the Ministry of the Environment contemplated imposing
similarly stringent measures for gas processing plants. Pemex-Gas managers, however,
had developed a history of sound environmental protection and a collegial relationship
with the regulators in the Ministry of the Environment. Upon learning about the proposal
for the NOM-086, Pemex-Gas adopted a conciliatory approach and rapidly negotiated a
new standard that, while stringent, was still within reach.3 23 Pemex-Refining, by contrast,
adopted a confrontational approach and, after a protracted process, was unable to prevent
the new measure.
Alternative Explanations III: Differences in Scale
The improvement of Pemex-Gas in relation to Pemex-Refining, however, could
have been facilitated by the smaller size of its operations. While the former is a company
of approximately 12,000 employees, the latter employs 45,000. Additionally,
optimization processes in refineries are more complicated than in gas processing plants.
Still, the scale of Pemex-Gas was, in absolute terms, very large. Moreover, prior to the
reform of 1995, Pemex managers had been unable to enhance the efficiency of its
operations, in spite of being a smaller company. These considerations give further
credence to the claim that the introduction of competition played a more significant role
than other variables.
322 Author's interview with a Pemex manager (Pemex.Env.# 1). Mexico City, July 2008.
323 Author's interview with a Mexican oil industry expert (Mex.Exp.#2), Mexico City, July 2008.
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6. Conclusion
Pemex-Gas and Pemex-Refining conduct many of the same activities, although
the former processes and distributes gas while the latter is in charge of refining crude oil.
Until the early 1990s, both subsidiaries were marred by inefficient practices and poor
industrial safety. Explosions in Guadalajara and in the gas processing plant of Cactus
underscored a broad problem with the management.
While the downstream was traditionally a preferred government instrument to
implement industrial policy, starting in the mid-1980s the policy utilization of the
companies had decreased. Rather than actively providing energy at low prices, the
government instead sought to stabilize the real price of gasoline and natural gas. This
more limited-albeit still present-industrial policy continued through the 2000s.
Starting in the late 1990s, the business efficiency of Pemex-Gas improved, while
Pemex-Refming fell behind. This chapter attributes the difference in performance to the
introduction of market competition in some segments of the natural gas market in Mexico
in 1995. In hindsight, the entry of rival firms would be very limited; however, at the time
of the reform, Pemex-Gas managers used the threat of competition to implement changes
throughout the company. A new market-oriented mentality was developed and relations
with customers improved. Additionally, the reform made evident the need to modernize
the network of pipelines in Pemex-Gas.
Presumably, the quality of the talent of the top managers at Pemex-Refining in the
late 1990s was as good as in Pemex-Gas; yet, the absence of competition did not provide
the former with leverage to compel reluctant middle managers to change their culture.
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Similarly, budgetary authorities in the Ministry of Finance were less willing to authorize
modernization investments in a Refining subsidiary that was not legally entitled to them
and could seemingly survive without them.
In 2003, the efforts to improve efficiency in Pemex-Refining were hindered with
the appointment of a politician to the subsidiary's chief executive position. Interviewees
familiar with the sociology of Pemex commented that such a move would be very
difficult in PEP, where petroleum engineers would have been to thwart the government's
ability to intervene in such a way by sidestepping the CEO. In Pemex-Refming, on the
other hand, managers lacked the collective action capacity provided by strong managerial
cohesion. As a result, optimization operations were suspended and political patronage
took priority in the company's decision-making. In Pemex-Gas, by contrast, three
different CEOs between 1995 and 2010 consolidated the new market-oriented managerial
mentality.
The present discussion of the downstream subsidiaries in Pemex concludes the
series of empirical chapters developed to show how variation in the main explanatory
variables affected the observed outcomes. The case of PMI (Chapter 4) presented the
history of a company that faced both high and low levels of competition and that
managed to develop managerial cohesion over time. The case of PEP (Chapter 5)
illustrated the behavior of a company with high managerial cohesion but that operates in
a monopolistic environment. In doing so, it detailed the ways in which a government may
exercise non-aligned intervention and how the lack of market competition exacerbates its
willingness to do so. This chapter complemented the previous two by showing the change
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that occurs in a subsidiary with low managerial cohesion that suddenly switches from a
monopoly to a context of market competition.
In all four subsidiaries, the political ideology of the government changed from a
leftist to a rightist orientation only once, in the early to mid- 1980s. The result, across
Pemex, was less emphasis on industrial policy. Yet, the two subsidiaries discussed in this
chapter had the highest level of industrial policy utilization of all three. This was not
surprising, given that they are the companies where Pemex interacts directly with
consumers, that they are directly affected by the government's energy pricing policy, and
that they have the lowest levels of managerial cohesion.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
1. New Light on the Study of State-Owned Enterprises
This dissertation sheds new light on the analysis of state-owned enterprise
behavior thanks to the use of a variety of theoretical and methodological tools from three
different fields: political science, economics, and organizational sociology. The study of
public enterprises within traditional disciplinary boundaries has only rendered partial
accounts of their behavior. State-owned enterprises are often large bureaucracies
embedded in the intersection of political and economic life, and an interdisciplinary
approach is better suited to identify the primary variables at play and how they interact
with each other.
Additionally, this study employs multiple empirical techniques to examine
political, economic, and sociological variables. Unlike many economic studies, I base my
organizational accounts on several months of participant-observation inside of Pemex.
Unlike many sociological and political science accounts, I examine the technological
characteristics of the different industrial activities in order to measure variables correctly
and identify more precisely when and how government intervention matters. Finally,
unlike many social science studies based on in-depth fieldwork, this dissertation
complements the qualitative evidence with extensive econometric analysis.
The study also benefitted from the use of the sub-organizational research design, a
novel method to analyze differences among state-owned enterprises. The study of the
subsidiary companies of Pemex allowed holding many confounding variables constant
and focusing on the explanatory variables of interest that determined the divergent
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outcomes. While the external validity of the findings remains to be tested, the internal
validity is strong given the robustness of this comparative research design.
2. The Contributions of the New Framework of SOE Behavior
This dissertation makes several contributions to the study of state-owned
enterprises. First, to my knowledge, this is the first explicit attempt to explain differences
in governments' policy utilization of state-owned enterprises. Analyzing the
multidimensional policy opportunities of a government is challenging. The approach
adopted here focuses on one widely relevant type of policy-the promotion of domestic
industry-with an appeal to the political ideology of the government. While other policy
objectives-e.g., political patronage-are not explicitly explained, they are addressed
throughout the analysis.
A second major contribution, from a theoretical perspective, consists in the
conceptual clarity provided by analyzing both business efficiency and policy utilization
simultaneously. By doing so, the tradeoffs between the two are more easily understood
and the importance of political variables becomes clear. The result is the realization that
non-aligned government intervention (NAGI), an eminently political variable, serves as a
bridge between the entrepreneurial and the ministerial elements of SOEs.
Third, non-aligned government intervention is further "unpackaged" into two
elements. On the one hand, to intervene, a government must be willing to do so.
Additionally, it must be able to steer the SOE-usually a large bureaucracy within the
state apparatus-in that direction. This conceptual insight greatly simplifies the analysis,
since it clarifies the role played by the different explanatory variables. Three types of
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interventions are discussed: the appointment of politicians to top managerial positions,
regulatory policy, and fiscal and budgetary controls.
The analytical discussion is careful not to conflate all kinds of government
intervention. After all, not all government participation is deleterious to the efficiency of
a state company. To avoid that conundrum, the analytical framework focuses on those
actions that are not explicitly meant to enhance the business operations of the firm-in
other words, that are not aligned with its commercial interests.
Fourth, the dissertation reveals how explanatory variables can affect business
efficiency and policy utilization directly as well as indirectly. Market competition and
managerial cohesion, for example, improve business efficiency directly just like they
would in the case of a private company. However, they also affect the level of NAGI, and
by doing so, they have an indirect impact on both business efficiency and policy
utilization. Similarly, political ideology affects policy utilization directly-by setting the
direction of the mandate-and it has an influence on business efficiency and policy
utilization indirectly by setting an upper bound to the government's willingness to
intervene.
A fifth major contribution of this dissertation, made possible by its "inside the
firm" approach, is revealing the causal mechanisms whereby market competition and
managerial cohesion improve the performance of a public enterprise. Without a doubt,
the main driving force for business efficiency among the subsidiaries of Pemex has been
the level of competition in the market environment of the firms. In the case of PMI, for
example, the times when competition grew most severe led the company to implement
highly successful innovations in its commercial strategies. Inaction for PMI meant
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suffering large financial losses, and the managers rallied looking for solutions. Perhaps
ahead of rival companies, PMI understood that the nature of competition in international
oil marketing resided in the reliability of the service as much as in the price and quality of
the product. Customers were willing to pay a premium in exchange for a less volatile
commercial relationship. In the case of Pemex-Gas, competition allowed the managers to
implement simple reforms that greatly improved the productivity of the firm.
On the other hand, in exploration and production and in refining, the company
and the government never felt threatened by rivals seeking to undersell them in the
market or to outbid them in exploration opportunities. When a sense of urgency is
lacking, the managers lack "pressures to change" and the government does not provide
"means to change." As the rest of the world moves ahead, the Pemex subsidiaries without
market competition remained static-falling further behind the industry leaders.
Similarly, a significant finding of the present study is the realization of the strong
impact that professional careers can have in improving company performance and in
dictating its relationship with the government. The importance of team cohesion among
managers has been examined at length in the management literature, and sociology
scholars have long emphasized the role of personal identities shaping the behavior of
groups. However, these perspectives had never been analyzed in the context of a state-
owned enterprise. As it turns out, the sociology of the managers can play a crucial role to
enhance efficiency not only because of its role in facilitating communication and taking
advantage of specialization, but also because it limits the capacity of the government to
interfere in the commercial decisions of the company. The case of PEP is paradigmatic in
this regard, where managers are members of the highly specialized profession of
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petroleum engineers first and foremost. They are professionally driven rather than
ideologically driven, and they view the appointment of politicians to managerial posts as
an affront to their way of life. In consequence, they have been known to coordinate easily
among themselves to sidestep political appointments or political orders that seem to run
counter to their opinion of the best interests of the firm.
Team cohesion, however, is not fully preordained by the professional background
of the managers. Sharing the common language and life experience that a specialized
training provides facilitates the creation of bonds among workers, but there are other
cohesion-building mechanisms. The findings of this study do indicate, however, that
outsiders who arrive in a state-owned enterprise are better served if they learn the patterns
of socialization of the insiders and thus earn their trust.
Finally, the dissertation underscores the importance of the type of industrial sector
as a key variable in political economy. Too often, even in the privatization literature, the
efficiency of state-owned enterprises has been analyzed without commenting on the
characteristics of the industry at stake. It is important to acknowledge, as this study
makes clear, that the nature of market competition is different across economic sectors. In
some industries, performance feedback loops are short and financial losses brought about
by competition can be sudden and severe. In others, feedback loops are long and high
rents disguise inefficiencies-even if multiple players participate. Similarly, some
industries are more susceptible to the development of strong bonds among the managers
than others.
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3. The Different Faces of Pemex, Reconsidered
What is Pemex, if not a bureaucratic colossus of nearly 150,000 employees, mired
by corruption, fiscal and regulatory suffocation, and technical backwardness? This
dissertation shows that the conventional wisdom on the business efficiency of Pemex is
misleading. Pemex has several faces, some of which are as ugly as popular accounts
portray, but not all. Pemex-Refining best exemplifies the concept of an inefficient state-
owned enterprise, while PMI shows that some SOEs may have strikingly high levels of
performance.
Can the ugly faces of Pemex be improved? The findings presented in this study
provide reasons to be optimistic. After all, the cases of PMI and Pemex-Gas illustrate that
the corporate culture in a large state-owned enterprise is relatively fluid. The Foreign
Trade Division needed less than a decade to change from a disorganized and informal
group into a highly specialized team of analysts and traders. Similarly, Pemex-Gas was
able to raise its productivity, revamp its infrastructure, acquire a market-oriented
mentality, and modernize its relationship with clients in only a few years.
When the right drivers of change are absent, however, reform is painstakingly
slow. For decades, Pemex and government officials have been aware of the inefficiency
of Pemex-Refining, yet the problems continue. Similarly, PEP's lack of experience
handling large engineering projects or managing assets with unexpected technical
challenges has been evident for several years; yet, little evidence of improvement has
been seen.
The results of the dissertation suggest several ways in which the Mexican
government could improve the business efficiency of the different branches without the
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need to privatize any of the subsidiaries of the company. First, the different branches
stand to benefit with the introduction of market competition. Thus, the Mexican state
could retain control over policy utilization, if it considered it necessary, but the cost of
non-aligned government intervention would be clearer. Additionally, competition would
provide the managers with "pressures to change" and thus avoid the long-term problems
associated with the lethargy of a mandated monopoly environment.
However, liberalizing several segments of the value chain would entail yielding
control of national petroleum resources that the Mexican government may be legitimately
unwilling or unable to surrender. Therefore, it is crucial to understand that efficiency
benefits may arise even if the liberalization takes place in peripheral segments of the
value chain with smaller symbolic value. In this regard, the history of Pemex-Gas is
highly illustrative. The opening of the transportation of natural gas to the private sector
was politically feasible and enhanced not only the pipeline administration and
infrastructure in Pemex-Gas, but it also had positive effects in other areas.
In the case of PEP, there are two obvious areas where competition could be
introduced: the market for exploration opportunities and the market for the inputs of
Pemex-Refining and Pemex-Gas. In the first instance, the threat of losing promising
blocks onshore or offshore in Mexico would pressure Pemex to train and retain top
geologists and thus accelerate the discovery of new reserves. In the second case, PEP
would face additional competitive pressures if the downstream industrial plants had the
choice to purchase their feedstock elsewhere in order to optimize their operations. While
the first option may be more direct, it may not be in the best interest of the government to
324 Pemex-Refining and Pemex-Gas are not allowed to purchase crude feedstocks from other suppliers,
even if these could be acquired at a lower price to optimize operations.
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hand over control over subsoil rights. In consequence, the second policy may be a great
opportunity to introduce some kind of competitive pressures into PEP without entering
into a nationalistic quagmire.
In Refining, a necessary first step for reform would be the liberalization of
consumer prices. Market signals cannot be transmitted smoothly in the presence of a
government-run price board. Once prices followed supply and demand conditions,
competition could be introduced at the retail level. If private investors could open
franchises to sell non-Pemex gasoline, the relationship between Pemex-Refining and
some of its clients would change.
Competition at the refinery level, however, poses additional challenges. After all,
even if rival firms were allowed to build and operate refineries, there is no guarantee that
they would find it economical to do so. However, it is again possible that the mere threat
of entry by competitors can introduce some of the "pressures to change" discussed
throughout this dissertation.
The general strategy for policy reform should be clear at this point. Each branch
of the company can be subject to small changes in areas that are less politically salient
and thus less likely to elicit major disagreements or resistance. Yet, these minor
alterations can trigger significant changes in the corporate culture and even provide
modernizing managers better tools to overcome regulatory constraints or non-aligned
political intervention. A well coordinated campaign of small, yet widespread changes
throughout the company may be more effective and more feasible than an ambitious
program requiring constitutional amendments that would distract the managers with
political calculations and which may never even materialize.
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4. A Research Agenda for State-Owned Enterprises in the Oil Industry
If the analytical framework advanced in this dissertation reflects the differences in
behavior within Pemex in a conceptually clear fashion, what can it contribute to the
understanding of other state-owned enterprises? A natural starting point to answer this
question is to examine the international oil industry and the different segments of its
value chain. A preliminary glance at other companies in Latin America suggests that the
framework presented in this dissertation may help explain variation in outcomes beyond
the Mexican case.
One avenue to extend the present study is by examining the case of Venezuela
and analyzing differences among the subsidiaries of its national oil company, PDVSA.
Corporate governance in Venezuela is similar to Mexico's. Like Pemex, PDVSA is also
100% state-owned, and it is also divided into subsidiary companies.m Moreover, there is
reason to believe that these subsidiaries show variation in their level of business
efficiency. For example, a comparison can be made between the operations of PDVSA-
Refining in Venezuela, under monopolistic conditions, and those of Citgo, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of PDVSA that operates in the competitive market of the United States.
Preliminary research has shown that Citgo has displayed high levels of efficiency since it
was acquired by the Venezuelan government in the 1980s, in large part due to the
competitive pressures of its environment (L6pez Mendoza and Nanda 1999a, 1999b;
Francisco Flores-Macias 2009). Inside of Venezuela, on the other hand, PDVSA has not
developed the ability to optimize operations. 326
325 Author's interview with Ram6n Espinasa, former chief economist of PDVSA, 19 May 2009.326 Author's interview with Luis Pacheco, former deputy director for planning of PDVSA, 1 July 2009.
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The recent history of PDVSA also supports the claim that political ideology is a
major factor to explain the industrial policy utilization of the company, and illustrates the
role that a high level of managerial cohesion can play to decrease the government's
ability to intervene in its internal operations. After the leftist Hugo Chi'vez was elected
president of Venezuela in December of 1998, he sought to steer the company towards the
implementation of industrial promotion and regional development programs (Mares and
Altamirano 2007). The career managers of PDVSA, known for having a high degree of
esprit-de-corps (Matsuda 1997), resisted and hindered the execution of the president's
plans for several years. The clash between Chaivez and the company executives reached a
critical point in late 2002, when a large number of middle- and upper-level managers
went on strike to protest the level of government intervention (Lander 2004).
Another path for future research consists in analyzing differences in the behavior
of the subsidiary companies of Brazil's state-owned Petr6leo Brasileiro (Petrobras). In
Brazil, a reform in 1997 liberalized the oil industry, thus providing a good case to
compare longitudinal differences in performance. Additionally, expert accounts suggest
that the degree of market competition in the different segments of the value chain has
been mixed. In the case of refining, the liberalization did not encourage the entry of rival
companies, presumably because they did not believe they could compete with Petrobras
under fair terms. 327 In the case of exploration and production, the regulatory agency
forced Petrobras to divest many of the blocks offshore that it had set aside for future
exploration. This process led to the implementation of a major initiative within the
327 Author's interviews with members of the Brazilian National Petroleum Agency, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
May 2010.
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exploration division of Petrobras to determine, in a short amount of time, which areas had
the greatest potential and let go of the rest.328
Preliminary interviews with Petrobras' employees suggest that the managers of its
exploration and production subsidiary also have a stronger level of cohesion than those in
other parts of the company. The socialization process is similar to PEP's, as bonds among
the geologists and petroleum engineers are developed based on the common experience
of working in remote and dangerous areas early in their careers. 329 Brazilian sociologists
have already researched this process (Alveal Contreras 1993), although the impact of this
cohesion on the level of non-aligned government intervention remains to be examined.
Finally, the policy utilization of Petrobras in recent years also appears to be
explained by the changes in the political ideology of the government. Observers of the
Brazilian industry argue that the leftist government of President Luiz Inicio Lula da Silva
(2003-2010) actively sought to use the company for the promotion of local industries. 0
That approach contrasted with the low industrialist orientation of the government of
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), a more centrist politician who pursued
neoliberal economic policies while in office.3 3 1
In general, with state-owned enterprises currently reigning in the energy industry,
opportunities to extend the current research beyond the confines of Pemex should be
forthcoming. To the extent that governments continue to own industrial companies, a
sharper and more extensive knowledge of the drivers of business efficiency and policy
328 Author's interview with Lincoln Guardados, manager for exploration in Petrobras at the time of the
liberalization of 1997, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 29 May 2010.329 Author's interview with Lincoln Guardados, manager for exploration in Petrobras at the time of the
liberalization of 1997, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 29 May 2010.
330 Author's interview with a Brazilian oil industry observer (Int.Exp.#2), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, May 2010.331 Author's interview with Rafael Schechtman, former manager in Brazil's National Petroleum Agency, 19
May 2010.
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utilization will permit a better understanding of comparative political economy and
should provide concrete policy recommendations for reform-minded politicians and
managers. Other Latin American state-owned oil companies, such as PDVSA and
Petrobras, provide a natural first step for comparative analysis. Eventually, the research
can be pursued in other regions of the world and in other industries, and the "external
validity" of the findings of this dissertation can be confirmed or disproved.
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APPENDIX A
TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF OIL MARKET COMMERCIAL POLICIES
Introduction
This appendix provides the technical discussion of the econometric results
included in Chapter 4. Time series analysis is conducted in order to test empirically the
qualitative claims made by the oil industry experts interviewed for the study. A large
dataset from 1983 to 2009 was collected to quantify the impact of the most important
commercial policies adopted by PMI. The results generally have coefficients with the
expected signs based on the experts' assessments, and in some cases they are statistically
significant at the 5% level. Additionally, this discussion shows that some of the policies
had a considerably stronger impact than others.
The effect of four commercial policies is tested. Three of these were devised by
PMI and one was not. The introduction of formula pricing, the acquisition of a 50%
equity stake-and subsequent deep conversion upgrade-in the refinery of Deer Park,
Texas, and the supply contracts signed with refining companies in the United States
(which led to additional investments in deep conversion capacity) were included in the
econometric model. Additionally, the impact of the use of netback pricing by Saudi
Arabia from 1985 to 1987 in order to regain its market share is also tested. There are two
dependent variables of interest: volume of exports and price. Industry practitioners often
referred to the joint objectives of maximizing these two quantities-a proposition
analogous to maximizing revenues.
The statistical methodology, Vector-Autoregression-Intervention-Analysis
(VARIA), follows from the univariate approach by Box and Tiao (1975) and that was
generalized to the multivariate setting by Abraham (1980). Enders and Sandler (1993)
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subsequently introduced the methodology to the political science literature. Granger and
Newbold (1986) and Enders (2004) provide textbook discussions of the methodology.
A distinction is made in the analysis between the immediate and the cumulative
impacts of the commercial policies. The former refers to the effect in the month when the
policy was introduced; the latter, as the name implies, shows the impact over time. The
distinction is important as some policies may have a strong short-term effect that
dwindles rapidly, while others may be moderate in any given month but sustained and
statistically significant over time.
Controlling for confounding factors, formula pricing has had the strongest
positive impact on both prices and the level of exports of Mexican crude. The investment
in the Deer Park refinery had a positive and statistically significant immediate impact on
the level of exports, but its immediate impact on prices is small and undistinguishable
from zero (in fact, in some models its sign is negative and in others it is positive). The
long-term supply contracts with refineries in the United States, by contrast, significantly
increased the price of Mexican crude, but their impact on exports volume was
insignificant. Finally, as expected, the use of netback pricing by Saudi Arabia had a
negative sign in all models, but it never achieved statistical significance-a result that
may be due to the small number of observations.
Methodology: A Vector Autoregression - Intervention Analysis
A VAR framework is appropriate for time series where the dependent variables
are jointly endogenous (Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989). This is often the case when
supply and demand series interact over time to determine price levels. In the global
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petroleum market, it is intuitive that price is dependent on both supply and demand, that
supply is dependent on both demand and prices, and similarly for demand. Estimation in
a VAR is conducted by regressing each endogenous variable on lagged values of itself
and all other endogenous variables in the model for a specified number of lags.
The essence of the VARIA approach is to include dummy variables in the vector
autoregression (VAR) in order to indicate the presence of a policy at a particular point in
time and estimate its effect on the dependent variables. Heuristically, intervention
analysis can be understood as testing for a statistically significant change in the mean of
each series. The simplest mathematical representation of a VARIA approach has two
endogenous variables, one lag, and one policy intervention:
Y1,t = a1,O + Y11P1,t + #11y1,t-1 + fl12Y2,t-1 + E1,t (1)
Y2,t = a2,0 + Y21P1,t + #21Y1,t-1 + fl22Y2,t-1 + E2,t (2)
where p, is an indicator variable equal to one if the policy is in effect at time t. The direct
impact of the policy on the dependent variables is simply given by the coefficient y1 and
721. If the right-hand-side of all equations is symmetric, then ordinary least-squares is an
efficient estimator. If equations are not symmetric, whereby some coefficients are a
priori restricted to equal zero, then seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation is
efficient (Enders 2005). Moreover, statistical inference after a VAR requires that all
dependent variables be covariance stationary-that is, that the mean and variance are
finite and independent of time. In practice, this means that if an augmented Dickey-Fuller
test fails to reject the null of a unit-root process, the series should be differenced.
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The structure of the VAR model that underlies the VARIA in this chapter follows
from Kilian (2009), who proposes a model with three jointly endogenous variables: (i)
global crude oil supply, (ii) real global economic activity as a measure of aggregate
demand, and (iii) the real price of oil. Shen (2009) also estimates Kilian's model, which
includes 24 monthly lags in order to capture both short- and long-term relationships
among the series. As in the classical regression model, the effect of overparameterization
of a VAR model is a loss of efficiency in the estimates. Misspecification due to
underparameterization, on the other hand, is more problematic, as it leads to biased
coefficients. This result follows from the fact that estimation is conducted by ordinary
least-squares (OLS). In matrix form, the underlying VAR used by Kilian is:
Boyt = a + ?41 Bi yt-i + Et, (3)
where Bo and B, are matrices of coefficients and a is a vector of constant terms. Kilian
also uses a Cholesky decomposition to identify the impact of the structural shocks in each
of the endogenous variables.
The models used in this chapter have three major differences from Kilian's
"workhorse" model. First, the addition of the intervention dummy variables modifies
equation (3) as follows:
Boyt = a + Fpt + E34, Bi ye-i + Et, (4)
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where p is a vector of dummy variables and Fis a matrix of coefficients. Second, the
variable measuring the price of oil is different, since the emphasis is on the results of
Mexican commercial practices. Thus, the price of Maya is used in two different ways-
described below. Third, some of the models have an additional endogenous variable:
exports of Mexican oil. This achieves two objectives. It allows gauging the impact of the
commercial policies on the level of Mexican exports. More importantly, it belongs in the
model on a priori theoretical grounds: given that heavy, sour crudes constitute a
submarket of the global oil market, it is sensible to believe that shifts in the level of
exports have an impact on the price of Maya, holding other variables constant. In some
instances, monthly dummy variables are included to control for seasonal effects.
Description of variables and data
Monthly data for the period 1983ml through 2009m12 (324 observations) were
collected. Table A l describes the operationalization of the variables.
[TABLE Al]
Crude oil supply (SUPPLY) is the natural logarithm of the total world production of
crude oil, published in the Petroleum Marketing Monthly issues of the Energy
Information Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy. This is the same
source used by Kilian (2009). The series has a unit root, so the series is differenced. In
addition to removing the unit root, differencing the log of a series has the advantage that
it approximately equals the percentage change from period to period. The total exports of
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Maya are extracted from this series prior to any transformations to avoid a spurious
correlation between those two variables.
The demand variable is operationalized using the natural logarithm of an index
based on representative dry cargo single-voyage freight rates (FREIGHT), which is the
measure used by Killian and is publicly available on his personal website. In his paper, he
provides a comprehensive justification for the variable. In essence, Killian argues that
"freight rates may be used as indicators of strong cumulative global demand pressures"
(p. 1056).332 The augmented Dickey-Fuller tests also suggest that the series has a unit
root; therefore, the series is differenced.
The two dependent variables of interest are the level of exports of Maya crude and
the effects of commercial policies on the price of Maya. The EXPORTS variable is
straightforward, simply accounting the number of barrels of Maya sold by Mexico per
day in international markets. Tests suggest that this variable also has a unit root process,
so the difference of the natural logarithm is used.
The price variable is measured in two ways. One method is to track changes in
the real price of Maya (MAYA), which is deflated using the U.S. consumer price index.
However, while this may allow to track the impact of these policies on the price of Maya,
it is possible that this effect becomes unidentifiable from oil-market specific changes that
332 Kilian (2009) writes: "While an index of real economic activity based on global dry cargo freight rates
offers clear advantages compared to, for example, measures of global industrial production, it is not free of
drawbacks. In particular, the presence of a ship-building and scrapping cycle may weaken the link between
real economic activity and the freight rate index. Given the procyclicality of shipbuilding, one would
expect the real freight rate index to lag increases in real economic activity (as spare capacity in shipping
cushions the impact of higher demand on freight rates) and to lead to decreases in real economic activity
(as the arrival of new ships depresses freight rates),thus accentuating upswings in real economic activity.
On the other hand, the proposed index is a direct measure of global economic activity which does not
require exchange-rate weighting, which automatically aggregates real economic activity in all countries,
and which already incorporates shifting country weights, changes in the composition of real output, and
changes in the propensity to import industrial commodities for a given unit of real output" (p. 1056).
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lead all types of crude oil to rise or decrease at the same time. In theory, assuming that
the data generating process of the price of Maya has been modeled correctly, the price of
other types of crude should be irrelevant. However, given the small number of
observations prior to the policy interventions and the potential for model
misspecification, an alternative measure, PRICE, is introduced. This variable measures the
difference between the real prices of Maya and a fairly comparable crude stream: Alaska
North Slope (ANS). This crude has the advantage that its price series is available for the
entire 1983-2009 period, that it has been relatively abundant throughout that time period,
that it is marketed in the North American market (as is Maya), and that its physical
characteristics (31.90API, 0.93% Sulfur) are closer to Maya than those of other marker
crudes such as WTI or Brent. Changes in production of ANS are not included in this
more elaborate model since this crude stream is not expected to impact the price of crude
oil, as it is sufficiently fungible with other medium, sweet crudes.
The purpose of the VARIA analysis is to estimate the effect of four policies: (1)
the introduction of formula pricing by Pemex in February of 1986 (FORMULA), (2) the use
of netback pricing by Saudi Arabia (NETBACK) between October of 1985 and November
of 1987, (3) the completion of the deep conversion upgrade in the refinery in Deer Park,
Texas in April of 1995 (DEER), and (4) the completion of the deep conversion upgrade in
Premcor's refinery in Port Arthur, Texas (ARTHUR), in , which was the first of the series
of upgrades after the supply contracts with external refineries.
310
Summary of the Models
In the models that follow, some of the coefficients of the policy interventions are
constrained to equal zero. These constraints simply mean that, based on economic theory,
those variables do not belong to the equations for certain endogenous variables.
Accordingly, SUR estimation is efficient. Furthermore, small-sample adjusted standard
errors are estimated in order to avoid an unwarranted asymptotic assumption. In effect,
this makes it more difficult to incorrectly reject the null hypothesis of no effect of a
policy intervention. 333 Table A2 presents the variables included in each of the models
estimated.
[TABLE A2]
For better exposition, and now that the models and the variables have been
described, we can re-write all the equations that are included in equation (4). For model
5, these are:
SUPPLY = a1 + X=1 B11,iF REIGHTt_i + L=1 B12 , PRICEt-i + 'L=1 B1 3J EXPORTSe + e1 (5)
FREIGHTt = a2 + t=1 B21,iSUPPLYe-i + L=1 B2 2,i PRICEt-i + L=1 B23,i EXPORTSt + E2 (6)
PRICEt = a3 + E=1 B31,iSUPPLY_ + 'L=1 B32,i FREIGHTt-i + 2L1 B33 ,i EXPORTSt +
y 31NETBACKt + y32FORMULAt + y33DEERt + Y34ARTHURt + E3 (7)
3 In the language of statistics, it reduces the probability of a Type II error.
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EXPORTSt = a4 + L=1 B 41,iSUPPLY-i + =18 4 2,1 FREIGHTt-i + L=1 B431 PRICEt +
y4 1NETBACKt + y42FORMULAt + y43DEERt + y 44ARTHURt + E (8)
where each B is a vector of coefficients and ai is a constant scalar. In order to estimate
Model 6 instead, a series of eleven monthly dummy variables are added to each equation.
Results
Table A3 presents the results of the immediate impact of each policy intervention
for each model, along with fit statistics (which are only comparable when the variables
are coded in the same way). Results vary according to different specifications, although a
general pattern is evident. Focusing on the most complete model specifications (Models 5
and 6), FORMULA, DEER, and ARTHUR all have a statistically significant impact on PRICE,
EXPORTS, or both. NETBACK, according to expectations, always has a negative impact on
PRICE and EXPORTS, although it never achieves statistical significance-presumably due
to the small number of time periods.
[TABLE A3]
According to the estimates of model 6, for example, the introduction of formula
pricing had an immediate direct impact on the success of PMI by increasing the price of
Maya, relative to Alaska North Slope, by almost two dollars and by increasing exports of
Maya by almost 11 %. The completion of the deep conversion facility in Deer Park also
had a positive immediate effect on exports, raising them by nearly 4%. Interestingly, the
completion of the upgrade in the Port Arthur refinery (along with the other projects that
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followed) appears to have had a small impact on exports. At first glance, this result is
striking, since this policy was implemented in anticipation of the large increase in
production in the Cantarell field (which substantially raised exports of Maya). However,
this period largely corresponded with an increase in global economic activity.
Accordingly, higher global demand would have absorbed the additional supply of Maya
even without the long-term supply agreements. However, these had a significant impact
in preventing the price of low-quality Maya from deteriorating severely. In fact, these
long-term agreements had an immediate impact of raising the price of Maya by half a
dollar relative to Alaska North Slope.
The dynamic impact of the each policy intervention on prices and exports is
presented in Figures Al and A2, respectively. These charts, based on the (non-
cumulative) dynamic multiplier estimates for Model 5, show the "response" of the
dependent variables to the introduction of the policies for a period of 18 months. The
gray area along the lines depicts the 67% confidence interval and the dashed lines show
the 95 % confidence intervals.
[FIGURE Al]
[FIGURE A2]
The charts reveal that policies have a more sustained impact on prices than on
experts. For the latter, effects are undistinguishable from zero, even at the 67% level,
after three months. Moreover, effects during the month when the policy is introduced
tend to be somewhat compensated during the next month. On the other hand, the
introduction of formula pricing had a sustained impact on prices that lasted for several
months.
313
Table Al. Description and Operationalization of Variables
Variable Description Operationalization
SUPPLY
World supply of crude oil minus
exports of Maya crude (thousands
of barrels per day)
World demand of crude oilDEMAND (thousands of barrels per day)
FREIGHT Global aggregate industrial activity
MAYA Real price of Maya
PRICE Difference between the real prices
of Maya and Alaska North Slope
ISTHMUS Difference between the real prices
of Isthmus and Alaska North Slope
EXPORTS Total exports of Maya (thousands
of barrels per day)
NETBACK Use of netback pricing policy bySaudi Arabia
FORMULA Use of formula pricing by PMI
DEER Operation of deep conversionfacility in Deer Park, TX refinery
Operation of deep conversion
ARTHUR facility in Clark's Port Arthur, TX
refinery
Dataset collected from the Petroleum Supply
Monthly publication of the EIA and INEGI
Dataset collected from the Petroleum Supply
Monthly publication of the EIA
Dataset used by Kilian (2009) and available
online at http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~lkilian.
Data for F.O.B. nominal price of Maya
available in the Sistema de Informacion
Economica at www.inegi.org.mx. Prices are
deflated using the U.S. consumer price index
(base = January 1983)
Data for the first purchase price of Alaska
North Slope available at www.eia.doe.gov.
Prices are deflated using the U.S. consumer
price index (base = January 1983)
Data for F.O.B. nominal price of Isthmus
available in the Sistema de Informacion
Economica at www.inegi.org.mx. Prices are
deflated using the U.S. consumer price index
(base = January 1983)
Data for exports of Maya available in the
Sistema de Informacion Economica at
www.inegi.org.mx.
Dummy variable equal to 1 between October
of 1985 and November of 1987
Dummy variable equal to 1 beginning in March
of 1986, the first full month of use of formula
pricing
Dummy variable equal to 1 beginning in May
of 1995, the date when the deep conversion
upgrade in the refinery became operational
Dummy variable equal to 1 beginning in
December of 2000, the date when the deep
conversion upgrade in the refinery became
operational
314
Table A2. Specification of VARIA Models
Endogenous Variables
D.log(SUPPLY) -- D.log(FREIGHT) -
D.log(MAYA)
D.log(SUPPLY) -> D.log(FREIGHT) 4
D.log(MAYA) 4 D.log(EXPORTS)
D.log(suPPLY) -> D.log(FREIGHT) ->
D.log(MAYA) 4 D.log(EXPORTS)
D.log(suPPLY) -> D.log(FREIGHT) -> PRICE
D.log(SUPPLY) 4 D.log(FREIGHT) - PRICE 4>
D.log(EXPORTS)
D.log(SUPPLY) 4 D.log(FREIGHT) 4 PRICE 4>
D.log(EXPORTS)
Coefficient Restrictions
No effect of policies on global
supply and demand
No effect of policies on global
supply and demand
No effect of policies on global
supply and demand, monthly
dummies
No effect of policies on global
supply and demand
No effect of policies on global
supply and demand
No effect of policies on global
supply and demand, monthly
dummies
As a check against a spurious result, the real price of ANS is used as a dependent
variable in the models instead of the spread between Maya and ANS. The a priori
expectation is that NETBACK will have a negative and significant effect on the price of
ANS, but the other variables should have no statistically significant impact. As explained
above, the price of ANS should respond to global supply and demand conditions and not
to the marketing policies of PMI that primarily affect the specialty market for heavy, sour
crude in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. Indeed, that is the case-only the NETBACK variable
has a significant effect (barely missing the 5 % level with a 1.90 t-statistic) and it is
negative. 334
334 This result refers to Model 5. If Model 6 is used, the coefficients are almost identical, but the standard
errors are slightly larger.
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Model
Model
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Table A3. Results of VARlA Analysis
Modefs
(1) (2) (3)
PRICE EXPORTS PRICE EXPORTS PRICE EXPORTS
-. 0101 -0.0434 0.0184 -0.0463 0.0185
(0.0289) (0.0296) (0.0309) 40.0293) (04315)
0.0630 0.0519 0.0380 0.0564 0.0396
(0.0386) (0-0366) (0.0381) 40.0360) (0.0387)
0.0241 0.0278 0.0152 0,0279* 0.0144
(0.0176) (0.0165) (0.0172) (0,0164) (0.0176)
-0.0122 -0.0020 -0.0185 0.0004 -0.0177
(0.0186) (0.0178) (0.0185) (0.0178) (0,0191)
0.0730
(0.0626)
289
-10-319
-7.351
289
-12-1612
-70358
289
-12.2720
-6.5884
PRICE EXPORTS PRICE EXPORTS PRICE EXPORTS
-0.2255 -0.5473 -0.0348 -0,5318 -0,0371
(0.3083) (0.3449) (040391) (0-3459) (0.0402)
1.7945'* 2.003*** 0.1034** 1.9303* 0,1068**
(OA514) (OA618) (0.0523) (0.4616) (0.0537)
-0.2559 -0,1408 0,037 * -01422 0.0369**
(0.1591) (0.1585) (0.0180) (0.1592) (0.0185)
0.430* 0.5188** 0.0071 0.5019* 0.0089
(0.2078) (0.2169) (0.0246) (0.2187) (0.0254)
09865*
(0.5428)
289
-6,1735
-3.2049
289
-7-8149
-2.6900
289
-7.9580
-2.2744
Smell-sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis,
* ZL<00* p<1),5;*** p<cO41
NETRACK
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DEER
ARTHUR
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N
AIC
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Figure Al. Impact of Policies on the Price of Maya
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APPENDIX B
REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON EXPLORATORY ACTIVITY
Introduction
This Appendix provides the technical discussion of the econometric results
discussed in Chapter 5. The objective of the statistical analysis is to assess the impact of
the threat of oil scarcity-conceptualized as an instance of fiscal jeopardy from the
perspective of the Ministry of Finance-on the willingness of the government to approve
the drilling of exploratory wells. In the case of PEP, Chapter 5 argues that the threat of oil
scarcity decreases the willingness of the government to introduce distortionary
intervention in the company, instead aligning the government objectives with the
commercial interests of the firm.335
The econometric results support this argument. The central finding is Pemex's
emphasis on exploration activities has responded to the threat of oil scarcity and not to
fluctuations in the price. This claim revises the argument of Moroney and Dieck-Assad
(2008), who analyzed a shorter dataset and concluded that the after-tax price signal was
the primary explanatory variable. In fact, the results presented here not only show that the
price of oil is not a statistically significant predictor-they also show that its point
estimate is very small.
3 For private oil companies, the size of the reserves is the most significant component of their valuation in
the market (David Johnston and Daniel Johnston 2006). As Arnott explains, "reserves reports should
provide a better reflection of the underlying value of the company than its balance sheet" (2004, p. 3).
Therefore, more than anything else, private E&P companies seek to increase the size of their oil stock in
the ground.
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The Model
The empirical model draws from Moroney and Dieck-Assad, extending both the
theory and the empirical analysis. Assume that the state-owned enterprise has a desired
long-run level of exploration intensity for year t, y,*. Moroney and Dieck-Assad specify a
model where this level of exploration is a linear function of the net (after-tax) price of oil:
y* = a + # NET PRICEt + vt (1)
This specification would be most realistic if drilling decisions were entirely made
the managers of the company. However, the nature of the relationship between the
Ministry of Finance and PEP raises some doubts. As Chapter 3 explains, throughout most
of the time under consideration (with the exception of the Diaz Serrano years), the
Ministry of Finance has controlled the amount and allocation of investments in Pemex.
Individual projects must be approved by the Ministry before funds are appropriated, as
investment decisions respond first to the needs of the country's public finances and not to
changes in market conditions. While the goals of the Ministry may occasionally coincide
with those of the managers, that is not necessarily the case.
The role played by the Ministry of Finance leads to two revisions to the
specification originally proposed by Moroney and Dieck (2008). First, the relevant price
signal for the entity in charge of decision-making, the Ministry, is not the after-tax price,
but rather the pre-tax one. Second, planning and appropriations for exploration are made
in the year prior to the observed drilling activity.
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The most important concern with their specification, however, is that it neglects
the relative abundance or scarcity of oil for the company. If this latter variable is
superfluous, the damage of including it in the equation is small: the coefficients estimated
remain unbiased, but the standard errors lose efficiency (see, for example, Greene 2007).
On the contrary, if the relative scarcity is an integral part of the model, then the price
coefficient is biased.
In consequence, the following changes are proposed. First, the pre-tax (real) price
of oil is used, since this is the relevant measure for the entity approving the projects-i.e.,
the Ministry of Finance. Second, a variable measuring the relative scarcity of oil at
different points in time is added. Third, since the planning takes place at the end of the
previous year, the explanatory variables come in with a lag of one time period (and do
not enter the equation contemporaneously with the dependent variable).336 This has the
additional advantage that, by treating the relative scarcity as predetermined (that is,
already set at time t - 1, when the planning is made), the possibility of contemporaneous
reverse causality of exploration intensity to relative scarcity of oil is eliminated. The
modified model is the following:
y* = a + fl PRICEt-1 + y SCARCITY 1 + vt (2)
Moroney and Dieck-Assad (2008) appeal to a partial adjustment model to account
for the fact that the change in the number of wells from one year to the next may not
336 A point can be raised as to whether this has been the budgeting procedure for Pemex for the entire time
period under consideration. Interviews with respondents familiar with the early relationship between Pemex
and the Ministry of Finance suggest that this is a reasonable assumption.
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reach the desired long-run level. In a partial adjustment framework, the following
equation is standard:
Yt - Yt-1 = (1 - 0)(yt* - Yt-1) + ut (3)
The factor 1 - 0 represents the fraction of the desired adjustment that is actually
accomplished. If 0 equals 0, then the adjustment to the desired long-run level takes place
in one time period. The closer that 9 is to 1, the longer it takes to reach the long-run level.
Substituting equation 3 into equation 2 renders the following:
yt - yt-1 = (1 - 6)(a + fl PRICEt-1 + y SCARCt_1 + vt - yt-1) + ut (4)
yt = a + b PRICEt-1 + g SCARCt_ 1 + yt-1 + Et (5)
Here, I make an appeal to a different causal mechanism but which results in the
same estimating equation (that is, equation 5). Rather than assuming that a long-run
desired level of exploration intensity exists, I simply allow for the possibility that
government budgets are "sticky" from year to year and, thus, if a given level of
exploratory wells is approved at a given point in time, the number for the next year will
be close to that of the previous year.337 To account for that, the estimating equation
337 This is a standard argument among schlars of the budgetary process. An OECD report on the matter
states: "If expenditures were not sticky, budgeting would not be incremental. A government could treat new
and old claims alike, and broaden its discretion to the full amount of expenditure. Stickiness has a positive
side, for it stabilizes government, gives citizens clear expectations of the services that will be available in
the future, and diminishes conflict over resources. It would be a mistake, however, to regard expenditures
as perfectly sticky" (Schick 2009, p. 436).
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includes an autoregressive term in the right-hand-side. In either case, the coefficient of
the autoregressive term estimates the level of stickiness from one year to the next. The
equation that I estimate is below. In essence, it is the same as the one used by Moroney
and Dieck-Assad but the use of the greek letters is meant to represent that no appeal is
made to a partial adjustment model:
yt = a + fl PRICEt-1 + y SCARCITYt- 1 + <p yt-1 + et (6)
Data
Annual data was collected for the period 1950-2008. Exploration intensity is
measured as the number of exploratory wells completed in a given year, obtained from
Pemex's statistical yearbooks. The price of oil posed some difficulty, given the scarcity
of publicly available information prior to the 1970s (Parra 2005). In order to keep the
time series comparable for the entire period under study, the data used is the average real
first purchase price of domestic crude oil in the United States, collected by the U.S.
338Department of Energy. While this indicator is not the actual export price of Mexican
crude, it provides a good approximation. 339
Oil scarcity is measured by the reserves-to-production ratio-a key statistic in the
oil industry that shows the company's ability to maintain levels of production. As
explained in Chapter 5, Pemex changed the methodology to measure reserves in the late
338 Parra (2005) argues that it was in the interest of the international oil companies to maintain opacity
regarding prices. It is only after the nationalizations of the 1970s that time series on international prices
become readily available. In order to maintain continuity in the time series, the average domestic first
purchase prices in the United States, in real terms, is used (available online at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/txt/ptb0518.html, accessed on 20 July 2010).
339 A robustness check was made by using the real price of Maya starting in 1979, when it first becomes
available. Results are virtually identical to the ones presented in the text.
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1990s and early 2000s (see Figure 5.1). While it is reasonable to assume that the Ministry
of Finance officials made decisions based on the updated reserves estimates given by the
new methodology, the analysis below presents results using both the old and the new
method as a check for robustness. The substantive implications of the results do not
change.
Results
Estimation is conducted by ordinary least-squares (OLS). In their Montecarlo
comparison of the use of different estimation techniques with a lagged dependent
variable, Keele and Kelly (2006) found that under conditions similar to those in the
present context, the bias of OLS coefficients is less than that of generalized least-squares
and alternative estimators even in small samples. Diagnostics tests on the regression
results showed that heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the errors is likely to be
low, further suggesting that the use of OLS is appropriate.340 As checks for robustness in
the estimation of the standard errors, both the White (1980) and the Newey-West (1987)
covariance estimators were used.341 In all instances, the results are virtually identical to
those shown below.
Table Al presents the results of five different model specifications using yearly
data from 1950 to 2008. The first three columns use variables in "levels," while the last
two employ variables in logged form. Model 1 is the specification used by Moroney and
Dieck-Assad (2008), although using a longer dataset (theirs only covers the period 1970-
340 In the presence of a lagged dependent variable, the Durbin-Watson test is likely to be biased (Green
2007); thus, the Breusch-Godfrey test is used, and the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be
re ected.
34 The Newey-West covariance was estimated with a miximum lag equal to 6.
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2000).342 Covering the new time period, it was not possible to replicate their findings.
While they had found that the net price had a significant positive effect on the number of
exploratory wells drilled, the results of this analysis showed no significant effect.
Models 2 and 3 expand on the specification by including the reserves-to-
production ratio, which is meant to measure the relative abundance of oil. Using the
measure of total reserves, for example, an increase of one year in the R/P ratio at time t-1
is associated with a -0.343 decrease in the number of wells drilled. Interestingly, the price
level is also not a significant determinant of exploratory drilling for any of these
models. 343
Models 4 and 5 are analogous to Models 2 and 3, except that the all variables are
logged. This common practice allows interpreting the coefficients as percentage changes
rather than as level changes. The results are, in essence, unchanged. In Model 4, for
example, a one percent increase in the total R/P ratio leads to a 0.28% decrease in the
number of wells. In Model 5, a one percent increase in the proven R/P ratio is associated
with an 18% decrease in exploratory wells drilled.
[TABLE Al HERE.]
As mentioned earlier, these results are robust to different estimation methods and
operationalization of variables. When the covariance matrix is estimated following the
Newey-West (1987) method, standard errors becomes slightly smaller. Similarly,
342 This specification uses the net, after-tax, estimate of the price of oil, following Moroney and Dieck-
Assad (2008).
3 In fact, the sign becomes negative, although it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of no effect.
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different methods of measuring the price of crude oil also render virtually identical
coefficients and standard errors.
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Table Al. Results from Ordinary Least-Squares Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Wells Wells Wells Log(Wells) Log(Wells)
Wells (t-1)
Net Price (t)
Net Price (t-1)
R/P (t-1), total reserves
R/P (t-1), proven reserves
Log(Price) (t-1)
Log(R/P) (t-1), total reserves
Log(R/P) (t-1), proven reserves
Log(Wells) (t-1)
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.824***
(0.0703)
0.360
(0.280)
0.773***
(0.0742)
-0.0929
(0.227)
-0.343**
(0.169)
0.797***
(0.0699)
-0.211
(0.219)
-0.253*
(0.127)
16.82** 35.92*** 31.29***
(6.907) (12.14) (10.59)
58 58 58
0.744 0.755 0.754
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0.0280
(0.0932)
-0.278**
(0.121)
-0.0656
(0.0879)
-0.184**
(0.0782)
0.845***
(0.0597)
1.520***
(0.534)
58
0.813
0.823***
(0.0635)
1.718***
(0.609)
58
0.813
APPENDIX C
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
Name Position Held Date
Aguilar, Enrique
Almazan, Manuel
Aspe, Pedro
Baker, George
Balliker, Ken
Barn6s de Castro, Francisco
Barros, Joio Carlos
Bazan, Gerardo
Boue, Juan Carlos
Braga, Carlos
Cano, Jos6 Luis
Chapela, Gustavo
De la Garza, Bernardo
De R6gules, Carlos
Dominguez, Jose
Donato, Marcos
Espinasa, Ram6n
Estrada, Ernesto
Garcia, Efr6n
Garcia, Gilberto
Mexican Petroleum Institute (IMP)
Researcher
Mexican government official
Secretary of Finance (1988-1994)
International oil industry expert
Deputy-director, PMI Houston office
Former Mexican Petroleum Institute
director-general; Commissioner,
Energy Regulatory Commission
Petroleum Manager, Petrobras
America
Advisor to Pemex CEO
Former Pemex International manager;
PDVSA advisor; Former member, Citgo
Board of Directors
Consultant, Petrobras (Corporate
Strategy)
IMP Researcher
Former Mexican Petroleum Institute
director-general
Former PMI crude oil director; Deputy-
director, Pemex-Refining
Pemex manager for environmental
protection
Pemex E&P, regional headquarters
manager
Researcher, Petrobras
Former chief economist, PDVSA
Former head of PMI in Houston;
former deputy-director, Pemex-Gas
Former director of communications,
Pemex
Advisor to Pemex CEO
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4/14/2008
4/7/2008
5/13/2009
2/11/2009
2/9/2009
7/8/2008
7/6/2009
6/11/2009
8/1/2008
5/25/2010
4/11/2008
7/15/2008
4/7/2008
7/10/2008
6/24/2008
5/27/2010
5/19/2009
8/4/2009
1/12/2010
7/4/2010
4/3/2008
4/7/2008
7/10/2008
Garcia Sainz, Ricardo
G6mez, Leopoldo
G6mez Cabrera, Jose Angel
G6mez Urquiza, Jose
Antonio
Grajales, Manuel
Guardado, Lincoln
Guzm n, Francisco
Haas, Pedro
Hern ndez, Gustavo
Hern ndez, Ismael
Herrmann, Claudio
Hinojosa, Javier
Lajous, Adrian
Lim, Arturo
Luna, Felipe
Macias Chapa, Luis
Manteca, Esteban
Mateus, Alexandre
Melgar, Lourdes
Mendoza, Jorge
Mereles, Marcelo
Mesmacher, Miguel
Mufioz Leos, Rail
Navarrete, Carlos
Olim6n, Alberto
Former Secretary of Planning and
Budget; former chair, appropriations
committee, Chamber of Deputies
IMP Researcher
UNAM Petroleum Engineering
Professor; former PEP manager
Pemex Refining top-level manager
IMP Researcher
Former manager, Petrobras E&P and
Petrobras Internacional
Mexican Oil Industry Expert
Former Pemex Gas CEO; former PMI
CEO
PEP, regional headquarters manager
Director, PMI Houston office
Manager, Petrobras Downstream
(petrochemicals)
Deputy-director, PEP
Former Pemex director-general (1994-
2000)
Former Mexican Petroleum Institute
director-general
Former deputy-director, Pemex-Gas
Former PEP manager
Former advisor to Pemex CEO
Economist, Petrobras Internacional
Former director of International
Affairs, Ministry of Energy (1998-
2002); international oil industry
consultant
IMP Researcher
Former advisor to Pemex CEO
Ministry of Finance official
Former Pemex director-general (2000-
2004)
Leader of PRD party, Mexican Senate
Former PMI manager
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7/17/2008
4/15/2008
4/16/2008
6/12/2008
4/11/2008
5/29/2010
4/11/2008
1/14/2009
6/24/2010
6/24/2008
2/9/2009
6/2/2010
6/25/2008
7/7/2008
1/12/2009
7/25/2008
6/29/2010
6/9/2008
7/16/2008
7/8/2008
5/18/2010
5/13/2009
4/15/2008
4/17/2008
2/6/2009
7/30/2008
7/28/2008
4/17/2008
Olivares, Lorenzo
Olmeta, Angel
Orozco, Moises
Pacheco, Luis
Pelayo, Elva
Perez, Ana Lilia
P6rez, Javier
Perez, Margarita
Pertusier, Rafael
Pinelli, Marcelo
Porres, Alma
Priest, Tyler
Reyes Heroles, Jes6s
Rodriguez Prats, Jose Luis
Rojas, Francisco
Romero, Juan Manuel
Ruiz, Guillermo
Salazar, Francisco
Schechtman, Rafael
Schwartz, Lawrence
Sears, Richard
Senne, Rodrigo
Sidaoui, Jose Juli n
Silva, Pedro
Suro, Vinicio
Szabo, Juan
Tellez, Luis
Former Pemex-Refining manager
Former COO, Citgo Petroleum Corp
Deputy-director, Pemex-Refining
Former Director of Planning, PDVSA
Pemex congressional liaison
IMP Researcher
Former advisor to Pemex CEO
Deputy-director, Pemex-Gas
Consultant, Petrobras
Downstream Manager, Petrobras
IMP Researcher
Director of Global Studies, C.T. Bauer
College of Business, University of
Houston; Oil industry historian
Former Pemex CEO (2006-2009);
former Minister of Energy (1995-1997)
Federal deputy, PAN; former federal
senator, PAN
Former Pemex director-general (1987-
1994); former federal comptroller; PRI
federal deputy
Former CFO of Pemex (1995-2000)
Pemex deputy-director for planning
President, Energy Regulatory
Commission; former chair, energy
committee, Chamber of Deputies
(2003-2006)
Former superintendent, National
Petroleum Agency, Brazil
International oil industry expert
Former VP for deepwater E&P, Shell
Staff, CERA Brazil office
Vicegovernor of the Bank of Mexico
Pemex E&P, regional director
Pemex E&P top-level manager
Former VP for E&P, PDVSA and former
member of the Citgo Board of
Directors
Secretary of Energy (1997-2000)
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7/18/2008
8/13/2009
4/9/2008
7/1/2009
7/1/2008
4/14/2008
7/6/2008
6/29/2010
5/18/2010
7/10/2009
4/8/2008
6/18/2009
5/2/2008
4/9/2008
7/30/2008
2/3/2010
7/25/2008
7/2/2008
5/19/2010
6/19/2009
5/14/2009
8/27/2009
5/28/2010
1/15/2010
6/25/2008
6/21/2008
7/11/2008
8/12/2009
6/26/2009
Vianna, Antonio Luiz
Zambrano, Rosendo
Zapata, Cuauhtemoc
Financial Planning Manager, Petrobras 5/17/2010(Corporate)
Former PMI director-general
IMP Researcher
6/12/2008
4/11/2008
Note: The list excludes those participants who requested anonymity as well as
informal and casual conversations with Pemex staff members.
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